Most vile concept/aspect of christianity?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I dispute that. The truth values of 2' and 1 are unrelated. Neither affects or changes the other.

I can make a claim "P happens at 9/11/01" with the auxiliary claim "I am speaking from 9/11/02", or with the auxiliary claim "I am speaking from 9/11/00."

The truth of neither auxiliary claim affects the truth of the main claim. I never claimed ...[text shortened]... ledge of claim 1; it is a necessary condition of the observer's knowledge of claim 1.

What I claimed has to do with knowledge of propositions, not their truth.

(2) and (2'😉 deal with knowledge of propositions. I could just as easily have used "knower" instead of "observer" ("observe" usually implies knowledge).

Do you want to change anything in your response assuming that (2) and (2'😉 have "knower" instead of "observer"?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]What I claimed has to do with knowledge of propositions, not their truth.

(2) and (2'😉 deal with knowledge of propositions. I could just as easily have used "knower" instead of "observer" ("observe" usually implies knowledge).

Do you want to change anything in your response assuming that (2) and (2'😉 have "knower" instead of "observer"?[/b]

Sure. 2' becomes incoherent if you change it to knower. Further, it is only well-defined if the truth of 1 is presumed. If 1 is false, 2 and 2' are not well-defined.

I took observer to mean nothing more than the person making the claim. If it means that he is literally an observer, then 2' is incoherent as is.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Sure. 2' becomes incoherent if you change it to knower. Further, it is only well-defined if the truth of 1 is presumed. If 1 is false, 2 and 2' are not well-defined.

I took observer to mean nothing more than the person making the claim. If it means that he is literally an observer, then 2' is incoherent as is.

If (1) is false, then (2) and (2'😉 are both false. (2), for instance, is equivalent to "X knows (1)" (2.1) and "X is at time T+t" (2.2). Since knowledge is true justified belief, if (1) is false then (2.1) is false and therefore (2) is false. Likewise for (2'😉.

(2'😉 is incoherent if and only if your definition of knowledge automatically precludes foreknowledge.

In which case you're simply begging the question.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]I've misrepresented nothing and you, in fact, owe me an apology for claiming I did.

Here's what you said:

"your claim is that no matter what information your mythical God gives me, I am in "no position" to make an independent assessment of his workings."

I don't owe you an apology - prior to my previous post, I made no such claim (nor ...[text shortened]... mething new to say, stop asking me to respond to points I have already responded to.[/b]

You're completely insane. Your first statement logically implied EXACTLY the conclusion I reached; what does the word "cannot" mean in this context? It's quite obviously clear that you, like Coletti, once read a high school textbook on Logic and think you somehow have some clue about this field of learning. You don't. The premise that each and every sentence in the English language conveys ONLY ONE idea and that imparting anything else BUT THE ONE TRUE MEANING is a "misrepresentation" is one of the strangest things I've ever read.

Originally posted by lucifershammer


(2'😉 is incoherent if and only if your definition of knowledge automatically precludes foreknowledge.

In which case you're simply begging the question.

And you're begging the same question by constructing that proposition in the first place. The proposition is only meaningful if you assume that foreknowledge exists.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
And you're begging the same question by constructing that proposition in the first place.

No, I'm not. Nothing in my definition of knowledge precludes foreknowledge. For me, knowledge is just "true justified belief" (plus Gettier's condition).

EDIT: And my definition does not assume the foreknowledge exists - just that it is not definitionally impossible.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]I've misrepresented nothing and you, in fact, owe me an apology for claiming I did.

Here's what you said:

"your claim is that no matter what information your mythical God gives me, I am in "no position" to make an independent assessment of his workings."

I don't owe you an apology - prior to my previous post, I made no such claim (nor mething new to say, stop asking me to respond to points I have already responded to.[/b]

In quantum mechanics, as I understand it, a wave function of possibilities (probabilities) collapses into a certainty at the time of observation. For a human observer, such an observation cannot take place at (t-1); if the “observer” knows for certain at (t-1) that P is the outcome, the wave function is effectively collapsed at that point.

If an omnisciently prescient God knows at (t-1) that P is the certain future outcome, all possibilities are collapsed into a 100% probable singular outcome; that is, the event is determined. At that point, I have no effective free will (at least in a libertarian sense).

_____________________________________

You can judge God's actions if and only if you are an all-knowing being yourself.

Would this statement apply to God’s attributes (such as justness, mercy, etc.) as well as God’s actions?

Suppose one says, “God is just.” Does it mean anything to say God is just, other than to say that God acts justly? But if one cannot make such a judgment, then does it not become a matter of presumptive faith, or simple speculation—whether such a statement of presumptive faith was made by Biblical observers/writers several millennia ago, or by the authors of the patristic tradition, or by you or I today?

EDIT: I just realized I should've written (T-t) above, rather than (t-1).

Originally posted by lucifershammer


And my definition does not assume the foreknowledge exists

Your construction of 2' relies on the assumption that foreknowledge exists. If foreknowledge does not exist, then 2' is incoherent.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
For me, knowledge is just "true justified belief" (plus Gettier's condition).

That's not knowledge.

If I am about to throw a fair die, it is justified to believe that it will not roll 6. If it then rolls 5, my belief was both justified and true. I did not, however, know that it would not roll 6.

If you really trusted your definition of knowledge, you would be willing to wager a million dollars on the die not rolling 6 just as readily as you would make the wager after having seen the outcome. That's knowledge.

Originally posted by vistesd
In quantum mechanics, as I understand it, a wave function of possibilities (probabilities) collapses into a certainty at the time of observation. For a human observer, such an observation cannot take place at (t-1); if the “observer” knows for certain at (t-1) that P is the outcome, the wave function is effectively collapsed at that point.
...[text shortened]... ermined. At that point, I have no effective free will (at least in a libertarian sense).

You and Scribs are committing the same mistake - you're confusing your epistemology and your metaphysics.

Non-deterministic (I prefer that term to 'libertarian' - libertarian free will is a subset of non-deterministic theories) free will simply states that given a sequence of events (E1, E2,... En, S), where S is an event involving free will, that (E1, E2,... En, S'😉 is logically possible, where S' is not identical to S. If S is true, that simply means S' is false - not that it is logically impossible.

Here's a simple analogy: I toss a coin and it comes up heads. Is it false that it came up tails? Of course. Is it logically impossible that it could've come up tails? Of course not.

(The problem with this analogy is that it brings up the charge that S was a random event - which is probably a valid criticism of libertarian free will, but I haven't made my mind up on other non-deterministic theories yet.)

Knowing S just means that S is true (and consequently, that S' is false) - not that S' is logically impossible.

Originally posted by lucifershammer


Knowing S just means that S is true (and consequently, that S' is false) - not that S' is logically impossible.

This is not so.

If a perfectly omniscient being knows that S will occur, it is logically impossible for it to not occur.

Originally posted by lucifershammer


Here's a simple analogy: I toss a coin and it comes up heads. Is it false that it came up tails? Of course. Is it logically impossible that it could've come up tails? Of course not.

But it is logically impossible that it did come up tails.

If you knew before the toss that it would come up heads, then, similarly, it would be logically impossible for it to come up tails.

As usual, you're trying to get the best of both worlds, this time on equivocating between happening and the potential to happen. Analyze one or the other from both temporal perspecitves; you're mixing and matching.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
But it is logically impossible that it did come up tails.

No, it's not.

To say that something is logically impossible is to say that there exists no possible world where it is true. There is clearly a possible world where it did come up tails, so it's not logically impossible. It didn't come up tails in our world, so it's false.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
You and Scribs are committing the same mistake

It seems that everybody but you must be mistaken.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]You can judge God's actions if and only if you are an all-knowing being yourself.

Would this statement apply to God’s attributes (such as justness, mercy, etc.) as well as God’s actions?

Suppose one says, “God is just.” Does it mean anything to say God is just, other than to say that God acts justly? But if one cannot make such a judgment, the ...[text shortened]... rs several millennia ago, or by the authors of the patristic tradition, or by you or I today?
[/b]

I think the term "judge" needs disambiguation here. In my discussion with no1, it has been used in the sense of a final, proof-type judgment. You're using a more probabilistic interpretation.