"Objective" Foundation for Morals

LemonJello,

I'm sure we probably exhibit some differences in moral behavior, but probably not radically so. It's not like I would spend the afternoon mugging and raping random persons I encounter while you would spend it churning out random acts of kindness, or vice versa. However, this would not imply that our patterns of moralistic deliberation are not substantially different in some ways. Similarity in behavior is not a guarantee for similarity in underlying deliberative patterns or motivations. It would not be hard to think of examples, for instance, where two persons perform the same act but for radically different underlying reasons or motivations.

Though different motivations or combinations of motivations occur, both persons do share something in common - the sense of shame at moral failure. Both feel moral guilt feelings at at moral failure.

Along with the question of where value and dignity were bestowed on evolving creatures, I would like to know something about the feeling of moral shame at moral failure.

If abstract moral principles are all there is to moral failure, I mean, these brute given moral truths as furniture of the universe, how is guilt associated towards them ?

It makes sense that guilt or sense of shame is directed towards other persons. I am not sure if you are postulating that sense of shame cold be directed toward this abstract moral thing out there. Guilt feelings make sense if one is in the presence of another Person. If the depth of and the presence of guilt is to be rational, there must be a Person toward whom one feels the shame or guilt.

Explain the feeling of guilt under two scenarios please:

1.) The feeling of shame or guilt when no other person is around towards whom one feels exposed.

2.) The feeling of shame or guilt which goes beyond what another person present deems is necessary.

(Here I do not speak of excessive self condemnation in a mentally imbalanced way, but legitimate sense that the other has not grasped the depth of the failure)

If a person has failed to perform what he feels OUGHT to have been performed, is this sense of shame only towards an abstract entity we call a moral principle as an item in the universe ?

When I was very young and told of a good God and His all seeing, all knowing observation of me, I remember in bed sometimes feeling a sense of shame. I would (according to a child's viewpoint) cover myself with a blanket so that God could not see me. I would try to hide from the eyes of God.

Latter in life when moving into more agnostic days, I was not sure there were any eyes of God upon me. But I could still feel shame at moral failure. Perhaps my ways of "hiding" or "concealing" failure just became more adult like. Perhaps my "covers" and "blankets" to conceal failure from the eyes of Goodness became more sophisticated, Ie. reasoning that at least I was not as bad as this other person, or doing something else good to try to balance out the scale on a whole, or just not believing God was there.

While you made some case for more adult like maturity in discarding of the belief in moral duty towards God, I think it is really just the "hiding" mechanisms to cover up our shame have just become more adult.

I think coming to confession to the Savior and Lord Jesus Christ is the New Testament's prescribed way for freedom from guilt and release from the power of moral failure. You seem convinced that simply admitting to God that there has been failure and seeking the cleansing of His redemptive act, is the "childish" reversion back to the juvenile.

I have found that there is tremendous power is agreeing with God - "Yes, I confess. in THIS matter I have failed. I agree with You God, that this act was indeed, as you say, a sinful act. Thank you for the cleansing blood of Christ which cleanses me from every sin."

The book of Revelation says that the blood of Christ has LOOSED us. That is not only brought cleansing from the stain on our character before God, but LOOSED the band of sin's power over us.

"And to Jesus Christ, the faithful Witness, the Firstborn from the dead, and the Ruler of the kings of the earth. To Him who loves us and has released [or loosed] us from our sins by His blood." (Rev. 1:5)

Can your brute given abstract moral furniture loose us from our sins ? Can these items of moral meaning release us from the sense of moral shame at failure ?

I think a Person issues forgiveness . And that forgiveness is very much needed to live and go on. "His [God's] mercies ... are fresh [or new] each morning."

Lamentations 3:22,23

Because of the Lord’s great love we are not consumed,
for his compassions never fail. They are new every morning;
great is your faithfulness.

LemonJello,

I think you have the gist correct. I do not think you have outlined here any reasonable resolution of the dilemma. Rather, I think you have just chosen the first horn of the dilemma, with the ensuing consequence that your view of morality will suffer from arbitrarity.
So I am unclear why you think what you have outlined is a satisfactory resolution for you. ...

what I write here could easily be revised slightly to reflect that you think that morals are grounded in God's essential nature, not in His commands per se: just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth, as appropriate):

I cut out the referenced thread because it is cumbersome enough to have this immediate comment before me while replying.

This gives me some pause as I try to follow this argument:

just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth, as appropriate

Uh, I'm not sure I want to do that. I think it may be walking into a trap.

First I would like to make clear a distinction between moral values and moral duties. I do believe that both exist because God exists. But to sort this out about, a distinction needs clarification.

1.) moral values - this is about what is good or bad.

2.) moral duties - this is about what is right or wrong.

At first glance one might think "What's the difference?" It is typical to just equate what is "right" with what is "good" and what is "bad" with what is "wrong."

But this equating is mistaken. Right and wrong pertain to what OUGHT to be done, or moral obligation. So I have above: " 2.) moral duties - this is about what is right or wrong. I am not obligated to do something just because it is good for me to do it. It is good to become a medical doctor. This does not imply that it is my duty, my obligation to become a medical doctor. It is good to become any number of professions, ie. firefighter, policeman, social worker, teacher, etc. But I am not obligated to become all of them, neither can I. It is not wrong for me to choose ONE of the professions.

So there is a conceptual difference between something being good or bad and something done being right or wrong. I also could be faced in some tragic circumstance in to having to choose from nothing but bad choices. Since I must choose, it is not wrong for me to choose one.

Moral values have to do with the worth.
Moral duties have to do with one's obligation.

I maintain that without God there would be no objective reality to moral values and moral duties. Without God's existence, as the greatest conceivable Being, there would be no distinction between good and evil and right and wrong.

Objective moral values means something is good or evil independently of whether any human being believes it or not.
Objective moral duties mean some acts are right or wrong independently of whether any human being believes these actions are or not.

In your complaint of arbitrariness of the theistic grounding of moral value and moral duties you said -

what I write here could easily be revised slightly to reflect that you think that morals are grounded in God's essential nature, not in His commands per se: just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth,

I will continue below, maybe tonight but maybe tomorrow.

Cont.

LJ:

I think you have the gist correct. I do not think you have outlined here any reasonable resolution of the dilemma. Rather, I think you have just chosen the first horn of the dilemma, with the ensuing consequence that your view of morality will suffer from arbitrarity.
So I am unclear why you think what you have outlined is a satisfactory resolution for you. ...

what I write here could easily be revised slightly to reflect that you think that morals are grounded in God's essential nature, not in His commands per se: just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth, as appropriate):

[My emphasis]

I said that moral value and moral duties exist objectively only because the are grounded in God's nature. But I think I should state that moral duties of His creature are because of His commands. To the two choices of the Euthyphro dilemma, you say I am forced into the first choice and have not proposed a third alternative.

Choice 1 - Something is good just because God wills it.

Choice 2 - God wills something because it is good.

You are saying that because I have said the goodness issues out of God's nature, I have chosen Choice #1. You reject that I have proposed a third alternative. If this is true then if God willed hatred, envy, lust, selfishness, robbery, THEY would be good.

This I think you condemn as arbitrariness. I agree that it would be arbitrary. I don't agree that this is the choice I am forced to take.

The alleged arbitrariness I do not accept by maintaining moral values and duties are grounded objectively in God.

The moral duties constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. For any action A and moral agent S, we can rationally analyze the moral requirement, prohibition, and permission of action A for moral agent S.

Moral agent S is required to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God commands S to do A .

Moral agent S is forbidden to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God commands S not to do A.

Moral agent S is permitted to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God does not command S NOT to do A.

Since our moral duties are grounded in God's commands, they are not independent from God. And it God does not exist then objective moral duties do not exist.

Neither are God's commands arbitrary because they are the necessary expressions of His just and loving nature. His nature is constituted with justness, kindness, impartiality, compassion and other excellencies of a "greatest conceivable Being". His commandments are reflections of His own nature.

The moral values (the good and the bad) are determined by reference to God's nature.

Moral duties (right and wrong) are determined by reference to God's will. His commands are the source of the moral agent's moral duties. This I would say in response to your attempt to channel moral duties into His nature alone:

what I write here could easily be revised slightly to reflect that you think that morals are grounded in God's essential nature, not in His commands per se: just replace God's commanding/forbidding act A with God's nature being reflective/non-reflective of act A, etc and so forth, as appropriate):

[My emphasis]

As God's commands are necessary expressions of God's nature they are not arbitrary.

The theist selects God's nature as the definitive highest moral value because by definition, to us, God is the greatest conceivable Being. God is a Person for whom a greater Person cannot be conceived. He is therefore the paradigm of goodness. His goodness is greater than any one who merely exemplifies goodness. He is the least arbitrary ultimate standard of value.

Unless we are nihilists, we have to recognize some ultimate standard of value. I think God is the least arbitrary place to stop. God is the locus of and source of moral goodness as moral value. Our moral obligations are sourced in His commands.

Originally posted by sonship
Cont.

LJ:

[quote] I think you have the gist correct. I do not think you have outlined here any reasonable resolution of the dilemma. Rather, I think you have just chosen the first horn of the dilemma, with the ensuing consequence that your view of morality will suffer from arbitrarity.
So I am unclear why you think what you have outlined is a sati ...[text shortened]... and source of moral goodness as moral value. Our moral obligations are sourced in His commands.

Thanks, sonship, for your continued engagement and study on this topic. Since my time is limited this week, I would like cut right to the heart of the matter and address the comments of yours that are directly related to the thread topic. When I have more time, I may also try to revisit and respond to your other comments and questions as well.

Here are the comments from your recent posts that I think are most relevant to the thread topic:

I would have to point out again that God, and the Mind of God is not just any mind.
…
I suppose I can go along with saying God's Mind is subjective to God. But there is no higher Mind, no Mind beyond, no Mind more powerful or more wise or knowledgeable…This is the ultimate Mind a greater than cannot exist. So this "subjectivity" is as universal and objective as it can possibly be.
…
I think God's existence is necessary for anything else to exist.
I think an Uncaused Cause is necessary for the existence of all other things besides.
…
I maintain that without God there would be no objective reality to moral values and moral duties. Without God's existence, as the greatest conceivable Being, there would be no distinction between good and evil and right and wrong.

Objective moral values means something is good or evil independently of whether any human being believes it or not.
Objective moral duties mean some acts are right or wrong independently of whether any human being believes these actions are or not.
…
The moral duties constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. For any action A and moral agent S, we can rationally analyze the moral requirement, prohibition, and permission of action A for moral agent S.

Moral agent S is required to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God commands S to do A .

Moral agent S is forbidden to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God commands S not to do A.

Moral agent S is permitted to perform action A if and only if a just and loving God does not command S NOT to do A.

Since our moral duties are grounded in God's commands, they are not independent from God. And it God does not exist then objective moral duties do not exist.

Neither are God's commands arbitrary because they are the necessary expressions of His just and loving nature. His nature is constituted with justness, kindness, impartiality, compassion and other excellencies of a "greatest conceivable Being". His commandments are reflections of His own nature.

Ok, so I would have a number of comments and objections, as discussed below. I'm trying to organize them in some fashion to make it a bit clearer.

(1) God's mind may not be "just any mind" (by the way, this is not somehow special: it holds for virtually any mind, since minds are characteristically unique), but it is still, of course, a mind. So if your view entails that things like moral properties and moral facts depend on God's mind, then it entails that such things are mind-dependent. Period. You seem to want to say that God's subjectivity is objective. No, it is subjective by definition. "Objective as it can possibly be" would be satisfied only in cases where there is total mind-independence, and yours clearly fails to satisfy this. Like I said, you can still get the universality you want; but not the objectivity.

(2) Regarding the fact that you think God's existence as the uncaused cause is necessary for the existence of everything else other than God, this would only outline a blanket metaphysical or ontological necessity for God. (And, obviously, the atheist is not remotely committed to such a thing.) It would not give any reason to think that the existence of God is logically necessary for, say, objective foundations for morals. You may as well blanketly say that the atheist's account for X's having property P is insufficient because the existence of God is necessary for the existence of X in the first place (where X and P stand in for just about anything). This objection is pure chaff.

(3) Now, regarding the rest, this is where we get to the real meat of the discussion. I think you have lifted a lot of these ideas and words from a reference such as Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview by JP Moreland and WL Craig, correct? I would have several comments and objections for you regarding this material:

(3a) First off, regarding the issue of arbitrarity, I do agree with you that this type of formulation is more resistant towards the charge of arbitrariness. As I understand it, this is in fact one of the motivations for this type of formulation. The reason why it is more resistant toward the charge of arbitrarity is straightforward. This is a restricted theological voluntarist view because here you are not claiming that all of morality or normativity is grounded in God's commands; just that things like moral duties and obligations are. In that case, it leaves you more room to provide extra-God reasons that explain the commands, which wards off arbitrarity. For instance in your formulation you can explain why God would command this as opposed to that, on the basis of reasons concerning what would be more or most loving, or more or most just. So, basically, I agree with you that this helps get around the problem of arbitrarity.

(3b) Secondly, I also agree with you that this formulation provides for "objective" moral duties and obligations, in the sense of how you have specifically defined 'objective' (in the sense of independence from human beliefs or desires).

(3c) However, notwithstanding point (3a), the higher resistance toward arbitrarity does not come free to you. It comes at the cost of God's being inessential towards a normative concept like 'justice' and towards a pro-social concept like 'love'. You cannot now claim that God is simply definitive of justice or love, for example, because then you have undermined yourself. You cannot say, for example, that your loving and just God would never, say, command rape and torture on the basis that such things are not loving and just; and then turn around and say that God is simply definitive of such things as love and justice. Your view would simply succumb again to arbitrarity. So, basically, you cannot have your cake and eat it too. You can get around the problem of arbitrarity by tying God's commands to plausible external reasons rooted in love and justice; but then God is inessential to those external constraints.

(3d) Moreover, notwithstanding point (3b), I do not at all agree that your definition of 'objective' aligns with how the term is normally used in these types of meta-ethical discussions. Again, 'objective' is supposed to refer to case of mind-independence; not merely to cases of human-mind-independence per se. Your view is only "objective" according to your idiosyncratic usage of the term. Your view, however, is not objective according to the standard usage of the term. Your view is still subjectivist because moral duties and obligations are still mind-dependent, depending constitutively on the mind of God. Of course, you can say that God would not command other than He does command because doing so would not be consistent with His being maximally loving and just, or some such (although have you read the OT lately? ). But the fact remains: if God's attitudes were different such that He did command differently, then duties and obligations would follow in tow. They are totally mind-dependent on your view.

(3e) At this point, I would like to step back and take stock of where we are. I stated way back in the opening post the following: "But, now, if this theist's motivation were just to have some account that is properly objective; well, they could just claim that moral determination and status are not tied to any persons at all, God included. But, this never seems to satisfy. So my question, then, is what is the actual motivation here? We could say, well, they do not actually require morals to be objective, properly construed; they just require that morals be independent from what any humans think. Okay. But I have thought more about this, and this cannot be all that they require here. For, again, simply saying that moral matters are settled by independent objective facts and do not depend on what anyone at all (including God) thinks get this done nicely; but yet still would not satisfy. So, what more is at issue?" Now, take a look at what you have done here. You have done precisely what I anticipated: you have defined 'objective' such that it just requires independence from what any humans think or believe. But, if there is no more at issue as I hint in my quote, then you are simply being contradictory. I asked you flat-out before if the ethical non-naturalism I described (consisting in the commitment to the existence of mind-independent moral properties and facts, which are non-reducible to natural properties and facts) sufficed for an "objective" foundation. You replied "No." But here you are, stating that "objectivity" definitionally only requires independence from what any human beings believe. Do you not understand that "mind-independent" implies independence from human minds? Or are you simply contradicting yourself? Either way, it seems the confusion here is all yours.

Now that we know exactly how you intend the term 'objective' here, I will give you one more chance to respond. I will ask you again. Suppose an atheist holds to the ethical non-naturalism I just described. Does that suffice for his or her having "objective" moral foundations? Yes or no? If you say no again, it will be at pain of everyone being able to clearly see that you are just willfully contradicting yourself. You would need to revise your position in that case, and still explain what more is at issue.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks, sonship, for your continued engagement and study on this topic. Since my time is limited this week, I would like cut right to the heart of the matter and address the comments of yours that are directly related to the thread topic. When I have more time, I may also try to revisit and respond to your other comments and questions as well.

Here a ...[text shortened]... . You would need to revise your position in that case, and still explain what more is at issue.

(1) God's mind may not be "just any mind" (by the way, this is not somehow special: it holds for virtually any mind, since minds are characteristically unique), but it is still, of course, a mind.

If this is the case, that there would be nothing special about the mind of God, then what other universe exists which is the creation out of someone's mind ? I know of no other.

So I would say that God's mind is like everyone else's mind - only more so.
Other created things do exist - the nest of a bird, the poem of a poet, the sky scrapper of an architect.
The entire universe is a ultimate unique creation out of an ultimate unique Mind and Will.

In that sense God's mind in special and unique.

Unless you postulate that no mind is responsible for the existence of the universe. This I find requires more faith to believe than theism.
Something like the structure of the DNA molecule reflects to many of us intelligent planning.

In that sense the mind of God is not just any mind.
Compare:
I intuitively know, and know that I know, that the external universe exists.
I intuitively know, and know that I know, human life has value and it is wrong to torture babies for amusement.

So if your view entails that things like moral properties and moral facts depend on God's mind, then it entails that such things are mind-dependent. Period.

I believe that absolute moral values depend upon the nature of God.
And as long as God was the Mind of God was. That is from eternity.
The existence ultimate moral values apart from an ultimate Person is counter intuitive and very puzzling.

Don't propositions and principles come from or exist in minds ?
Is the a command without a commander ?
That ultimate moral value is grounded in an Ultimate Person is less puzzling than postulating them in an impersonal universe.

It is too ad hoc to propose that absolute moral values existed in an impersonal universe as brute givens, with no regard to a Person.
However we argue about God's mind being subjective it is objective to all of us.

If as above, you respond that that would be nothing special, for, ie. every one's mind is objective to another person, I would respond similarly. God's mind is not like everyone else's, especially in His eternality, His infinite wisdom, the power to call into being space, time, mass, motion, matter, energy, life, and humanity out of His Divine Mind.

To every other created mind that is the ultimate Objective character and mind.

You seem to want to say that God's subjectivity is objective. No, it is subjective by definition. "Objective as it can possibly be" would be satisfied only in cases where there is total mind-independence, and yours clearly fails to satisfy this. Like I said, you can still get the universality you want; but not the objectivity.

Total mind -independent moral values and moral duties I think are an ad hoc concept.
It is more problematic rather than less.

One can believe that objective moral values existed as brute givens like Platonic Forms (according to one interpretation of Plato). That is these entities did not need to come from anywhere, including God. It is only a step further to believe that an eternal Person exists if eternal moral values exist. It puzzles me that one would not want to take this further simple step for it makes the existence moral values less ad hoc and less counter intuitive.

Moral values minus a Ultimate Moral Being appears to me only to be an atheistic preference that no Higher Person as God exist.
It appears to me that denying an Ultimate Person while postulating moral values as eternal Platonic forms needing to come from no one, is merely a biased preference that nothing upstage human autonomy.

In the naturalistic evolutionary theory we are only short lived, insignificant glimmers in the night, on a spec of a planet circling around rather second rate star. Why would the impersonal moral universe overlap the physical universe just at the point where human life exists ?

In the imagined march of evolution mankind should just be one of millions of other intermediate stations. It is suggested by some that all the stages from the amoebas to and including human being are only temp stages moving toward some unknown future higher life form. From amoebas to humans then no intrinsic value would be had but only a stepping stone like intermediate instrumental value. All prior forms including man are only contributing to a latter stage.

It is hard then to see why this short lived creature - human would be the point where the moral universe and the physical universe suddenly connect. To assume an unwarranted species superiority is arbitrary to the atheist.

But it is easy to see from my Christian belief why humans would be special in uniquely being attributed moral value as a kind of crown of God's creation - different in that only with man the Triune God said "Let us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness. And let them have dominion ..." .

I think the atheist want to enjoy the furniture but for some reason is not on good terms with the Father of the house.

Comment on further paragraphs has to be latter.

Originally posted by sonship

(1) God's mind may not be "just any mind" (by the way, this is not somehow special: it holds for virtually any mind, since minds are characteristically unique), but it is still, of course, a mind.

If this is the case, that there would be nothing special about the mind of God, then what other universe exists which is the creation out of so ...[text shortened]... on good terms with the Father of the house.

Comment on further paragraphs has to be latter.

The entire universe is a ultimate unique creation out of an ultimate unique Mind and Will.

In that sense God's mind in special and unique

Yes, we already know that you think God's mind is special and unique in this sense. That's not the issue. The issue regards your wanting to finagle your way out of admitting that moral facts and properties are mind-dependent on your view, on the rationale that God's mind is not "just any mind". Just because you think God's mind is special, that does not somehow mean that things that depend on that mind are not thereby mind-dependent. For the purposes of whether or not your view is objectivist or subjectivist, what does it matter that God's mind is special in some regards? It's still a mind, and hence your view is subjectivist.

Of course, your view is "objective" under your idiosyncratic usage of the term. But, I am still waiting for you to answer if the atheist's ethical non-naturalist view I outlined is likewise "objective".

I believe that absolute moral values depend upon the nature of God

I do not understand this claim. "Absolute" here means…what? And how would it tie into the subject of objectivity?

Is the a command without a commander ?

There are no commands without a commander; but there are no good reasons to think that moral facts derive from, or must derive from, commands.

However we argue about God's mind being subjective it is objective to all of us

No. If it is subjective, then it is subjective. That's just tautological. Like I already said, you can still get universality within your view. But you cannot have the objectivity.

Your argument here rests on evasion and equivocation. Besides, if you agree that God's mind is "subjective", then you are basically contradicting your earlier idiosyncratic usage. You implied earlier that "objective" just means being independent of what any humans believe. Surely, if God exists, His mind is as it is regardless of what any humans believe. So it is "objective" according to your usage. Hey, if you're going to use words idiosyncratically, at least own it and be consistent.

If as above, you respond that that would be nothing special, for, ie. every one's mind is objective to another person, I would respond similarly. God's mind is not like everyone else's, especially in His eternality, His infinite wisdom, the power to call into being space, time, mass, motion, matter, energy, life, and humanity out of His Divine Mind.

I would not claim that every one's mind is objective to another person. I think any mind is subjective by definition, period. But you raise a good point. If you're going to claim that God's subjectivity is somehow objective to everyone besides God, then I may as well claim that LemonJello's subjectivity, or sonship's subjectivity, or whoever's subjectivity, is likewise somehow objective to everyone else. Yes, very good point. And, no, your response that "God's mind is not like everyone else's" is not sufficient to successfully rebut this objection. After all, LemonJello's mind is not like everyone else's either; neither is sonship's mind....

I'll stop here and wait for you to respond to the remainder of my post. I understand now that what you mean by "objective" as it applies to your own moral foundations is just based on some idiosyncratic co-opting of the term. Whether or not you are consistent in its application to other views is less clear. So, I am more interested now in how you will respond to the remainder of my post.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Very well. "Perfect" justice was a concept I heard from jaywill. However, I still fail to see how people can rightly be held accountable for a failure to believe, when 'believing' is not a choice you can make, and I fail to see how the one-size-fits-all punishment of hell is even remotely 'just'.

Rightly held accountable for sins! You can also believe and go to Hell with
the biggest example for that one Satan, he believes it will do him no good.

The one size fits all punishment help put in place the one size grace and
mercy for all. The sin we do we give an account for, to be forgiven is to
grab the salvation God provided. Rejecting that would be like rejecting a
life raft sent out to save you from freezing water which got to you in time.

Your rejection of the life raft would cause you to die, but it would be the
freezing water that killed you.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello

The entire universe is a ultimate unique creation out of an ultimate unique Mind and Will.

In that sense God's mind in special and unique

Yes, we already know that you think God's mind is special and unique in this sense. That's not the issue. The issue regards your wanting to finagle your way out of admitting that moral facts and ...[text shortened]... s less clear. So, I am more interested now in how you will respond to the remainder of my post.

"There are no commands without a commander; but there are no good reasons to think that moral facts derive from, or must derive from, commands."

It occurs to me that this phase of the discussion is very much a rephrasing of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Is an act good because God gives it His moral approval (hence, it is subjectively good) or does God give it His moral approval it because it is good (hence, it is objectively good).

Originally posted by JS357
"There are no commands without a commander; but there are no good reasons to think that moral facts derive from, or must derive from, commands."

It occurs to me that this phase of the discussion is very much a rephrasing of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Is an act good because God gives it His moral approval (hence, it is subjectively good) or does God give it His moral approval it because it is good (hence, it is objectively good).

Yes, the Euthyphro has already reared its head a few times in this thread. Based on his recent studies, it seems sonship is putting forth a restricted voluntarist view, under which only some particular subset of related moral notions, such as obligations and duties, are grounded constitutively in God's commands. As I mentioned in a previous post, I think this may help him get around the charges of aribitrarity that attend the Euthyphro dilemma; but it may require other significant concessions on his part.

LJ:

(2) Regarding the fact that you think God's existence as the uncaused cause is necessary for the existence of everything else other than God, this would only outline a blanket metaphysical or ontological necessity for God.

The concept could be neatly cataloged and placed in the proper philosophical compartment. I know this.

I acknowledge your more familiarity with philosophical terms like "the ontological necessity of God" or as I have seen it "a necessary being."

What I will be watching out for is that you do not attempt to jury-rig definitions so as to fault me for not using words in a "standard" way when speaking in reference to God. If the words are not adequate to express my thoughts then I might be forced to borrow such words and use them in a non-standard way according to modern philosophical vocabulary.

You say in essence that I am violating the "standard" usage of "objective".
I am cautious to detect that you may so jury-rig the jargon so that "God" is impossible.

I heard it said that for every philosophy there is an equally strong opposite philosophy. Maybe some philosopher argued about the "standard" definition of "objective."

Who else outside of or above or behind God as a superior umpire of sorts so as to inform God about good and evil ? I refer to Genesis for fun:

Gen. 1:4 - "And God saw the light was good ..."
verse 10 - " ... and God saw that it was good."
verse 12 - " ... and God saw that it was good."
verse 18 - " ... and God saw that it was good."
etc. etc.
verse 31 - "And God saw everything that He had made, and indeed, is was very good."

What else or Who else existed above God or behind God or outside of God to which God had to consult about moral value ?

Are you attempting to so arrange the philosophical game field so that "God" is impossible? I hold that the ultimate moral value has to be inside the ultimate Person.

(And, obviously, the atheist is not remotely committed to such a thing.)

I realize that. And at best maybe clear lines of differences only, can be outlined by our discussion.

It would not give any reason to think that the existence of God is logically necessary for, say, objective foundations for morals.

I think you got me to write something like I thought it is "less problematic" to conceive of moral values issuing of God than eternally existing without reference to God as Platonic form like givens.

I have to add that this has nothing to do with an atheist being able to be morally good or morally responsible. The acts of one who does not believe in God can be good or even better than some theist who does believe in God who behaves with bad moral acts. So this is not the issue.

The issue is rational basis for objective moral values.
I believe that since both theist and non-theist being made in the image of God have a sense of the objective moral value and duty. But when the atheist muses on their source he ends up with relativism or subjectivity.

I am looking hard for the difference that you claim you have.
So far I see you postulate objective moral values as part of the furniture of the universe as just "brute" givens. God is not needed for this, you insist. And I am concerned that you wish to fix "standard" definitions of terms as to jury rig the court so philosophical language cannot be used to bring a maximally greatest being into the discussion.

It is possible that I am being unfair here. But I am watchful and wary that as you inform me this or that "standard definition" of a term rules out God as the final truly Objective basis of moral value.

You may as well blanketly say that the atheist's account for X's having property P is insufficient because the existence of God is necessary for the existence of X in the first place (where X and P stand in for just about anything). This objection is pure chaff.

Well when I transfer the origins problem to the entire universe, I think it is necessary that Something OUTSIDE of the universe and nature brought the universe into being. I think that is necessarily so. Out of nothing nothing comes.

So for something to come out of nothing and that something embraces all time, space, matter, mass, motion, energy, and that with spectacular precision such that life like us is possible, conceiving of God requires less faith than conceiving that it just happened for no reason.

At this point the problem of the origin of moral values and duties and the origin of the creation and mankind are interlinked. I am keeping my eye open to a disconnect proposed between them. But as of yet I think origins are origins.

Let me bring this point down into my view again.

You may as well blanketly say that the atheist's account for X's having property P is insufficient because the existence of God is necessary for the existence of X in the first place (where X and P stand in for just about anything). This objection is pure chaff.

I don't think that is what I am saying.
I don't think I am saying that because God is the source of the existence of X therefore X cannot possibly have property P.

I'll tell you what I find impossible. This is going back to the Euthyphro dilemma (which I think is a false dilemma). That is the the charge made that one horn is that if God commands that torturing babies for fun is good arbitrarily, then that action is good by fiat. It is good only because God said it was good.

I think this is like saying that God commands that there be a square circle.
As the laws of logic come from Him and certain things are impossible so
His nature just makes certain things impossible for even Himself.

Omnipotence does not mean God can do what is logically impossible like making a square circle.

And somethings are impossible to God like lying - " ... in which it is impossible for God to lie .." (Hebrews 6:18)

Ultimate moral value are objectively outside of man. They are not outside of and above or behind or over God sourced in some super reality. They are from inside of God and as eternal as God is.

Please explain where these moral values and duties originate if not from God? As of yet I cannot see how as an atheist you do not end up with a subjectivist theory about that.

I think you postulate a greatest good. I think you postulate a greatest good quite apart from God. I think you are saying there can be a greatest good in an impersonal and atheistic universe. I think you are saying this greatest good is without mind/s to conceive of it in order to be truly objective.

If this is true then would you not agree that the greatest EVIL then would be to deny this objective, mind independent greatest good ?

Would you agree that the greatest evil must be to deny the existence of the greatest good ?

Originally posted by sonship
LJ:

(2) Regarding the fact that you think God's existence as the uncaused cause is necessary for the existence of everything else other than God, this would only outline a blanket metaphysical or ontological necessity for God.

The concept could be neatly cataloged and placed in the proper philosophical compartment. I know this.

I ...[text shortened]...

Would you agree that the greatest evil must be to deny the existence of the greatest good ?

The issue is rational basis for objective moral values.
I believe that since both theist and non-theist being made in the image of God have a sense of the objective moral value and duty. But when the atheist muses on their source he ends up with relativism or subjectivity.

Right, let's stick to the issue, instead of getting bogged down with non-issues. You believe that your account of things like moral values and moral duties is "objective" in the sense that such things are as they are, independently of what any humans believe about them. You have stated that clearly enough. Now, it is simply an obvious fact that many secular ethical theories entail exactly this: that moral entities are as they are independently of any human mental attitudes. For example, the fact that it follows from the ethical non-naturalism I described earlier is obvious, since the fact that moral facts and properties are mind-independent on such a view naturally entails that they are independent of any human minds. So I will ask you one more time: does such a view, held by an atheist, suffice for "objective" moral foundations? Yes or no?

But I am watchful and wary that as you inform me this or that "standard definition" of a term rules out God as the final truly Objective basis of moral value

You have bigger problems than just the fact that the standard usage of 'objective' in meta-ethical discussions rules out a mind, like God, as the objective basis of virtually anything. The fact is, there is simply no reason to think that God is the "final truly objective basis of moral value" even when we stick faithfully to your own idiosyncratic usage of 'objective'. And there is certainly no reason to think that God is necessary for "objective" foundations, according to your own usage of the term. All you require, apparently, for "objectivity" in this sense is that moral values and moral duties be independent from human attitudes. Well, there's no reason why God is required for that, and there is no reason why God-mind-dependent facts are required for it either. The idea that there are mind-independent facts thereof gets the job done swimmingly. So, God is not necessary for, or in any way particularly indicated by, "objectivity", even according to your very own usage of the term!

That is the the charge made that one horn is that if God commands that torturing babies for fun is good arbitrarily, then that action is good by fiat. It is good only because God said it was good.

I have already explained that if you restrict your voluntarist view, such that only some subset of moral notions, like those in the obligation family, are grounded in God's commands; then it becomes much easier for you to ward off the charges of arbitrarity – for example, on the basis that God's commands are constrained by extra-God considerations of things like justice or love. But the upshot is that God becomes inessential to these further constraints.

Please explain where these moral values and duties originate if not from God? As of yet I cannot see how as an atheist you do not end up with a subjectivist theory about that.

Right, somehow you cannot see that an atheist can have an "objective" view on morality, even though I have explained clearly how some atheistic views are "objective" according to your very own usage of that term. Still sonship cannot see, just cannot see…. Oh well…you probably need to seek out an ophthalmologist then.

Originally posted by LemonJello

Right, let's stick to the issue, instead of getting bogged down with non-issues. You believe that your account of things like moral values and moral duties is "objective" in the sense that such things are as they are, independently of what any humans believe about them. You have stated that clearly enough. Now, it is simply an obvious fact that many secular ethical theories entail exactly this: that moral entities are as they are independently of any human mental attitudes. For example, the fact that it follows from the ethical non-naturalism I described earlier is obvious, since the fact that moral facts and properties are mind-independent on such a view naturally entails that they are independent of any human minds. So I will ask you one more time: does such a view, held by an atheist, suffice for "objective" moral foundations? Yes or no?

You keep asking me this in a kind of ultimatum tone.

No, I don't think the atheist has a sufficient objective foundation of morality. But I am willing to learn more.

By this, you have to realize, and I think you may, that I am not saying an atheist cannot act morally good. Are we clear about that ? For this is often a misunderstanding in the theist / atheist debate.

Not having sufficient rational basis for objective morality is not the same thing as not being able to do goodness.

So you have asked one more time. When I see that I have to change my view on that, if I do, I'll let you know. And I might add that I have found that some theist theologians probably would not agree with me.

If you wish you could point me to some theists philosophers who would not agree with me on that.

Now way back I asked you if your viewpoint on the meaning of life could be described classically as "Immanent Purpose" ? Did I miss your answer to that ?


Yes?
No?
Don't Know?

sonship:

But I am watchful and wary that as you inform me this or that "standard definition" of a term rules out God as the final truly Objective basis of moral value

LJ:
You have bigger problems than just the fact that the standard usage of 'objective' in meta-ethical discussions rules out a mind, like God, as the objective basis of virtually anything. The fact is, there is simply no reason to think that God is the "final truly objective basis of moral value" ..."

Well, yea. I KNOW you assert as much.

even when we stick faithfully to your own idiosyncratic usage of 'objective'. And there is certainly no reason to think that God is necessary for "objective" foundations, according to your own usage of the term.

Yea. I have heard you assert this. Ie. There is simply no reason .... etc.

All you require, apparently, for "objectivity" in this sense is that moral values and moral duties be independent from human attitudes. Well, there's no reason why God is required for that, and there is no reason why God-mind-dependent facts are required for it either.

I am not sure I follow you.

Let's take God out of the picture - God does not exist.

Let's take man out of the picture - Man does not exist.

Let's take all minds, life, personhood completely out of the picture.

Now are YOU saying that objective moral values and duties exist in that totally personless, mindless universe ?

Yes?
No?
Don't know ?

The idea that there are mind-independent facts thereof gets the job done swimmingly. So, God is not necessary for, or in any way particularly indicated by, "objectivity", even according to your very own usage of the term!

Humor me if you can.
We have taken all Person or "persons" or minds of living beings from being at all. We are left with nothing but a universe void of any living PERIOD, not only in the past or now but forever.

In that lifeless universe with no Creator over it, in it, behind it, in any wise do moral values and duties exist objectively ?

sonship:
That is the the charge made that one horn is that if God commands that torturing babies for fun is good arbitrarily, then that action is good by fiat. It is good only because God said it was good.

LJ:
I have already explained that if you restrict your voluntarist view,

Define "voluntarist view" please. What do you mean that my view is a "voluntarist view" ? You keep defining my position in various ways with phrases comfortable to you.

such that only some subset of moral notions, like those in the obligation family, are grounded in God's commands; then it becomes much easier for you to ward off the charges of arbitrarity – for example, on the basis that God's commands are constrained by extra-God considerations of things like justice or love. But the upshot is that God becomes inessential to these further constraints.

This sentences is not understood by me -

for example, on the basis that God's commands are constrained by extra-God considerations of things like justice or love.

I don't understand what you are saying here.

I will withhold comment.

sonship:
Please explain where these moral values and duties originate if not from God? As of yet I cannot see how as an atheist you do not end up with a subjectivist theory about that.

[quote]
Right, somehow you cannot see that an atheist can have an "objective" view on morality, even though I have explained clearly how some atheistic views are "objective" according to your very own usage of that term. Still sonship cannot see, just cannot see…. Oh well…you probably need to seek out an ophthalmologist then.

Maybe I need a prescription tailored to the some of the fog you're producing here with terms undefined which you're fond of using.

I believe that an atheist can have a deep seated sense of obligation or what she or he ought to do. But according to the atheist position taken to the end a rational justification for why he ought to act morally evaporates into something inside himself rather than outside of himself.

He lives with objective morals. His philosophy taken consistently through cannot rationalize the objective source of these convictions.

He intuitively senses a kind of prescription is written in our hearts to do good. In the end I can only see that there is no prescriber outside of himself. If you go to the pharmacy and ask for a prescription they will ask you who made it. If you say no one did, you will get nothing.

Now, maybe I am not hitting your point. But Some call this moral prescription written on our hearts "conscience." Others call it "Natural Law." Some theists call it a "Moral Law." The US founding fathers, I think, referred to "Nature's Law." It think whatever you call it, it is some standard that has been in human beings. Laws have law givers. Legislatures have Legislators. Obligations are toward someone.

The atheist only wants to be obligated to himself or humanity in general.
This is an insufficient objective ground for morality.

You'll say perhaps "Get better glasses and read me again. An atheist can have objective grounds for moral values and duties."

Get yourself a magnifying glass then. An atheist can live that way and indeed has to, ie. objective moral truths independent of his mind exist. Rationally justifying that objective - "outside" of himself - moral truth, I don't think he can (without God).

Originally posted by sonship
[quote] Right, let's stick to the issue, instead of getting bogged down with non-issues. You believe that your account of things like moral values and moral duties is "objective" in the sense that such things are as they are, independently of what any humans believe about them. You have stated that clearly enough. Now, it is simply an obvious fact that many ...[text shortened]... tifying that objective - "outside" of himself - moral truth, I don't think he can (without God).

Let's go through this. It was you who stated the following:

Objective moral values means something is good or evil independently of whether any human being believes it or not.
Objective moral duties mean some acts are right or wrong independently of whether any human being believes these actions are or not.

Okay, so by "objective" you mean being independent from human beliefs. Now, as I have explained many times to you, there are many secular ethical theories that entail that moral values and moral duties are independent of human beliefs in just this sense. A specific example, already raised, is of the atheist who happens to be a proponent of ethical non-naturalism and who holds that there are mind-independent moral properties and facts, explaining values and duties etc, that are non-reducible to natural properties and facts. Now, it is simply a direct and immediate result that this person's view counts as "objective" according to your very own definition. However, you keep claiming that this view does not suffice for objectivity. This is you contradicting yourself.

Let's just take this a step further and really try to understand your stance here. One of your contentions is that, based on your studies of Moreland, you yourself should be considered a non-naturalist ethicist:

I guess you could say I am a non-naturalistic ethicist as a Christian theist.

And of course, you think your own view is "objective". It follows from all this that you think ethical non-naturalism suffices for an objective view. Oh…but only when it is held by a theist, not when it is held by an atheist. Perhaps you just do not understand ethical non-naturalism, but it has nothing in itself to do with God: it is simply a thesis that holds, generally, that there are objective moral properties and facts, not reducible to natural properties and facts. This view could be held by a theist; but just as well by an atheist.

So, what's the point here? There are two main observations, directly relevant to why I started this thread:

(1) It seems clear you'll continue to deny that atheistic moral views count as "objective", despite the fact that it is painfully obvious that many of these views count as "objective" according to your very own definition of the term.

(2) While under the impression that moral view X (ethical non-naturalism) is held by a theist, you claim it is "objective"; whereas while under the impression that the same moral view X is held by an atheist, you claim it does not count as "objective" but is rather "subjective". Nothing could justify this sort of intellectual disingenuity, hypocrisy, and discrimination. This is nothing more than your co-opting the term 'objective' for your own service, while projecting the term 'subjective' onto the atheist's view. It is clear that you do this based not on any consistency and respect for the meaning of the words involved but simply for rhetorical effect, wanting the positive connotation of the term 'objective' on your side while shoving the negative connotation of a pejorative like 'subjective' on the other side. What a sham.

By this, you have to realize, and I think you may, that I am not saying an atheist cannot act morally good. Are we clear about that ?

Yes, we are and have been clear about that.

Now way back I asked you if your viewpoint on the meaning of life could be described classically as "Immanent Purpose" ?

No.

Let's take all minds, life, personhood completely out of the picture.

Now are YOU saying that objective moral values and duties exist in that totally personless, mindless universe ?

For the last time, no. I have already explained in detail (probably some here and some in the other current thread) that both of our views are "subjective" in this sense: they both will hold that moral values, duties, properties, etc do not exist if there are no minds. That's irrelevant to the question of whether or not our views are "objective" in a meta-ethical sense. This further sense has to do with the nature of truth conditions for moral claims and statements.

Define "voluntarist view" please. What do you mean that my view is a "voluntarist view" ? You keep defining my position in various ways with phrases comfortable to you.

I am sorry if you are not familiar with the accepted terminology, but the view you have espoused is a form of restricted theological voluntarism. Please check out this site for background:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/

But according to the atheist position taken to the end a rational justification for why he ought to act morally evaporates into something inside himself rather than outside of himself

You have no justification for such a statement. Please humor me and present an argument that actually shows this.

The atheist only wants to be obligated to himself or humanity in general

Yeah and you theists just want an invisible sky fairy to give you eschatological rewards, stroke your throbbing egos, and pacify your selfish fears. It sucks when someone willfully distorts and trivializes your position, does it not?

Originally posted by KellyJay
Rightly held accountable for sins! You can also believe and go to Hell with
the biggest example for that one Satan, he believes it will do him no good.

The one size fits all punishment help put in place the one size grace and
mercy for all. The sin we do we give an account for, to be forgiven is to
grab the salvation God provided. Rejecting that would ...[text shortened]... he life raft would cause you to die, but it would be the
freezing water that killed you.
Kelly

I've heard that metaphor before. Unfortunately, you go to hell for unbelief, and you do not decide what you believe; the metaphor's not apt.

Originally posted by KingOnPoint
Pudgenik,
The amount of "our" love is not how Christ saves anyone. Chris Himself is the Savior while we put faith in Him. Our abilities to have enough love or faith is not the issue. Christ is the focus of how we are saved.

Christ sacrificed Himself and took the punishment of God for our sins so that we can be saved in Him. We cannot deserve eter ...[text shortened]... ved?

And they said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house.

You are wrong in your conclusion. Our love does matter. All of the scripture pionts to it.

It is God's grace that gives us faith. Then in faith we seek Jesus, who is our salvation. But we have to recieve Jesus into our heart, or all that He did was for nothing.

And when we recieve Jesus into our heart; Jesus is God and God is love. It is God's love that draws us to Him. But He wants us to love Him in return. And how do we show this love. Love in itself is an action. We show this love by who we are.

If all you can do is sit on the rooftop and shout to the world, I know jesus is my Lord and Savior, yet do nothing more. Then you have nothing. Paul states, faith without love is like a gong clanging in the wind.

You state, "Christ makes people joint heirs of God, not love". My question to you is, what do you think love is?