C.S. Lewis, The Case for Christianity

@suzianne said
No mocking going on here. Nope. Nuh-uh.

Just wholesale slandering and propagandizing.

Do you yourself ever do any wholesale slandering and propagandizing about people's spiritual and political beliefs?

@suzianne said
Because, of course, this forum is so much better.
No mocking going on here. Nope. Nuh-uh.
Just wholesale slandering and propagandizing.
Nothing to see here though, just move along, isn't that right?

“Wholesale slandering” LOL.

"Bespoke slandering at affordable prices"

“Glib vacuousness - with or without anchovies”

@dj2becker said
When you say that CS Lewis is making a bad argument, do you believe that to be absolutely true or is it merely an expression of your subjective opinions?

For propositional truth I try to keep it simple: a proposition is true just in case it picks out a fact. That means truth is an objective relational property of propositions (those that have correspondence relation to fact). So on my view, truth is objective by definition, since its satisfaction has no dependence on any observer attitudes. Sure, it is my subjective opinion that Lewis's argument is unsound, but that opinion happens to be objectively true irrespective of my holding it (not that "objectively" really adds anything there -- it is doublespeak on my view).

We have been over this before, but YOUR view is the one that bizarrely perverts truth into a subjective and arbitrary property. For some strange reason, you think that in order to make truth "objective" you need to anchor it constitutively to God's mind. That's a very strange take indeed, since objectivity is literally supposed to be about mind-independence. It's like you got the memo that tying objective truth to human minds makes no sense but missed the addendum that tying it to God's mind is equally nonsensical. God's mind is still a mind, and so your view is thoroughly subjective. On your view, truth is not about a relation between propositions and facts, or any sensible variant thereof. Rather, it is about whatever happens to align with God's subjectivity, absent any external constraints. So, quite literally, truth on your view is both subjective and arbitrary.

Since I know it is hard for you to follow stuff, I'll summarize succinctly:

Truth on LemonJello's view: objective; non-arbitrary.

Truth on dj2becker's view (aka Fetchmyjunk and whatever other handles you have): subjective; arbitrary.

@lemonjello said
For propositional truth I try to keep it simple: a proposition is true just in case it picks out a fact. That means truth is an objective relational property of propositions (those that have correspondence relation to fact). So on my view, truth is objective by definition, since its satisfaction has no dependence on any observer attitudes. Sure, it is my subjective opin ...[text shortened]... th on dj2becker's view (aka Fetchmyjunk and whatever other handles you have): subjective; arbitrary.

Forgive me for this, but I can't find the post you're responding to due to spammers making about 8 posts in a row which messes up these threads. I'm assuming the CS Lewis argument in the OP is the one under discussion. His argument is at the least problematic.

However, that's not why I'm commenting, I'm bothered by your definition of truth: that a proposition corresponds with a fact strikes me as a circular definition since a fact is, essentially, a proposition which is true. So we're still left with the problem of what makes the proposition true. The difficulty with a correspondence theory is that waffling about "states of affairs" is another way of saying "a proposition which is true".

@djbecker seems to be relying on a coherence theory of truth, which of itself isn't dreadful, but raises a question: Why should one theory of the world have presidence over another? If the statement in the OP is believable to a theist it ought to be believable to an atheist, otherwise our theory of truth lacks universality - which does seem to be the problem with coherence theories of truth.

So, as a universal theory of truth clearly we ought to simply go with what it says in Wikipedia. Admittedly what's true depends on editing wars and might change from day to day, but we can cope, as Orwellian nightmares go it could be a lot worse.

Nice to hear from you again.

@deepthought said
Forgive me for this, but I can't find the post you're responding to due to spammers making about 8 posts in a row which messes up these threads.

If you encounter spamming or spammers, I suggest you report it to the moderators. Most people here want to have debates and discussions without there being spam that disrupts threads.

@DeepThought

Forgive me for this, but I can't find the post you're responding to due to spammers making about 8 posts in a row which messes up these threads. I'm assuming the CS Lewis argument in the OP is the one under discussion. His argument is at the least problematic.

No, sorry for the confusion. The Lewis argument in question was his trilemma argument sometimes referred to as the "Lunatic, Liar, or Lord" argument. I posted somewhere in this thread that it is a famously bad argument, and this is what dj2becker was responding to. We had already diverged from the OP by then.

However, that's not why I'm commenting, I'm bothered by your definition of truth: that a proposition corresponds with a fact strikes me as a circular definition since a fact is, essentially, a proposition which is true. So we're still left with the problem of what makes the proposition true. The difficulty with a correspondence theory is that waffling about "states of affairs" is another way of saying "a proposition which is true".

No. Under correspondence theory, a fact (or state of affairs, etc) is not a proposition. They are not in the same category. One is truth-apt and the other is not. Under such a theory, there is a category of truth-bearer: this is the category of that which is truth-apt, such as propositions, sentences, what have you. And then there is a separate category of truth-maker: this is the category that contains the actual articles or portions of reality that complete the correspondence relation and make the truth-bearer true. This category contains the facts or states of affairs, what have you, and these are not truth-apt. I know in normal parlance, it is common to say this or that fact is true, or some such. But under a correspondence theory such as mine, that is strictly nonsense. Facts are not true; facts just are. But they are what make the truth-bearers true. So, there is no real substance to this concern.

@djbecker seems to be relying on a coherence theory of truth, which of itself isn't dreadful

Based on my past exchanges with him, I would not classify his view as coherentist.

It's nice to hear from you too!

@lemonjello said
For propositional truth I try to keep it simple: a proposition is true just in case it picks out a fact. That means truth is an objective relational property of propositions (those that have correspondence relation to fact). So on my view, truth is objective by definition, since its satisfaction has no dependence on any observer attitudes. Sure, it is my subjective opin ...[text shortened]... th on dj2becker's view (aka Fetchmyjunk and whatever other handles you have): subjective; arbitrary.

I take it you therefore have an objective standard of morality by which you can judge whether or not something is morally right or wrong? Or do you only believe in objective truth when it suits your personal preference?

@lemonjello said
@DeepThought

Forgive me for this, but I can't find the post you're responding to due to spammers making about 8 posts in a row which messes up these threads. I'm assuming the CS Lewis argument in the OP is the one under discussion. His argument is at the least problematic.

No, sorry for the confusion. The Lewis argument in question was his trilemma a ...[text shortened]... xchanges with him, I would not classify his view as coherentist.

It's nice to hear from you too!

Happily Wikipedia has a page on the trilemma [1], it does seem to rely rather heavily on the literal truth of the gospels. It also strikes me as something between an argument to consequences and a strawman, either Christ is an aspect of God or he's evil or he's mad. Since we don't want to think he's evil and the story precludes insanity he must be divine. The problem with the argument is that Christ never actually claims to be divine, at least in Mark, and the possibilities are neither exhausted by the trilemma as stated since archetypal hero and historical figure whose life story as related by third parties is embellished with events such as the miracles, nor mutually exclusive.

I'm still worried by your definition of fact. The distinction you're making is like the difference between theory and experiment in physics. But the results of an experiment aren't the actual events that occurred but a collection of propositions. I saw a smooth snake while walking one day and have a picture of it on my phone. My last sentence is a proposition which happens to be true, as this is a true story. So although the event happened any attempt at relating it must involve a proposition. We need to make ontological claims about the existence of the past for there to be a truth giver here. So while I see what you're saying my concern has now shifted to an explosion of ontological baggage.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis's_trilemma

@dj2becker said
I take it you therefore have an objective standard of morality by which you can judge whether or not something is morally right or wrong? Or do you only believe in objective truth when it suits your personal preference?

No, a fact is just something that happened. A moral claim is an attitude towards a fact, which is a relationship between an agent and the fact. It involves the mindstate of the agent and the fact. So it can hardly be objective. You might make a claim to universality, so pretty much everyone thinks that murder is bad, but that an attitude is universally held does not make it objective.

@deepthought said
No, a fact is just something that happened. A moral claim is an attitude towards a fact, which is a relationship between an agent and the fact. It involves the mindstate of the agent and the fact. So it can hardly be objective. You might make a claim to universality, so pretty much everyone thinks that murder is bad, but that an attitude is universally held does not make it objective.

Thanks for this. It's like a small, tasty worth-every-penny cup of Kopi Luwak.