"Objective" Foundation for Morals

Originally posted by JS357
Thank you for the extensive reply. It clears up my thinking. I would like to comment on your [i]"So, clearly, TO and I have very different understanding of what is intended by the term 'objective' here. According to TO, for morals to be "objective" it requires God. But why? God, in a philosophical sense, is a subject. Why would some thing's being objective req ...[text shortened]... objective reality.

I will continue to follow this thread hoping it does not reach an impasse.

I think these theists you refer to here, view God as the creator of all which is the case (all facts), including moral facts, and if they agree that God is a subject, these created facts do not depend on any created subject for their facticity. In a way, they view God's subjective reality -- the reality God chose to create -- as our objective reality

Yes, that would help explain why, and in what sense, they think their own view provides "objective" foundations for morality. However, I do not think this would not help explain why they claim that God's existence is necessary for "objective" morality. Simply that the moral facts do not depend on any created subjects for their facticity is clearly satisfied by any account that holds that there are independent objective facts that settle moral matter, facts not dependent on God or anybody else. But, again, this answer never satisfies. Now, it could be that this answer clashes with another metaphysical commitment they hold, something like that there can be no facts of any kind that do not depend on God. But this could not justify the idea that the atheist's account does not provide for "objective" foundations, if objectivity just demands that there be facts not dependent on any created subjects. To be consistent, they would have to agree that the atheist's account does provide for objectivity; but they would argue against the account's being metaphysically reasonable, according to further considerations. But, moreover, if that were the case, then why would this theist specifically target moral matters, as opposed to any matters in general? If there can be no facts independent of God, then God would be necessary for objective foundations in any matters, not just moral ones. But, typically, the theist will only specifically target moral matters. I think what you say hits on something right (that they demand that moral facts not depend on any created subjects), but does not cover all the bases. I think there must be more they require for "objective" moral foundations, as evidenced by the fact that views that entail that moral facts do not depend on what any humans think are typically not sufficient for meeting their demands for "objective" foundations.

Originally posted by black beetle
Plato would blink if he was aware of the mainstream exoteric Christian view of Justice. Because, if indeed justice is nothing but Harmony (Rep. 4, 434c) and Works (doing one’s own job, Rep. 4, 443b), and if indeed the soul has three parts (Appetitive: hungry for immoral gratification, Spirited: courageous, vigorous and with strong volition, Rational: ev ...[text shortened]... is thoroughly objective?

Methinks all views are purely mind-dependent and fully subjective😵

…they appear to believe for one that the objectivity of the Divine Justice holds by means of a collective universal subjective consensus, and for two that the transcendental subjective will of G-d becomes an undisputed universal objectivity.

I agree with the second of these. This is more or less the point that JS357 raised above, too. They make a notional error in that case, since just because something is universal does not make it objective; something that is subjective but universal is still, of course, subjective (at pain of contradicting ourselves otherwise). But, more to the point here, I do not agree that this fully encapsulates their requirements for "objective" foundations. As I mentioned to JS357, this is based on the fact that they are still very quick to reject other accounts that still provide the same measure of universality.

And also, does your moral view (and/ or anybody’s moral view) is thoroughly objective?

Methinks all views are purely mind-dependent and fully subjective

This employs some equivocation. Of course every view is "subjective" in the sense that it belongs to a subject. That's trivial and has nothing to do with whether or not some subject's moral view is, in a meta-ethical sense, subjectivist or not.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I believe that in these discussions there is some confusion as to what the word 'morality' means.
I often use it to refer to issues related to causing harm to others or preventing harm to them - and when this may be considered 'right' or 'wrong'. However, I think many people use a much broader meaning covering 'right' or 'wrong' behaviour in other contex ...[text shortened]... ion, but this does not in any way explain our motivations for acting morally in the first place.

I often use it to refer to issues related to causing harm to others or preventing harm to them - and when this may be considered 'right' or 'wrong'. However, I think many people use a much broader meaning covering 'right' or 'wrong' behaviour in other contexts.
I would say that the former meaning is inherently Objective by definition and what may be subjective is specific interpretations of it based on context.
The latter meaning is necessarily subjective as it is generally a set of norms or standards that a given individual follows based on a range of considerations.

Why do you say that the former is inherently objective by definition? Let's suppose that statements regarding causing harm and preventing harm are either true or false. For instance, the statement "One ought not intentionally bring harm on another person for no good reason." Let's agree that this is a true statement. It would still be a further question whether this is objectively or subjectively the case. For instance, person A may say that this statement is true, rather than false, because everyone he knows agrees that it is true, rather than false; whereas perhaps person B may say it is true simply because it reports a mind-independent fact. Then person A's account is subjectivist because it entails that the truth value of the claim depends on what observers think about the claim; whereas person B's account is objective because it holds that the truth value of the claim is independent of what any observers think. Correct me if I am wrong, but I think what you are saying is that it is an inherently objective matter whether or not an action causes harm or prevents harm. However, even if true, the issue of subjective vs objective in a meta-ethical sense would be a further question relating to, for example, the nature of the truth conditions regarding moral statements about causing or preventing harm.

I would have a similar question for the latter: why do you say it is necessarily subjective? I think you are saying it is subjective because the norms one puts into practice for himself or herself are based on his or her subjective decision making, etc. True, but again, if one is committed to there being true statements regarding how one ought to behave in these other contexts, then the question about whether this view is subjective or objective deals with how one views the nature of the associated truth conditions. Perhaps one thinks that what makes it true that he ought to behave in such and such a way is that it is an established custom that all his people collectively endorse. Those are subjectivist grounds, since they appeal to the prevailing attitudes of some group of persons as a truth-maker. Perhaps someone else has an objective view that holds that such statements are true or false, just depending on whether or not they report a mind-independent fact.

Originally posted by sonship
In analyzing Metaethics the meaning of moral statements, would you describe your view as following Noncognivist or Cognitivist Theory ?

If a Congnitivist do you consider that you follow a Subjectivist theory or an Objectivist theory ?

Thanks

Mine would be cognitivist => objectivist.

Based on your analysis, correct me if you think I am wrong, but I'm quite confident yours is cognitivist => subjectivist.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
God is love.

God is love.

You'll have to elaborate. But we already know that you take God to be an agent, not some complex of dispositions. So this must be a statement of predication, not one of identity.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[quote]I think these theists you refer to here, view God as the creator of all which is the case (all facts), including moral facts, and if they agree that God is a subject, these created facts do not depend on any created subject for their facticity. In a way, they view God's subjective reality -- the reality God chose to create -- as our objective reali ...[text shortened]... humans think are typically not sufficient for meeting their demands for "objective" foundations.

Whew, dense but efficient.

"I think there must be more they require for "objective" moral foundations, as evidenced by the fact that views that entail that moral facts do not depend on what any humans think are typically not sufficient for meeting their demands for "objective" foundations."

I think this will require hitting the books for what people who have dedicated their lives to such thinking, have to say. At any rate, if the theists here are our resource, the ball is in their court, first to confirm or rebut the bolded part of your statement above. Is a moral fact sufficiently objective due entirely to the fact that it does not depend on what any human (or more broadly created) being thinks?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Why do you say that the former is inherently objective by definition?

Its a little confusing here I know, but basically my definition of morality, highly simplified, (the former one) is that:
Morality is the notion that bringing harm to another person for no good reason is wrong.
This is a definition, not a claim. It is therefore neither true, nor false. It is also objective as all definitions must be - if it even makes sense to categorize definitions as objective or subjective.
Whether or not someone acts morally, or feels he should act morally, or feels other people should act morally, may be subjective. But morality itself remains objective ie when someone says 'I will not act morally and shouldn't' he means he will not seek to avoid causing harm to others, nor sees the need to do so, he cannot give the above statement and mean that he will not trim his toe nails and does not feel the need to do so.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think what you are saying is that it is an inherently objective matter whether or not an action causes harm or prevents harm. However, even if true, the issue of subjective vs objective in a meta-ethical sense would be a further question relating to, for example, the nature of the truth conditions regarding moral statements about causing or preventing harm.
I think you are correct, but I am having trouble deciphering what you said.

I would have a similar question for the latter: why do you say it is necessarily subjective?
I think you are saying it is subjective because the norms one puts into practice for himself or herself are based on his or her subjective decision making, etc.
Correct.

True, but again, if one is committed to there being true statements regarding how one ought to behave in these other contexts,
I guess that I am not committed to that. I think it is entirely subjective.

Perhaps one thinks that what makes it true that he ought to behave in such and such a way is that it is an established custom that all his people collectively endorse.
I think people have many different motivations for believing what they ought or ought not to do - but none of those motivations is universal, and there is nothing besides those motivations that makes a universal ought or ought not.

Originally posted by LemonJello

…they appear to believe for one that the objectivity of the Divine Justice holds by means of a collective universal subjective consensus, and for two that the transcendental subjective will of G-d becomes an undisputed universal objectivity.

I agree with the second of these. This is more or less the point that JS357 raised above, too. ...[text shortened]... with whether or not some subject's moral view is, in a meta-ethical sense, subjectivist or not.

We agree;


Edit: "This employs some equivocation. Of course every view is "subjective" in the sense that it belongs to a subject. That's trivial and has nothing to do with whether or not some subject's moral view is, in a meta-ethical sense, subjectivist or not."

In this discussion I keep myself out of Metaethics and all kinds of ethical formalism. Regardless of what exactly I consider true and which way I come to this conclusion, I don’t conceive “truth” in terms of a specific correspondence with an external reality that exists as is but in terms of assertability conditions, hence I regard a statement as true if specific conditions obtain that warrant my asserting this statement. So when I accept as true the statement “the fire is hot”, it is neither because there is some kind of structural correspondence between it and a fact about the fire, nor because some kind of inherently existent objectivity holds. The reason why that statement is true is clearly that I have something that justifies me in making this statement (ie based on facts about empirical observation, pragmatic success etc etc, you name it). This view means there couldn’t be truths beyond our ability to know them for there is no way to have a warrant for asserting such statements, and it follows that such statements would be regarded as lacking a truth value. This (purely subjective) way I get rid of all kinds of verification of any version of transcendentalism, but the main point is that I see nothing as an inherently existent epistemic object. Well, in this case nothing can be beyond the grasp of such instruments either, whilst by force due to the fact that an epistemic instrument is always context-depended, there is no context-independent concept of knowledge I could use in order to form the idea of a truth that exists somewhere beyond my epistemic objects. So, to me there is no such a thing as an ultimate truth enveloped by a specific theory of reality that describes how things really are independent of my interests and my cognizance. This is in my opinion the nature of all truths that are concluded as such when viewing the world by means of all of our linguistically (and mathematically, scientifically, religiously etc) formed conceptual framework, therefore any notion of the kind “this is the way things really are” is incoherent.
And yes, as regards the OP, methinks too that the specific Christian thesis is purely subjective.

If we disagree or your view is based on a different perspective, kindly please expand. If we agree, then all we have is our conventional truth that consists in agreement with commonly accepted practices and conventions; however this is not objectivity but a result of a consensus as regards fractals of our collective subjectivity
😵

Originally posted by LemonJello
Mine would be cognitivist => objectivist.

Based on your analysis, correct me if you think I am wrong, but I'm quite confident yours is cognitivist => subjectivist.

Mine would be cognitivist => objectivist.

Based on your analysis, correct me if you think I am wrong, but I'm quite confident yours is cognitivist => subjectivist.

Thankyou.

It helps me to understand some of the concepts you're espousing with some working familiarity with the vocabulary.

I'll be catching up to some of your comments soon, hopefully.

Attempting to catch up, I will start here:

I did not say that I think the idea of God's existence is bizarre. What I take to be bizarre here are (1) the idea that your particular conception of morality (and some closely related ones) is an objective one and (2) the idea that God's existence is required for there to be objective morality.

First, I really wonder how much different my view of morality on a day by day practical level differs from your own. Probably there is not much difference. I think we would both have the same basic reaction to being mugged in an alley or having someone try to convince us that we should participate in such a mugging.

On any given Tuesday afternoon, how different are we, on a day by day behavioral basis? I say, we're probably the same.

Going beyond this into a philosophy of why we think we have these characteristics, some differences arise.

You say above that the thought of God is not bizarre to you. But you fail to understand a Christian saying that there is no Platonic Euthyphro dilemma in righteousness, goodness, moral perfection issuing out of God's nature.

Your dilemma argues that either:

1.) something is morally good because God arbitrarily commands it so and has the authority to command human compliance. Ie God becomes a bare willer of good morality by fiat alone.

In this case God could become no better than a Cosmic Adolf Hitler.

2.) something is already moral quite outside of God, independent of His nature. Some reason outside of God is why things are right. And people should do good for those reasons and not because God commanded anything.

Perhaps what is bizarre to you is that this could [not] be the only possibilities with God and morality. Maybe you reason that God bestows meaning and value on life arbitrarily or because He does so because the meaning and value already exist independent of God.

In Christian theism human life has value and purpose and a sense of the moral all because humans reflect God's nature. The moral is not something outside of God but are grounded in His nature. The moral flows out of His being by the very nature of what He is.

I think it is here that for some reason you think "This is bizarre." But many Christian theists split the horns of the dilemma right by simply agreeing with the revelation of Scripture in that morality is grounded in God's nature. Some things are right because the good God, the loving and just God command them. They are not good based on something outside of God Himself but rather on what is inside His own being, His own moral attributes.

sonship:
Discrimination of right from wrong does require a mind.
Decision to do right from wrong or vica versa does require a will.
Personhood of one kind or another is involved in morality.
LJ:
All granted. But none of this even remotely implies that a mind, or a will, or personhood of one kind or another is required for the actual determination of moral status or the determination of the truth values of moral claims. I am not talking here about just the ability to discriminate between what is right or wrong in a looser sense of "determining", which as you point out does require a mind; I am talking about what, constitutively, actually makes something right or wrong.

Alternative explanations, to me, are less likely than that moral value is grounded in the nature of God and God's Mind.

Now I assume from your admission that you are evaluation of metaethics is of the theories of Cognitive ---> Objectivism. But I want to flesh out a bit more whether your Objectivist Theory leans to Naturalist or Nonnaturalist ? theory.

If you want to spell it out you can just tell me.
You don't have to, because I think I can figure it out.

And I will probably attempt to show you that though you may have explanations for where and what bestowed moral value on objective moral entities which you think exist out there quite not needing God, I think the necessariness of God's existence is a more satisfactory answer to me.

In the mean time -

If you are at school or work on a job, eventually you realize that someone is above you in some capacity. You also are above someone else in some capacity. Instead of robbing your supervisor of the responsibilities which are rightfully his, you could let him simply occupy that position which is his and you yours.

LJ:
I already do that, thanks. But, of course, my supervisors do not literally make it such that the rules of the workplace and right and worth my following.

Okay. But she's also responsible to a "higher" supervisor. It might end in the corporate statement of the company as a whole.

I am a little reluctant to pursue an analogy at anyone's gig with being morally accountable to the Creator of being and life and the universe. I won't chase this comparison too far.

Maybe I'll just say that in every human company we expect imperfection because humans themselves are imperfect. Especially since the fall of man we are sinners and imperfect. But the Head of the universe is Perfect.

But in your objection there, someone or some board higher up DOES define what you are to do on the grounds of that corporation and what is your meaning TO it.

Am I right ?

They just help enforce rules that are justified on the basis of independent objective reasons that explain why the rules conduce to our working well together.

Granted. But go up high enough and you get some kind of mission statement of that enterprise. You are just saying that someone is higher in the company structure than your supervisor.

So, my supervisors are inessential to the constitutive nature of these rules. Of course, your view entails the opposite about God (but, curiously, not about any other persons or agents).

I am not sure I follow this.

The same authority by which God holds every single atomic structure together in the entire universe, or HOWEVER, He maintains the physical laws of creation, that authority is manifested in His oversight of our moral acts.

You know that Einstein showed a kind of conversion principle between energy and matter. They were two sides of one thing really. There can be a conversion of one side to the other.

I believe that there is a creation side of the universe which has a principle of conversion (not mathematically) but in authority. The creative power and authority responsible for holding the cosmos together is another side of the moral, spiritual, ethical power and authority which governs our human living.

Both attributes flow out of God's nature. He's the source of being and the source of life.

sonship: How about we just let God be God ?

LJ:
Sure, sounds good. But the question remains: why is God required for there to be "objective" morals? His existence is required for "objective" morals…why exactly?

That is the question I still am examining in your terms using some of your own jargon. And I need more time.

But above I want to correct something. It is not simply that we let God be God (which you say sounds good). The New Testament is not only let God be God but let God be man too.

The nature of our human being is that we are vessels - containers - living ones.

Or put another way, let man be GOD IN man. That is a union, a mingling, a incorporation of the Divine Life with the created life in a harmonious and blended way.

In the Bible this is what we see a conclusion to the journey of human history. In Christ you have God/Man united in a Person. And in the end of human history you have God/Man enlarged, expanded, multiplied into a "city" - a multitude which no one could number.

But I'll put this aside, maybe for latter. Before you reply let me catch up to one more of your posts.

You're losing me, man. Not just with this statement but with the vast majority of the rest of your posts here. Just please answer the question I posed above: why is God required for there to be "objective" morals? His existence is required for "objective" morals…why exactly?

I hear your question. Still examining your alternative answers to that.

LemmonJello:

why is God required for there to be "objective" morals? His existence is required for "objective" morals…why exactly?

According to a Naturalist theory of Cognitive, Objectivst evalustion of metaethics what is "right" would be ie.

what is approved by most people or
what most people desire or
what is approved by an impartial, ideal observer or
what maximizes desire or interest or
what further human survival, etc.

Perhaps you would further argue that such things can be scientifically measured. The can be tied to biological or psychological or anthropological
facts. You might argue that measurements can be scientifically obtained about this things. The "rightness" can be reduced, in this view, to some natural property which can be measured.

Heart rate, impulses of the nervous system, coloration of the skin and other physical phenomenon the ethical naturalist could say put a measurement on this "rightness".

This becomes a problem to the oughtness of moral issues. We are not talking only about what is but what ought to be. If some act has the property of "rightness" to it then one ought to act in that way.

The natural properties listed above are just brute givens and carry not ought with them. They are not normative. They speak only of what one recorded as having been.

what is approved by most people or
what most people desire or
what is approved by an impartial, ideal observer or
what maximizes desire or interest or
what furthers human survival, etc.

In the first case "what most people approve of" the majority of people can be wrong. If most of the German people thought to exterminate the Jews was a good idea, according to this view the Holocaust was the "right" thing.

If something really ought not to have been done the rightness of conformity should be according to SOMEONE. In the example above it cannot be right according to the majority. Who else can it be right according to if the majority of people can be wrong ?

The objective moral rightness of a value should be so according to a moral agent. A minority is a candidate, But ultimately, I say God as an untranscendable final living one, qualifies. So that without the existence of God the Oughtness of moral act has no grounding. It is like a ballet in outer space.

Measureable facts in the human body which indicate happiness or well being may render somethings which are as reducible to scientific facts. They do not help explain the nature of moral values that define what ought to be done. Moral properties are about what ought to be done. That is what is ideal, what is normative, what is that should be acted.

The non-naturalist school of Cognitive - Objectivism in evaluating metaethics would argue differently. That school would say that moral facts and properties really exist as part of the furniture of the universe. These moral properties to them are irreducible, unanalyzable into scientific measurements as the previous ethical naturalist does.

I guess you could say I am a non-naturalistic ethicist as a Christian theist. In short I think the existence of God is less problematic as the ground for such moral properties then otherwise.



But an unbeliever in God could also be an Nonnaturalistic ethicist, believing that there are in existence moral properties as brute givens and furniture of the universe.

I'll stop here and speak to that latter for space's sake.

LemmonJello,

I wrote above something I suspect you will object to.

I said:

If something really ought not to have been done the rightness of conformity should be according to SOMEONE.

But why to SOMEONE ? I hear you ask.
But why not it really ought not to be done to s SOME THING ?

I think I would answer that the evaluation of moral value should be carried out by man or someone of a higher order of life than man.

It goes without question that a dog can decide for us the OUGHTNESS of many ethical acts. I had a friend leave his lunch sandwich on a bench as he was working. A dog ate the sandwich up without the slightest twinge of guilt about it. He simply had a satisfied look on his dog face as my friend fumed at his confiscated lunch.

I do not expect the dog to evaluate what ought to have been done there. Not to say that some dogs can be trained to assist people with this or that helpful behavior.

No life "below" a dog could do any better.
Why inquire to any material THING, such as a stone or pile of dust to do any better. These are all in some way on a "lower" plane of life and consciousness than human beings.

On this planet, human beings are the only other life that could tell us the oughtness of a moral act.

Of course any computer would have to be programmed by humans or by other computers so manufactured and programmed by humans. We humans are on the top plane of consciousness on earth. No brag, just fact.

I have to count out any kind of vibration, wave, force, energy as informing us of the rightness of a moral act. I believe that vibrations, waves, forces, energies are on a lower plane of consciousness than a living human being.

So it must be something who is a someone/s or Someone. This evaluator should be on an equal or higher level of consciousness than a man.

Since we are talking about universals, the universal and final Divine Person of God, I would submit is the least problematic candidate. I think this knowledge would rest best in a God who is omniscient and omnipresent.

Someone who knows ALL the facts and ALL the circumstances would be best qualified to inform on ultimate moral values.

Originally posted by sonship
LemmonJello,

I wrote above something I suspect you will object to.

I said:

If something really ought not to have been done the rightness of conformity should be according to SOMEONE.

But why to SOMEONE ? I hear you ask.
But why not it really ought not to be done to s SOME THING ?

I think I would answer that ...[text shortened]... the facts and ALL the circumstances would be best qualified to inform on ultimate moral values.

"If something really ought not to have been done the rightness of conformity should be according to SOMEONE. "

I don't mean to interrupt, but: What if that which should be, is not the case?

Originally posted by JS357
Whew, dense but efficient.

"I think there must be more they require for "objective" moral foundations, as evidenced by the fact that [b]views that entail that moral facts do not depend on what any humans think are typically not sufficient for meeting their demands for "objective" foundations."

I think this will require hitting the books for what peop ...[text shortened]... ly to the fact that it does not depend on what any human (or more broadly created) being thinks?[/b]

Yes, good, thank you. Hopefully some theist(s) here will help clarify this.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Its a little confusing here I know, but basically my definition of morality, highly simplified, (the former one) is that:
Morality is the notion that bringing harm to another person for no good reason is wrong.
This is a definition, not a claim. It is therefore neither true, nor false. It is also objective as all definitions must be - if it even makes s ...[text shortened]... ersal, and there is nothing besides those motivations that makes a universal ought or ought not.

Thanks for clarifying your position. Based on your clarifications, I would say that we would probably be talking past each other in this thread for a couple of reasons. For one, the point of contention between sonship and myself deals largely with the truth conditions of moral statements, what sort of conditions they are, etc. However, you seem to be saying that you guess you are not committed to there being any such conditions in the first place (for instance, where you say you guess you are not committed to there being true statements regarding how one ought to behave in various contexts). For two, your definition of 'morality' as you have clarified it may be much narrower than ours.