31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ivanhoeYes, this definition of 'moral perfection' is consistent with choosing the lesser evil (if the lesser evil is morally preferable than the greater evil, which seems clear).
Bbarr: "Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for any two acts, events, or states of affairs A and B, if A is morally preferable to B then G prefers that A occur or obtain rather than B, and G acts accordingly."
Does this definition of being morally perfect entails the possibility of choosing the lesser evil ? The way your definition is formulated, my answer would be "yes".
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ColettiLogical subjects and predicates, whatever those are (and I can't imagine what you might think they mean, given your lack of proficiency with rudimentary concepts of reason), do not a proposition make.
Define something without using a logical subject and a logical predicate. Oh, and don't us the word 'is' or some form thereof.
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ColettiI never claimed that. Are you summarizing an argument from some other website? Did you even read the argument I provided? It takes the form of a dilemma with five possible resolutions, corresponding to the rejection of any of the first 5 premises. Rejecting any one of these premises resolves the contradiction.
And since God did not choose to do something you have not defined, then there is no God??
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ColettiWhat Bennett is doing, for the sake of not getting waylaid on a side-
What is morally preferred?? Oh, I know! - that which someone morally perfect would choose.
track discussion (too late!), is granting whatever definition anyone
wants to define 'morally perfect' for the purposes of his argument.
The only stipulation is that a morally perfect entity will always choose
the greatest good available.
The problem I have with the argument is twofold:
1) An omnipotent being will have the ability to create 'the greatest'
good at all times. As such, there will never be a lesser evil. There
will only be the 'greatest good' and an infinitude of 'lesser goods-to-
lesser evils-to-greater evils.'
2) As we are not omniscient, we have know way of knowing whether or
not an apparantly evil act is, in the 'economy of goodness,' in fact a
'greater good.' That is, I am a ~1400 chess player. I can't see more
than four or so moves in advance. Thus, if you set up a gambit that
relied on a seven move combo, I would have no way of knowing
that the gambit is, in fact, not in my favor in the 'economy of pieces.'
An omniscient being would be able to see that, all the deaths in the
13th century plague had a morally beneficial end result in the 23rd
century, but we have no way of knowing (or even testing) this proposition.
Nemesio
31 Mar 05
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrNothing can follow deductively from a definition.
If definitions don't have truth values, then how could anything follow deductively from a definition?
Only axioms and propositions are fodder for deduction.
The statement 'God is anything that is OOO' could be any of a definition, an axiom, or a proposition, depending on how it is used in the system of deduction. If it is merely a definition, then it has no truth value. If it is used as an axiom, it serves as a standard for what it means for other propositions in the system to have the value 'true'. If it is used as a proposition, its truth value is dependent upon the axioms of the system (unless you can show that it is tautological).
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by NemesioSo, you reject premise (2), correct?
What Bennett is doing, for the sake of not getting waylaid on a side-
track discussion (too late!), is granting whatever definition anyone
wants to define 'morally perfect' for the purposes of his argument.
The only stipulation is that a morally perfect entity will always choose
the greatest good available.
The problem I have with the argument is tw ...[text shortened]... the 23rd
century, but we have no way of knowing (or even testing) this proposition.
Nemesio
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesO.K., we use these terms slightly differently then. On your view, definitions don't have truth values, but there may be propositions that express definitions that do have truth values, as in:
Nothing can follow deductively from a definition.
Only axioms and propositions are fodder for deduction.
The statement 'God is anything that is OOO' could be any of a definition, an axiom, or a proposition, depending on how it is used in the system of deduction. If it is merely a definition, then it has no truth value. If it is used as an a ...[text shortened]... value is dependent upon the axioms of the system (unless you can show that it is tautological).
The term 'Bachelor' means 'unmarried adult male of marriageable age'.
That above would not be a definition, but it would express a definition, correct?
31 Mar 05
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrNo. I read the argument and saw that it falls short at the start. But here is a quote from a website:
I never claimed that. Are you summarizing an argument from some other website? Did you even read the argument I provided? It takes the form of a dilemma with five possible resolutions, corresponding to the rejection of any of the first 5 pr ...[text shortened]... . Rejecting any one of these premises resolves the contradiction.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_and_evidential_arguments_from_evil
"The problem of evil arises from the supposition that a perfectly good God would not allow evil to exist in the world, and that an omniscient and omnipotent god should be able to arrange the world according to his intentions."
It's a good article, which covers what you are inferring. Wikipedia is cool dude!
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ColettiYou are confused, Coletti. My definition of 'morally perfect' allows the theist to presuppose his own ethical theory. My definition does not stipulate anything at all about morality itself. Please get this through your head. If the argument falls short, it is due to a false premise, and not any definition.
No. I read the argument and saw that it falls short at the start. But here is a quote from a website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_and_evidential_arguments_from_evil
"The problem of evil arises from the supposition that a perfectly good God would not allow evil to exist in the world, and that an omniscient and omnipotent god should ...[text shortened]... ns."
It's a good article, which covers what you are inferring. Wikipedia is cool dude!
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by lucifershammer
I think we've already established that everyone but Coletti rejects premise (2). That's your cue (I'm guessing) to make an argument that ends in "A is precisely an event that satisfies premise 2 and has occurred".
Heck, can God create a rock too heavy for Him to lift OR Can God lie ?
Was Jesus's crucifixion morally preferable to Jesus not being crucified ?
Can God remove Himself from a particular place and then ... NOT be omnipotent ? IE: Is God in Hell ?
LOL... why you guys even having a debate on this, or did God pass down these 'definitions' to us of His being ? 😉
31 Mar 05
2 edits
Originally posted by pcaspianLOL, do you think one of these definitions is inaccurate? If so, which?
Originally posted by lucifershammer
I think we've already established that everyone but Coletti rejects premise (2). That's your cue (I'm guessing) to make an argument that ends in "A is precisely an event that satisfies pre d God pass down these 'definitions' to us of His being ? 😉
31 Mar 05
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrThat proposition expresses a definition, but depending on the axioms of the system in which that proposition lives, it could have a value of 'true' or 'false'. You can't simply make it be 'true' because it expresses a definition, for you may be able to deduce its falsehood from the axioms.
O.K., we use these terms slightly differently then. On your view, definitions don't have truth values, but there may be propositions that express definitions that do have truth values, as in:
The term 'Bachelor' means 'unmarried ad d not be a definition, but it would express a definition, correct?
Contrast this with what I mean by 'definition'. Given any set of axioms, you can always introduce the definition "Let 'Bachelor' mean an unmarried adult male." No axioms prohibit me from issuing this imperative, even if we have 'The term 'Bachelor' means a married woman' as an axiom. If definitions had truth values this could not be done; but mathematicians do it all the time, just making up definitions with complete disregard for what the axioms of math have to say about their 'truth'.
For example, consider the definition of prime numbers.
Let p be a prime iff its only divisors are 1 and itself.
Is this definition 'true' with respect to rest of the axiomatic system? Does is make sense to ask that?
Suppose you answer yes to both of these. Then consider the definition
Let p be a prime iff it has other divisors than 1 and itself. You must conclude
that that definition is false with respect to the rest of the axiomatic system.
But if that second definition is false, substitute 'composite' for 'prime' and it
becomes true! But we both know that 'prime' and 'composite' are simply
arbitrarily chosen terms, so we would have something of a contradition if your
sense of 'definition' entails that definitions have truth values with respect to the
other axioms of the system.