A General Argument from Evil.

It all depends on definitions and most (not in math for instance, .... ahaaa .... ) most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inherently more or less vague. Reasoning based ...[text shortened]..[/b]

Yes hilarious, isn't it ?

Please look upon my reasoning with extreme scepticism and point out the flaws, if there are any, and please also address if and to which extent "The fallacy of Ambiguity" also applies to my reasoning.


Do you intend to adress this post ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe

That is the fallacy of the "False Analogy".

No, it is not. This is an analogy. Analogies are neither true nor false. They are either accurate or innaccurate. If you think that the analogy is innacurate, provide an argument to that effect. You claimed, without support, that one could not define 'omniscient' without being omniscient. There is no reason to believe that this claim of yours is correct.

We can define any number of things without being the things that are defined. I can define 'bachelor' without being a bachelor. I can define 'chair' without being a chair. I can define 'Christian' without being a Christian, and so on, and so on, and so on.

Further, even if the definition of 'omniscient' is incomplete, it doesn't matter. Whatever the definition of 'omniscient' is, it will include as a necessary condition that an omniscient being know all true propositions. This is the only condition necessary for the argument.

So, unless you think that an entity can be omniscient and not know all true propositions, then your claims here are completely irrelevant.

Originally posted by ivanhoe

BBarr: "It is not intended as a definition of 'moral' or 'morally preferable'. The definition is completely silent on the nature of morality."

I know, that is one of its flaws. The ambiguity of words and terms remember ?


...[text shortened]...

I seem to have failed in my attempts of making this clear.

Oh my God, Ivanhoe. Please stop and listen carefully. Please. Try and follow what we have all been trying to point out for pages and pages.

The definition is silent on the nature of morality because I want the argument to apply regardless of which non-skeptical ethical theory is correct. I don't care if you are a utilitarian, or a Kantian, or a virtue theorist, or divine command theorist, or a natural law theorist, or whatever. Every ethical theory will have some concept of moral preferability, and every theory will have some account of what is good. Plug into the argument whatever account of 'morally preferable' or 'greater good' you want. It doesn't matter for the sake of the argument.

I repeat: It doesn't matter for the sake of the argument.

Once more: Any non-skeptical ethical theory you endorse is compatible with this argument. I don't care which ethical theory you endorse, and neither does the argument presuppose any ethical theory whatever.

Originally posted by bbarr
Oh my God, Ivanhoe. Please stop and listen carefully. Please. Try and follow what we have all been trying to point out for pages and pages.

[b]The definition is silent on the nature of morality because I want the argument to apply regardless of which non-skeptical ethical theory is correct. I don't care if you are a utilitarian, or a Kantian, or a ...[text shortened]... thical theory you endorse, and neither does the argument presuppose any ethical theory whatever.[/b]

BBarr: "Oh my God, Ivanhoe."

Since when do you have a God ....

All right, I understand and accept that the definition is silent about the nature of morality and that it doesn't matter for the sake of the argument.

Originally posted by ivanhoe
BBarr: "Oh my God, Ivanhoe."

Since when do you have a God ....

All right, I understand and accept that the definition is silent about the nature of morality and that it doesn't matter for the sake of the argument.

Sorry Ivanhoe but I have to do this . . .


(chuch choir): Hal-le-lu-jah!

Originally posted by bbarr
God (def.): An entity that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

...
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for any two acts, events, or states of affairs A and B, if A is morally preferable to B then G prefers that A occur or obtain rather than B, and G acts accordingly.

Now that I think about it, it seems we are obligated to conclude that God must not be
morally perfect within the context of your argument. If God were to pick what was morally ideal in
every circumstance, it would seem to me that we would be living in Paradise or Heaven or the like.

By virtue of the existance of suffering at all we can conclude that God has not selected
the ideal result in every circumstance. If we accept omnipotence and omniscience, then God
would know the best way to improve our current circumstance and have the ability to do so. But
it is clear that we are expected to undergo a trial or test and, as such, morally imperfect
experiences occur. Obviously, God is not concerned with moral perfection, otherwise these
experiences would not be extant.

This outweighs my earlier concern with E, that a seemingly negative event might have positive
ramifications in the overall 'economy of goodness' because God (being omnipotent) would be able
to effect such goodness without the existance of suffering.

If thinking this hard is a prerequisite for Enlightenment, I'm not cut out for it. 😛

Nemesio

Originally posted by ivanhoe
BBarr: "Oh my God, Ivanhoe."

Since when do you have a God ....

Since long before I started playing chess here, but that is irrelevant to the point of this thread.

Anyway, since almost everybody is now on board with the rejection of (2), and the quibbling concering definitions has come to an hopefully permanent end, I will present my defense of (2). I will present this in a few hours, after I have made it as rigorous as I can.

Originally posted by bbarr
Oh my God, Ivanhoe. Please stop and listen carefully. Please. Try and follow what we have all been trying to point out for pages and pages.

[b]The definition is silent on the nature of morality because I want the argument to apply regardless of which non-skeptical ethical theory is correct. I don't care if you are a utilitarian, or a Kantian, or a ...[text shortened]... thical theory you endorse, and neither does the argument presuppose any ethical theory whatever.[/b]

Sorry if this has been raised before - but doesn't premise 2 pre-suppose that "unnecessary suffering" is evil?

Originally posted by Nemesio
I think that Bennett is leaving it undefined for the expressed purpose
of allowing anyone to insert their definition of 'morally perfect' without
having to debate the merits of whether or not that definition is, in fact,
representative of 'moral perfection.'

For example, say Bennett gave this proposition:

[i]Given: God is a good basketball playe ...[text shortened]... the proof without providing
a reason; in other words, s/he gave a meaningless post.

Nemesio

Nemesio sorry for my late reaction.

I was trying to trigger an argument about the definitions.

Like stated by Coletti with a undefined term your argument has no weigth.

Sice the above very well succeeded I disagree with you in stating my post was meaningless. If you still think so please feel free to message me about it. I'm always open for discussion. But I think posting on this forum would lead very quickly to an off-topic discusion.

To give answers to your questions no I was not disputing the fact that "God" is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect (as defined in the first post). But I am not stating it either. I am only having trouble with humans stating definitions for "morally perfect" & "God" as 100% the truth. In fact you may describe it, but please state it as your view on it or your belief and don't start to try to win an argument. If anyone would really know the EXACT meaning of the word "God" or "morally perfect" then by my vision,.... that would mean he or she is God itself.

For your knowledge I am a "he" and I am not a 100% Christian, I'm just not saying they are wrong either.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Sorry if this has been raised before - but doesn't premise 2 pre-suppose that "unnecessary suffering" is evil?

No, it does not. Premise (2) merely claims that there has occurred at least one event E such that a) E brought about suffering, and b) the suffering E brought about was not logically necessary for the maximization of the good. The term 'good' herein, and the term 'greater good' in (2) presuppose the truth of no ethical theory whatever (although it does presuppose that moral skepticism is false, but no theist will be a moral skeptic, so that is immaterial in this context).

Originally posted by Siebren
Nemesio sorry for my late reaction.

I was trying to trigger an argument about the definitions.

Like stated by Coletti with a undefined term your argument has no weigth.

Sice the above very well succeeded I disagree with you in stating my post was meaningless. If you still think so please feel free to message me about it. I'm always open for discus ...[text shortened]... wledge I am a "he" and I am not a 100% Christian, I'm just not saying they are wrong either.

Either the definitions are accurate or they are not. If so, then they stand as stated. If not, then either the claims they make are false, or they need to be supplemented by further claims. If they need to be supplemented by further claims, then it doesn't matter in the context of this argument, for the argument only relies on the claims these definitions actually make. If the defintions include claims that are false, then at least one of the following is the case:

1. God cannot do some things it is logically possible for Him to do.
2. There are some true propositions God does not know.
3. God sometimes chooses that which is not morally preferable.

So, which one of these do you think is the case, 1, 2 or 3. If you think none of these is the case, then you have no relevant objection to the definitions provided.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, it does not. Premise (2) merely claims that there has occurred at least one event E such that a) E brought about suffering, and b) the suffering E brought about was not logically necessary for the maximization of the good. The term 'good' herein, and the term 'greater good' in (2) presuppose the truth of no ethical theory whatever (although it does p ...[text shortened]... pticism is false, but no theist will be a moral skeptic, so that is immaterial in this context).

Premise 5 then.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Premise 5 then.

Premise (5) does presuppose that it is morally preferable that suffering not occur, if that suffering is not logically necessary for the greater good. This means that given any two events, A and B, if A involves more suffering than B, and the suffering involved in A would bring about no more good than that which would be brought about by B, then the morally perfect being would choose B.

Do you wish to reject premise (5)? I hope not. If so, you will be committed to the claim that a morally perfect being could prefer gratuitous, unnecessary suffering.

Originally posted by bbarr
Either the definitions are accurate or they are not. If so, then they stand as stated. If not, then either the claims they make are false, or they need to be supplemented by further claims. If they need to be supplemented by further claims, then it doesn't matter in the context of this argument, for the argument only relies on the claims these definitions a ...[text shortened]... hink none of these is the case, then you have no relevant objection to the definitions provided.

bbarr

"1. God cannot do some things it is logically possible for Him to do."
If something is "logically possible" to do it can be done. If something is logically possible for me to do. I can do it. Maybe you mean "God cannot do things we think is logically possible for God to do. Then again how can WE judge this.

"2. There are some true propositions God does not know."
I don't know.

3. God sometimes chooses that which is not morally preferable.
If I may rearange this statement to. "3. God sometimes chooses that, which we do not see as morally preferable" I would choose 3.

Then again I don't know HOW God "chooses".

If you state God is choosing everything to happen, then you also state we have no free wil of our own. Which means we don't really excist but are mere poppets, controlled in everything (actions, thinking,etc) by God.

That would not be a thing I would call "morally preferable". However if God takes away control, we are free to do wat we want, but then we create things as awful as war, raping, murdering, kapitalism, hunger, etc. which I also don't describe as morally preferable. But if WE have to choose I think having our control is the most "morally preferable" to do.

In my opninion the fact of us not being perfect is the biggest problem here.

Originally posted by bbarr
Premise (5) does presuppose that it is morally preferable that suffering not occur, [b]if that suffering is not logically necessary for the greater good. This means that given any two events, A and B, if A involves more suffering than B, and the suffering involved in A would bring about no more good than that which would be brought about by B, then the mo ...[text shortened]... mitted to the claim that a morally perfect being could prefer gratuitous, unnecessary suffering.[/b]

I'm not rejecting Premise (5) - merely observing that your argument will not work with any non-skeptical morality.