Originally posted by vistesdSeems like a red herring to me. Just because someone believes something is possible, doesn't necessarily mean that they believe it to be true. The possibility may sway one's actions, but this doesn't necessarily constitute "belief". A person who has absolutely no knowledge of the NFL may lay a bet down on Cleveland to win the Super Bowl while in Vegas. When asked if he believes they'll win, he says, "I don't know." Perhaps you'd take the bet as an implicit indication of his believing that they'd win, but I'd believe him when he said that he didn't know.
G or ~G. If one honestly says the answer is unknowable, one is still going to live as if either G or ~G.
To use rwingett’s phrases: if one finds the arguments both for and against G to be insufficient, relative to one another, to make an explicit intellectual decision, one might honestly say, “I don’t know.” Explicitly th ble. That is, by how I live my life, I am either assenting to the proposition G, or I am not.
The definitions of "belief" below seem to denote a pretty high level of certainty, which is how I think of it.
be·lief [ bi lf ] (plural be·liefs)
noun
Definition:
1. acceptance of truth of something: acceptance by the mind that something is true or real, often underpinned by an emotional or spiritual sense of certainty
2. trust: confidence that somebody or something is good or will be effective
3. something that somebody believes in: a statement, principle, or doctrine that a person or group accepts as true
4. opinion: an opinion, especially a firm and considered one
5. religious faith: faith in God or in a religion's gods
Originally posted by scottishinnzYou really make this more difficult than it is. Try re-reading the definition.
Now you are coming back to belief again!
Belief and factual knowledge are TWO DIFFERENT THINGS!
[edit; the definition talked of factual knowledge, not belief.]
Generally speaking you have the ideas of both down pretty good. As in all belief systems, there are different levels and strengths of someone's faith. It has been my experience with dealing with both that there is desire to be sure of the answer tothe question, Is there a God?" I also believe that down in their hearts where no one is allowed to go, they want God to exist. Part of the problem is that we Christians have done a lousy job in presenting that info in a way that is reasonable and understandable.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOnePoint well taken. But a bet made with no idea of probabilities for winning (even if it is a long shot) cannot be a bet based on any belief—it seems to me to be an irrational bet, unless he did it for the pragmatic reason of the good feelings (thrill?) that betting gives him. And if I ask him why he bet, and he says, "I don't know"--I conclude that he just isn't self-aware, he isn't paying attention to his mental state.
Seems like a red herring to me. Just because someone believes something is possible, doesn't necessarily mean that they believe it to be true. The possibility may sway one's actions, but this doesn't necessarily constitute "belief". A person who has absolutely no knowledge of the NFL may lay a bet down on Cleveland to win the Super Bowl while in Vegas. Wh nsidered one
5. religious faith: faith in God or in a religion's gods
[/b]
Returning to theism, the agnostic is essentially saying that there is not sufficient information to form adequate probabilites of their being G or ~G. Nevertheless, he must “bet”—in terms of how he lives his life. He really has no choice to refrain, as he does in the football example. He will either live his life as if G, or—which I think is more likely—as if ~G (unless he buys into the terms of Pascal’s Wager).
Implicit belief was perhaps sloppy language on my part. Nevertheless, I would suggest that if the agnostic we’re talking about decides to live his life as if ~G (or vice versa), then I wonder if subconsciosly he hasn’t concluded that ~G really is more likely than G—and if pressed, would have to say something like, “I don’t know, but _______.” Unless his lifestyle is simply for, say, aesthetic reasons.
Another twist here, however, is that conventional forms of Christianity stress belief. For example, if one does not actually have an opinion on whether or not Jesus was the Christ, etc., I’m not sure that acting “as if” counts.
In any event, I return to my original point: even if the “Sextian” agnostic/skeptic is able to suspend intellectual belief and disbelief, she nonetheless will live either as if G, or as if ~G. In doing so, she will have assented de facto to one or the other.
Basically, I was just trying to articulate a scenario in which an agnosticism which is not simply laziness could be a valid intellectual position. It seems to me that such a scenario is pretty limited: one must actually conclude that the arguments for both sides cancel out in terms of weight.
Originally posted by twhiteheadI have used the beasty in the fridge to argue that, after one has opened the door to look enough times, absence of evidence can be taken as evidence of absence--enough to form a justified belief that there is no such beasty there.
Does anyone here 'believe' that the invisible pink unicorn that hides in my fridge does not exist? You cannot prove whether it does or doesn't. If so would you categorize that as a belief or simply a lack of belief?
“Yes, but he only manifests when the door is closed!”
Okay, there seems to be a lot of disagreement about the terms and about the implications of those terms, so I'll just lay my personal view down, it is largely based on a Bayesian view of belief probability. I'll state right away, that the definitions provided in dictionaries are those of generic wordsmiths, lexicographers and linguists not of philosophers, artists or priests. As such they are generally irrespective of the personal experience of those for which the terms are an everyday item and of importance in the construction of thought processes. I will also state that whilst I used to agree with rwingett over the lack of belief, as regards atheism, I no longer do. I find it foolhardy to attempt to segregate belief in such a way, since I cannot reconcile the notion of not believing in something with my holism, and instead I have recategorised belief in terms of credence and added a further distinction of 'faith' which helps bear out the position more consistently. I'll try my hand at the Spinoza way, just for fun.
Definitions:
Belief - The weight of credence for a claim that A, based upon evidence for A being such. To say one has a belief in something is to assert that the credence for that thing is more than 50% in favour of A over ¬A. In other words if I believe it is such, I think it is more probable than not that it occurs and back that by appeal to evidence.
Faith - A position which asserts a claim that A, without supporting evidence, thus nullifying the need for credence. Such a claim is unassailable by probability.
Atheism - A generalistic position regarding god's lack of existence, be it supported in terms of belief state, ontology or logical reasoning etc.
Theism - A generalistic position regarding the existence of god, it can be supported on the same terms as atheism, though is most often done so through faith.
Agnosticism - I define agnosticism in two ways: 1) The claim that we cannot know god. This is a positive claim which rests on the notion of not having the sensory apparatus or the cognitive functions to come to know anything about god. 2) The claim that we don't know what it is that god is, so we cannot make a decision. In other words the evidence has us split 50-50 in terms of probability.
Demonstratum
Strong Atheism - An affirmative belief in the non-existence of god. I have come up against two types: 1) That of positive belief in the non-existence of god, characterised by a claim that god does not exist and presumably based upon some supporting evidence. This claim is subject to the same burden of proof that a belief in god would carry. 2) A claim that god does not exist as an affirmation of the state of the world being such that god could not exist and be consistent in it. I believe this form is held by bbarr (apologies if I have misconstrued).
Weak Atheism - The passive view of god's non-existence. It says that since there is no evidence to support god's existence we should put no credence in such a claim. Until evidence comes to light which adds credence, an implicit state of denial regarding god should be held. A weak atheist should, upon presentation of evidence to prove god's existence, move to theism with no complaint.
Bleak Atheism - The passive acceptance of the non-existence of god based on the belief that we live in such a bleak world, how could it be that god exists?
Bleet Atheism - The herd instinct to deny god's existence based upon peer pressure, popular culture etc.
Meek Atheism – Characterised by “I don’t think god exists, but I don’t want to talk about it”.
Strong Theism - The belief that god exists, positively asserted and held without regard to evidence and generally by appeal to faith (as definted above) or self-evidency of some sort.
Weak Theist - The belief that god exists based upon evidence, the credence in god's existence is such that it is more probable that he exist than not.
Bleak, Bleet and Meek Theisms are prone to the opposite forces of their counterparts in the atheistic sense and are of little importance here.
Strong agnosticism - This is the silliest of all, to positively assert that we cannot know god or claim that there is an exact 50-50 spilt on credence for or against is either on the grounds of laziness, or triviality. If you're a strong agnostic, then accepting an explicit position of indecision instead of an implicit position of denial is just poor epistemology. Face it, you're an atheist in an apathetic mood.
Weak agnosticism - This is just plain pointless. If one is to remain in a position where we are so unconcerned with whether or not god exists, or whether or not god can be known, so as to fail to pursue the question, then one doesn't even need to have a category, one should just leave the debating table and go do something less boring instead.
Discussion
So we should, in light of a depth of definitions, dismiss all attempts to generalise atheism and or theism when applying claims to them. People who try and claim that 'atheists this' or 'theists that', unless concerning the generic terms which apply to all subdivisions, should be forced to restate their claim or withdraw it. This is my general argument with most theists here (I'm sure atheists do it to, just my personal experience), who often attempt to degrade all theists into logical inconsistency, by grouping them into the same position and then applying specific claims to generalistic definitions.
Agnosticism is the path of pointlessness. Either you accept that you cannot know god and are atheist by implication, or you make a bloody decision on how the evidence lays and choose to be theist or atheist.
It is important to say one more thing about belief in terms of credence. We all have beliefs, it is the case that if we hold thought processes to be consistent with an idea we have a belief in that idea. To make any claim and deny belief is the basis thereof is, to my mind, contrary and misdirective. However, it is not the theist's right to claim beliefs are the realm of the fanciful, in an attempt to undermine atheism. Beliefs can be grounded on evidence and supported logically, consistently and positively and as such (if correctly built) lend no power to the theist in undermining atheism.
Penultimately; a statement of my own intension. I am a weak atheist, a Bayesian weak atheist if you want. I believe (yes believe) that because of a lack of evidence to support the explicit notion of god's existence, my implicit position is one in which god does not exist. I believe unicorns do not exist because I have no evidence to support the belief that they do. It is a base state that has yet to be changed, when my credence in god rises above 50% I will accept the belief that god does exist, until then I do not believe in god's existence. Lastly I have no time for agnostics, they need to work their heads out or just leave the discussion.
Originally posted by vistesdI did say he was invisible. I also never specified how big (or small he was). Also since he clearly doesn't fit the usual definition of 'unicorn' I haven't really given you any information about what to look for at all. I might have meant a neutrino.
I have used the beasty in the fridge to argue that, after one has opened the door to look enough times, absence of evidence can be taken as evidence of absence--enough to form a justified belief that there is no such beasty there.
“Yes, but he only manifests when the door is closed!”
My point is that anyone who says 'You must possess infinite knowledge to prove that there is no God, so you must be theist or agnostic' is assuming that the word 'God' can mean anything whereas what I am saying is that as long as it does not affect me and remains undetectable to me then I don't really care whether it exists or not but will assume for the sake of simplicity that it doesn't. In fact I will base my definition of the word 'exist' on such a stance and thus claim that it doesn't exist.
However almost anyone who calls himself theist claims that what they call 'God' does have a detectable influence in the universe. I take agnostic to mean 'there might be a being with properties similar to those suggested by theists'.
Originally posted by StarrmanI do not accept that recognizing a 51% probability in something equals a belief in it. If I draw a diamond from a standard deck of cards, there is subsequently a 51% chance that the next card I draw will be black. Do I therefore 'believe' that the next card drawn will be black? No, I don't. To do so would be absurd. And that is with a standard deck of cards, which is a known quantity. If we have a postulated deck about which there is an unknown number of suits and an unknown number of cards, no probability assessment can be made at all.
Okay, there seems to be a lot of disagreement about the terms and about the implications of those terms, so I'll just lay my personal view down, it is largely based on a Bayesian view of belief probability. I'll state right away, that the definitions provided in dictionaries are those of generic wordsmiths, lexicographers and linguists not of philosophers, ...[text shortened]... gnostics, they need to work their heads out or just leave the discussion.
Originally posted by rwingettI should have talked more about degrees of belief. Whilst you cannot know what card you will draw next, the likelyhood is in favour of a black card. The amount of belief you invest in that corresponds to the weight of that probability. The strength of your belief grows according to the weight of the evidence. So you might not strongly believe that the next card will be black, but you can most certainly say that you have a belief that it is more likely to be black.
I do not accept that recognizing a 51% probability in something equals a belief in it. If I draw a diamond from a standard deck of cards, there is subsequently a 51% chance that the next card I draw will be black. Do I therefore 'believe' that the next card drawn will be black? No, I don't. To do so would be absurd. And that is with a standard deck of cards ...[text shortened]... number of suits and an unknown number of cards, no probability assessment can be made at all.
Certainly we will feel uneasy about investing strong belief in claims which rest close to the balance. I am not by any means attempting to put numbers on what percentage might accompany what strength of belief. In fact this is part of my point concerning agnostics, I think resting on the fence is untenable, you are never likely to have a 50-50 split, nor perhaps even close to one (ignoring how the importance of the subject might affect the strength of the evidence). I am merely noting that the strength of my belief corresponds to what I percieve to be the weight of evidence.
I am using probability in a very broad way, I have no desire to reduce it to numbers, I believe in a more organic and relativist approach to credence, which I see was not very well born out in my first post.
Originally posted by vistesdWhy can't one conclude that neither side has enough weight for one to draw a conclusion? You're placing an artificial constraint on the choices that are available that has no basis in reality. Whether or not action is taken is immaterial. "I don't know enough to draw a conclusion" is a valid position.
Point well taken. But a bet made with no idea of probabilities for winning (even if it is a long shot) cannot be a bet based on any belief—it seems to me to be an irrational bet, unless he did it for the pragmatic reason of the good feelings (thrill?) that betting gives him. And if I ask him why he bet, and he says, "I don't know"--I conclude t ...[text shortened]... one must actually conclude that the arguments for both sides cancel out in terms of weight.
Originally posted by StarrmanI agree that I believe that the next card from my previous example is more likely to be black. You could say that I very strongly believe that its probability is 51%. But what does in mean to say that I have a 100% belief that its probability is 51%? Does that mean I 'believe' the next card will be black? Again, no, it doesn't.
I should have talked more about degrees of belief. Whilst you cannot know what card you will draw next, the likelyhood is in favour of a black card. The amount of belief you invest in that corresponds to the weight of that probability. The strength of your belief grows according to the weight of the evidence. So you might not strongly believe that the n ...[text shortened]... ic and relativist approach to credence, which I see was not very well born out in my first post.
And again, I wish to stress that you can only make that type of probability assessment with a knowable quantity, such as a standard deck of cards. Or perhaps with a semi-knowable quantity. But with an inherently and completely unknowable quantity, such as a god, you cannot even begin to assign a probability to it. Such attempts are necessarily thwarted by the very incoherence of the object you are attempting to quantify.
Originally posted by rwingettWould the pack of cards analogy be better if we said that we have no idea how many black cards there are or how many read cards there are.
I agree that I believe that the next card from my previous example is more likely to be black. You could say that I very strongly believe that its probability is 51%. But what does in mean to say that I have a 100% belief that its probability is 51%? Does that mean I 'believe' the next card will be black? Again, no, it doesn't.
And again, I wish to stre ...[text shortened]... re necessarily thwarted by the very incoherence of the object you are attempting to quantify.
I think this is quite a good analogy. If black = G and red = Not G, you maybe can say I believe the next card will be black. However, theists tend to believe in one particular religion so surely they are saying "I believe that the next card will be the 9 of clubs".
The atheist is saying that "all the cards that have been verifiably drawn from the pack so far, have been red. So although I don't know for sure, I will provisionally put my trust in the assumption that the deck contains no black cards.
[edit] Of course I haven't stated what the two coloured cards represent. The black cards, I think represent direct evidence for a specific god - a 'supernatural' event that does not turn out to have a naturalistic cause. The red cards are then a naturalistic explanation for a phenomenon. there are a number of cards still to be drawn: abiogenesis, the Big Bang and consciousness are probably three of them though there are naturalistic theories and hypotheses for all of these.
I think at this point the analogy gets a little strained!
--- Penguin.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneYour mistake is in assuming that there are two competing claims in play, with one side claiming that there is a god, and the other claiming that there is no god. This view is false. There is only ONE claim in play - the theist's claim that there is a god. Atheism is the neutral starting ground from which that claim must be assessed. If the theist's claim is unpersuasive, then whether you say "I don't believe it" or "I don't know enough to draw a conclusion" it amounts to the same thing; you automatically default back to the neutral atheist starting ground.
Why can't one conclude that neither side has enough weight for one to draw a conclusion? You're placing an artificial constraint on the choices that are available that has no basis in reality. Whether or not action is taken is immaterial. "I don't know enough to draw a conclusion" is a valid position.
Originally posted by rwingett
You could say that I very strongly believe that its probability is 51%. But what does in mean to say that I have a 100% belief that its probability is 51%? Does that mean I 'believe' the next card will be black? Again, no, it doesn't.
That's not what I meant at all. I meant that you can have a varying strength of belief in the next card being black, which corresponds to the probability that it will come out so, not that you can have a 100% belief that it will be 51%. Your belief in the next card being black will be just a little stronger than your belief that it is red. The closer those two beliefs are, the less likely you will be to invest in the certainty of the outcome.
And again, I wish to stress that you can only make that type of probability assessment with a knowable quantity, such as a standard deck of cards. Or perhaps with a semi-knowable quantity. But with an inherently and completely unknowable quantity, such as a god, you cannot even begin to assign a probability to it. Such attempts are necessarily thwarted by the very incoherence of the object you are attempting to quantify.
If you are only looking at the evidence for god existing and weighing it against god not existing you can certainly say my belief in one is stronger than that in the other. I stress again, I am not trying to map the nature of the problem by numbers, we're talking about an intangible concept, but we can certainly say it is far more likely that based upon the evidence for and against god's existence I have a strength of belief in him doing so or not. What I'm trying to get across here is that strength of belief for or against is what we're dealing with, not denial of belief in one case and acceptance of belief in another.