Why Is There Belief in the Divinity of Jesus?

Originally posted by whodey
Do you think that the teaching that there is a God is an outlandish claim? In fact, if it were the case, why is it that most people seem to believe in a God? Now using your epistemology skills, how do you explain this discrepency? Conversly, how many people believe in invisible trees? Do you not think there is much more logic/evidince behind the belief in an invisible God than an invisible tree?

Do you think that the teaching that there is a God is an outlandish claim?...

You're missing the point I was trying to make. The point is that your account of justification has bizarre, ridiculous entailments and, as such, cannot be correct. I didn't say the claim that there is a god is outlandish; I said that your account of justification commits us to the idea that some completely outlandish claims are true and justified (at least those for which we fail to uncover good "defeating" evidence). I also talked about how your account would potentially have us presume contraditions (P and not-P). Do you see above where bbarr stated the following?

bbarr: In many cases the best we can do to settle disputes about the nature of epistemic justification or of the credentials of first-order moral judgments is to construct localized consistency arguments of the form "if you believe that, then you commit yourself to this implausible entailment", where we hope the implausibility of the entailment is evident to our interlocutor.

This is exactly what I was trying to do.

To address your question directly, there are many different forms of theism. Some, I think, could be properly labeled as outlandish; others not. It depends on the particulars.

why is it that most people seem to believe in a God? Now using your epistemology skills, how do you explain this discrepency?

As I said before, I think our talk of epistemic justification is in the business of attributing properties to things such as our doxastic states. I certainly don't consider it the job of our talk of epistemic justification to give an adequate account of why people believe certain stuff. It's an extremely interesting topic you touch on, and I have my ideas; but it's an exercise in something like practical anthropology.

I'll respond to your other post later when I have more time.

Originally posted by bbarr
It is difficult for me to be clear about all this, primarily because I rarely use the term 'faith' and am typically unsure of the intended sense of the term when I hear it used by others. Further, there is a fine line between excavating and stipulating the sense of terms used colloquially. So, what follows is largely vague and exploratory, so please bear wit ...[text shortened]... P on faith to cite pragmatic reasons for the positing.

More later...

4) S believes P based on faith.

Of course this entails that S believes P, and so it will be an open question whether this belief is epistemically justified. I hear this or similar claims quite often, and admit to being at a loss as to what exactly is meant. Often the claim is simply pejorative; elliptical for "S has no evidence for his belief that P'. If this is how 'faith' is to be construed, then of course it will follow that faith is epistemically irresponsible, since it leads to unjustified believing. But this is not the only way we can construe (4). 'Faith' here could refer to either some other propositional attitude, as in (1) above, from the propositional contents of which the belief that P is inferred, or to some actual proposition taken to be foundational or nomratively central, as in (2) above, from which P is inferred, or it could refer to some psychological capacity or state or trait that functions as a mechanism of belief formation. Although the epistemological details here matter, the upshot of this non-pejorative reading of 'faith', and the basing relation in particular, is that justified faith can itself justify belief (or, if faith is a belief forming psychological mechanism, that it may yield justified beliefs if it reliably produces true ones).

So, I am certainly not claiming prior to the specification of some desired construal of 'faith', that faith is epistemically irresponsible. So, given all this, what construal of 'faith' do you, Epiphinehas, prefer?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I may be irremediably conceptually confused, but I'm pretty sure that James was talking about religious belief in that statement, rather than the nomological classes of truth which you've described.

Judge for yourself. Here is a larger excerpt from James' The Will to Believe:

__________

"...We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to u ...[text shortened]... te; I couldn't resist - so much of it is relevant to the discussion at hand.[/b]

Yes, so? My objection was to James' criterion, and did not presuppose that he was talking about any particular class of propositions. But, in any case, nothing I've said entails that we cannot freely adopt religious hypotheses as preliminaries to inquiry. But it would be epistemically irresponsible to treat these hypotheses as beliefs prior to the results of inquiry. Further, we do not have the power to simply choose to believe propositions, at most we can choose to treat the world provisionally as though it were the case that some proposition or other were true.

Originally posted by jaywill
The other possibility is that you are flawed to think that reality is limited to what you sense with your five physical senses.

Ah. Just like I thought. You define 'real' and 'met' in non-standard ways.

Originally posted by whodey
Sorry, you know I am not as trained in this epistemology stuff as you kids are. All I have is a brief exposure to it all. Perhaps my angle is completly off the epistemology charts? I know, lets come up with a completly new theory in epistemology and we will call it the whodey theory. 😀

So here it goes. We will use your example of the friend in questi ...[text shortened]... ys on. In fact, I am sure you have had similar experiences about other "truths" in your life.

…Now getting back to personal testimonies, if everyone I met came to me and claimed that the invisible tree existed, I would probably begin to question my own scepticism and perhaps begin to believe that it is actually there….

Yes, I think most of us understand that. But that is just an unfortunate irrational predisposition most of us have (including myself) to go “with the crowd” even when the crowd is simply wrong. I had to learn to fight against that irrational predisposition because I knew it was irrational. Once everyone believed the Earth was flat -could all those people wrong? (actually, I have been informed that that is historically inaccurate -but that is besides the point. The point is that just because everyone believes something to be true doesn’t mean it is true. Perhaps a better example would be that once most people believed that the sun revolved around the Earth).

…Again, the more testimony I get from people believing the tree existed, the more evidence supports its existence. ….

I assume when you talk of “evidence” in the above, you mean “evidence” in a purely subjective sense? -I mean, testimony you may get from people believing the invisible tree exists is not “real evidence” for its existence -right? -I mean, it doesn’t mater if a trillion people believe it and nobody doubts it, this doesn’t change the fact that reality is indifferent to what people believe it is -right?

…However, to go against what everyone else believes takes a great deal of courage and a determination that you know without a doubt what the truth actually is. This is part of why the testimony of Christ is so appealing to me. He went against the grain and spoke against many commonly held beliefs of his time. In fact, he paid for it with his life.….

I have no doubt that he had “courage” but, he went “against what everyone else believes”? - I mean, he didn’t go against theism did he?

…In fact, he paid for it with his life. My conclusion then, is that he had to have had enough motive to go against the grain to act in such a way. So what was his motive? Was it money, was it power, was it sheer lunacy? Studying his life and his teachings, I would have to rule out all three, rather, his motive seems to have been standing up for what he considered to be truth..….

I think few people would question his altruistic motives, but the problem is the most kind-hearted altruistically motivated person in the world can have a false belief (I am specifically thinking here about the belief that there is a god). I am sure that some of the people that once thought the world was flat would go into that category.

Originally posted by bbarr
4) S believes P based on faith.

Of course this entails that S believes P, and so it will be an open question whether this belief is epistemically justified. I hear this or similar claims quite often, and admit to being at a loss as to what exactly is meant. Often the claim is simply pejorative; elliptical for "S has no evidence for his belief that P'. If onsible. So, given all this, what construal of 'faith' do you, Epiphinehas, prefer?

So, I am certainly not claiming prior to the specification of some desired construal of 'faith', that faith is epistemically irresponsible. So, given all this, what construal of 'faith' do you, Epiphinehas, prefer?

I'd prefer (1) and (3).

Originally posted by whodey
Sorry, you know I am not as trained in this epistemology stuff as you kids are. All I have is a brief exposure to it all. Perhaps my angle is completly off the epistemology charts? I know, lets come up with a completly new theory in epistemology and we will call it the whodey theory. 😀

So here it goes. We will use your example of the friend in questi ...[text shortened]... ys on. In fact, I am sure you have had similar experiences about other "truths" in your life.

We will use your example of the friend in question, who sees an invisible tree on the horizen.

The example I gave didn't claim that your friend sees something on the horizon (if he saw it, then he wouldn't believe it to be invisible). I said that he believes there is an invisible tree on the horizon. I gave this example because, first off, it seems like an outlandish belief about the world since the idea of an invisible tree is bizarre; and, secondly, it's doubtful that, looking out at the horizon alongside your friend, you have "defeating" evidence for his belief. So, in accord with your account of justification, you're just going to presume that this seemingly outlandish belief is thereby true and justified? That's ridiculous, and that was my point: your account admits of ridiculous situations like that (because it doesn't place the right demands on the evidence for our beliefs -- if I understand correctly how you are using the terminology, the lack of "defeating" evidence should be necessary for justification, but not sufficient). Also, I have already listed other problems I see with your account.

Now getting back to personal testimonies...

I agree that the testimonies of others can serve as justifiers, but not just any testimony will be able to fulfill this role. The testimony needs to be reliable, and that will involve considerations such as who renders the testimony, what level of knowledge they can be said to hold on the topic at hand, whether or not you have good reasons to think they are a reliable source of information, (and even if they are generally reliable) whether or not there are particular circumstances that may impair their judgment in the current setting, etc., etc.

the more testimony I get from people...the more evidence...

Again, not necessarily. You still need to have good indicators that the testimony is reliable. If somebody whacked out of his mind on LSD furnishes the testimony, how much trust are you going to place in it?

suppose I had been taught since birth that the invisible tree existed and had no one even questioning this belief? This would add to the likelyhood that I would believe that it existed.

Probably, but what does this have to do with whether the belief is justified or not?

I understand what you are saying in the rest of your post, but I'm not sure how it is relevant to the discussion.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I said that he believes there is an invisible tree on the horizon. I gave this example because, first off, it seems like an outlandish belief about the world since the idea of an invisible tree is bizarre; and, secondly, it's doubtful that, looking out at the horizon alongside your friend, you have "defeating" evidence for his belief. So, in accord with yo ...[text shortened]... ou're just going to presume that this seemingly outlandish belief is thereby true and justified?

Incorrect. The mere fact that he has no other evidence other than to say it exists would be defeating evidence in my mind. In fact, if no one were even to back up his claims I would have to presume that his evidence is severely lacking and doubtful.

Now getting back to epistemology justificaton, what is the justification for the majority of people to believe in God of are they simply off the charts, so to speak, as myself? Also, if they are all off the charts, are the charts adequate in studying such phenomenon? In other words, I recognize such tools as epistemology is valuable as a tool and discipline in reason, however, so is using the theory of relativity in solving mysteries about our physical universe, but can the theory of relativity be helpful in determining if God exists? No one tool is capable of getting every job done, if you know what I mean. Perhaps epistemology is not the tool for the job in this regard?

To put another way, is God logical? In fact, how do you define what is logical? Is not logic defined using man made paramaters and tool such as epistemology and their own reasoning? Therefore, if God's logic is beyond your own, which would have to be the case if he were God, would you not presume that your tools and reasoning would fall short at some point? Granted, I am not suggesting that logic and reasoning must be abandoned in ones faith, rather, I am merely suggesting that God is greater than I and is why I need faith. At some point, God will tell me something that may not make much sense if any, therefore, I will have a choice to make. I will either fall back on what I know, which is limited and shortsided, or I can defer to the one who I believe knows all and sees all.

Now is that logical or what? 😀

Originally posted by LemonJello
I agree that the testimonies of others can serve as justifiers, but not just any testimony will be able to fulfill this role. The testimony needs to be reliable, and that will involve considerations such as who renders the testimony, what level of knowledge they can be said to hold on the topic at hand, whether or not you have good reasons to think they are ...[text shortened]... there are particular circumstances that may impair their judgment in the current setting, etc., etc.

Interesting, because my faith seems to indicate that this is the main way in which people come to God. First they are exposed to your character and demeanor. They will then see if you are trustworthy, kind, level headed etc. and then they will be exposed to your testimony. They will then have one of two choices. They can attribute your good qualities to simply being a good person or they can attribute them to what you say has made you a good person. In fact, change is painful and scary so the ONLY way it can be facilitated is either through force or through your own desire. Naturally, since God gave us free will it comes through desire so the only way to attract others to Christ is to provide them with something desirable. In short, people need to see that there is a better road to travel than the one they are currently on or they will NEVER come to God.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]We will use your example of the friend in question, who sees an invisible tree on the horizen.

The example I gave didn't claim that your friend sees something on the horizon (if he saw it, then he wouldn't believe it to be invisible). I said that he believes there is an invisible tree on the horizon. I gave this example because, first off, it ...[text shortened]... ying in the rest of your post, but I'm not sure how it is relevant to the discussion.[/b]

As the poet said, 'Only God can make a tree' -- probably because it's so hard to figure out how to get the bark on.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
Correct-

Then the existential claim or denial is irrelevant in the determination of who has the burden of proof; it falls on the person whose claim lacks sufficient evidence (whether it claims the existence of something improbable or denies the existence of something probable.)

Do you think that some people might have a different evaluation of what is probable (or has evidence) when they make a claim? For example, a person who claims the existence of the president of the USA in front of a group of tribal savages may have the burden of proof. If so, surely an atheist at a conference of theists would have the burden of proof. Does that make sense?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Then the existential claim or denial is irrelevant in the determination of who has the burden of proof; it falls on the person whose claim lacks sufficient evidence (whether it claims the existence of something improbable or denies the existence of something probable.)

Do you think that some people might have a different evaluation of what is probable (o ...[text shortened]... rely an atheist at a conference of theists would have the burden of proof. Does that make sense?

If you say so -- but clearly it is entirely arbitrary -- it ain't rocket science.

That is, you cannot calculate a parabola to intersect a comet using any of the rules you are talking about.

Now, if anyone had something better than the old Anselm ontological argument to offer, something more akin to rocket science, say a hidden code buried among the integers in the value of Pi, I'd concede the point right there.

But we've no such type of evidence and it is my belief, if you will, that such evidence will forever be beyond our grasp. We simply find it so hard to abandon our hubris -- look how long it took before we were able to admit the Sun did not orbit the Earth - that we aren't the center of all things.

The kind of arrogance that assumes we are is what strikes me most about organized religion. It is essentially a form of arrogating power for its own sake. It is predatory in that it takes advantage of a hard-wired human need for order and security in a universe that almost always appears to be formless, chaotic, random, and if not inherently evil, then certainly coldly indifferent to human suffering.

If we can get out of our lies and understand that the best of us cause pain, and that much of the pain that has been inflicted on us was not meant as anything personal, then perhaps we can forgive each other and ourselves for what we've done. If we can liberate ourselves from the lies and weirdness of our society and our minds, we can live with some dignity and grace. We can live in that real love that accepts us as we are, without any need for lies.

Originally posted by Scriabin
If you say so -- but clearly it is entirely arbitrary -- it ain't rocket science.

That is, you cannot calculate a parabola to intersect a comet using any of the rules you are talking about.

Now, if anyone had something better than the old Anselm ontological argument to offer, something more akin to rocket science, say a hidden code buried among the i grace. We can live in that real love that accepts us as we are, without any need for lies.

I think you have misconstrued my intentions. I do not want to give a comprehensive rule that will allow people to calculate a parabola that will intersect a comet. My objection is to this "burden of proof": originally, Hamilton said it applied to instances of existential claims with insufficient evidence, but the 'existential' part of the claim is not relevant -- what matters is whether there is evidence for the claim; presumably, if there is insufficient evidence for the claim, the burden of proof falls on the claimant.

But even that is inadequate. Often, we do not know objectively what evidence there is for a claim (and when we impose the burden of proof, we are clearly acknowledging that we do not know all the evidence from an omniscient view; we are admitting that our personal understanding is that there is insufficient evidence but there could be evidence to sway them.) And obviously this will depend on the circumstances because people will have partial evidence for either way(in an auditorium full of climate skeptics, the burden of proof will fall on the person who says there is evidence of global warming.) Essentially, the burden of proof is a conversational maxim that says a person should explain reasons for their belief to those who disagree and deny that there is sufficient evidence for such a belief. Hamilton, however, exaggerates the purpose of this conversational maxim and claims that, unless he knows of otherwise evidence, he can make whatever statements he wants unchecked -- which is not really what the burden of proof allows (at a theistic conference, for example, the burden of proof is intuitively on him.)

Originally posted by Scriabin
If you say so -- but clearly it is entirely arbitrary -- it ain't rocket science.

That is, you cannot calculate a parabola to intersect a comet using any of the rules you are talking about.

Now, if anyone had something better than the old Anselm ontological argument to offer, something more akin to rocket science, say a hidden code buried among the i grace. We can live in that real love that accepts us as we are, without any need for lies.

I would also say that there is no reason to assume that we are the singular species the grammar of whose consciousness is exhaustive of the syntax of the cosmos, in which and of which we also are.

There is, at least until the point where we do know that we know all there is to know, room for mystery. Much of what is called religion seems to seek to define that domain of mystery such that it is no longer—mystery. (Okay, as well as to obfuscate much of what we can know.)

Quite frankly, Scriabin, neither you nor I can express completely the nature of our existence. To limit ourselves to what we can express is legitimate—as long as it is not a claim that only what we can express is real. To speculate beyond what we can express is acceptable—as long as it is acknowledged as just that: speculation.

You have enough experience with Eastern spiritual traditions to understand what I am saying. Whenever I express myself in the language/symbolism of Western traditions—you should understand me to be saying nothing intrinsically different. (Different spiritual traditions have, as you know different aesthetic qualities, aside from whatever propositional claims they might make.)

Since you are familiar with such Eastern traditions, I will spare you any talk about clear-awareness, or the tathata (or “God”, or Brahman, or ein sof ) that is prior to all our thinking about it, all our concepts about it, etc.—again, of which we also are (we can never really escape that loop!*).

After all, how else do you explain your decision not to insure that “blessing pottery”? I would suggest that—in my words, of course, not yours—you had some innate recognition of that realm of mystery against which one cannot insure...? Not that that implies anything supernatural or occult or any such thing (as I have said, I do not admit a supernatural category in my thinking, regardless of what religious language I might use here or there; neither did Gregory of Nyssa. I’m not convinced that Rebbe Nachman did either...).

________________________________________

* And it is that loop that makes me more sympathetic to Camus, who—in one sense—was arguing against any kind of “leap” (religious or philosophical) that attempted to escape that loop, which is (on my interpretation) the source of Camusian “absurdity”. After reading your stuff, however, I am going to have to revisit Frankl. 🙂

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
Once everyone believed the Earth was flat -could all those people wrong? (actually, I have been informed that that is historically inaccurate -but that is besides the point. The point is that just because everyone believes something to be true doesn’t mean it is true. Perhaps a better example would be that once most people believed that the sun revolved around the Earth).

I concede that just believing what everyone else believes is not enough. In fact, as a Christian you are faced daily with going against what the crowd thinks. There are other evidences besides the testimony of others that persuaded me to my faith in Christ, howver, the testimony of others is usually the most powerful and persuasive from what I have seen and it is something on these boards that is almost an impossibility to experience.