belief

Originally posted by googlefudge
What you are supporting here is abominable.

Try to work out why before I do it for you when I get time tomorrow.

what exactly do you think i am supporting? you asked for an explanation of the verse,
you got one, you dont like it, what is that to do with me? that is correct, absolutely
nothing. Are you so deviod of reason that you need to make it personal? Whether you
think its abominable is not by business, is it, its simply an opinion, of which you are
entitled to vent. It of course doesn't mean anything, to anyone, but you. Try and work
out why, before you waste your time telling me something I already know.

Originally posted by karoly aczel
It sure is, and he's not denying one bit!

He thinks women have their place and should stick to it because that's what scripture teaches him.

Abominable? very much so!!

You have no idea what i think, in fact you have no idea what you think. Another room
full of mirrors, trying to pretend he knows from a single verse what the Bible teaches
with regard to the status of women and how i personally reflect that when i post an
explanation of a verse in an internet forum, . Haha what a zoob you purport to be,
your simply full of it. Dont you have a triangle to tingle? Some wishy esoteric meaning
to wash? Some tenets to make up as you go along?

Originally posted by googlefudge
I am not going to do a full response now as its too late and I am too tired to do it justice.
I will do so later.

But I did want to say this.

You haven't grasped what I am saying.

Whether this is through me not being clear enough I don't know, it is entirely possible.

I have never studied (in any formal way) economics or philosophy, and thus ...[text shortened]... ur points without jargon that would perhaps make life easier, if possibly more verbose.

If you think I failed to grasp what you said, I will await your clarifying remarks and study them closely.

At any rate, I gather from your previous post that you think there is some conflict between (1) the idea that it is not necessary to have certainty that P in order to know that P and (2) the idea that only true propositions can be known. But you have not convinced me that there is any actual problem here.

Here, I will revisit the lottery example; give you a fallibilist interpretation; and then you tell me what you think is wrong with the interpretation.

In the lottery example, consider one of the many Pn that happen to be true. Call it Pt. Consider also the one particular Pn that happens to be false. Call it Pf. We suppose that n is large -- say 1000000. Within S's epistemic situation, the epistemic probability that Pt is true is 0.999999, which makes the truth of Pt overwhelmingly probable but not certain (and S believes Pt on such basis). The very same goes for Pf. Do I think S is justified in believing Pt? Do I think S is justified in believing Pf? Yes, and yes. Do I think S would be justified in claiming to know Pt? Do I think S would be justified in claiming to know Pf? Yes, and yes. Do I think S knows Pt? Do I think S knows Pf? Yes, and of course not.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Fallibilism definitely does not imply that some known propositions will be false -- that is absurd.

I cannot see how it cannot imply that, and the lottery example is nothing more than a proof of this. As far as I can tell this whole argument is based on misusing definitions. ie you define fallibilism one way, then use it another way, then prove that it is inconsistent.
Either:
1. Fallibilism recognises that some claims will be false.
or
2. A fallibilist would not claim to know that a lottery ticket is not a winner.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I cannot see how it cannot imply that, and the lottery example is nothing more than a proof of this. As far as I can tell this whole argument is based on misusing definitions. ie you define fallibilism one way, then use it another way, then prove that it is inconsistent.
Either:
1. Fallibilism recognises that some claims will be false.
or
2. A fallibilist would not claim to know that a lottery ticket is not a winner.

Exactly,
I can claim knowledge of something with perfectly good justification, but new evidence
turns up, or in the case of the lottery the lottery is actually run, and it turns out I am wrong.

Until that evidence arises the only way of knowing that my claimed knowledge was false is
to have external knowledge of the system.

I could claim to know that you can't accelerate objects past light speed.
Yet there is a possibility that this is wrong, All the evidence (latest experiment not withstanding
till and if it gets confirmed) points to it being true, nothing contradicts it, but it is possible there
is some special circumstance to which it doesn't apply and we just haven't found it yet.

The only way you can know the truth absolutely of my statement is to have external knowledge
of the universe. To be privy to the exact laws of nature.
This is impossible.
We can never know if we have found the exact laws of nature.

So if I require a proposition to be actually true (as opposed to simply being true given all available
evidence) I can never know anything (of the world, ignoring here knowledge like maths that is internal
and can be known infallibly).

Properly justified claimed knowledge and actual knowledge can only be told apart with external
knowledge of the situation.

Which makes the distinction as far as I am concerned meaningless.
If you require something to actually be true to know it, then you can't know anything in the world.

Thus if you allow for knowledge of the world you have to accept that some of that knowledge will be false.

Originally posted by LemonJello
If you think I failed to grasp what you said, I will await your clarifying remarks and study them closely.

At any rate, I gather from your previous post that you think there is some conflict between (1) the idea that it is not necessary to have certainty that P in order to know that P and (2) the idea that only true propositions can be known. But you ...[text shortened]... now Pf? Yes, and yes. Do I think S knows Pt? Do I think S knows Pf? Yes, and of course not.

Only because you know that Pf is false.
S doesn't know Pf is false (and Pf is only false) when the lottery is run and Pf wins.
You can only claim S doesn't know Pf because you have privileged external information that Pf is going to win.

From the perspective of S, Pf is just as justified and true as Pt and until S discovers that Pf won S can claim
knowledge of Pf just as strongly as Pt.
The claims are indistinguishable without the external knowledge you have by being god and setting this
thought experiment up.

As we are all S, and not god, requiring the external knowledge of truth as part of our definition of knowledge
means you can't know anything not absolutely certain.
Which means you can only know infallibilist things, which rules out any knowledge of the world.


In the lottery example you can gain the external knowledge after running the lottery and finding out which ticket wins,
but in thought experiment world (where evil demons don't exist) where this lottery is being run, this means you can
now know Pt infallibly, which renders the fallibilist definition of knowledge mute.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Exactly,
I can claim knowledge of something with perfectly good justification, but new evidence
turns up, or in the case of the lottery the lottery is actually run, and it turns out I am wrong.

Until that evidence arises the only way of knowing that my claimed knowledge was false is
to have external knowledge of the system.

I could claim to kn ...[text shortened]... low for knowledge of the world you have to accept that some of that knowledge will be false.

You're confused. You're equivocating between (1) 'S knows P', (2) 'S knows that he knows P', and (3) 'It is reasonable for S to claim that he knows P'. These are all different propositions; you can't take them as equivalent. (1) may not entail (2) or (3). (2) entails (1) but may not entail (3). (3) does not entail (1) or (2).

Originally posted by bbarr
You're confused. You're equivocating between (1) 'S knows P', (2) 'S knows that he knows P', and (3) 'It is reasonable for S to claim that he knows P'. These are all different propositions; you can't take them as equivalent. (1) may not entail (2) or (3). (2) entails (1) but may not entail (3). (3) does not entail (1) or (2).

Your going to have to clarify if you want me to agree that S can Know P but not know that S knows P.
as written (1) entails (2)

And if S knows P, then it must be reasonable for S to claim to know P.
So as written (1) entails (3)

If (2) is true, then (1) must be true. If (1) is true, (3) must be true.

However I will grant that (3) may well be true but that it does not entail (1) or (2)
It is perfectly justified to claim to know man first walked on the moon in 1969 but many (nutters) dispute that.

Also, I may be wrong or mistaken, or have misunderstood what you are saying...
I am not confused.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I cannot see how it cannot imply that, and the lottery example is nothing more than a proof of this. As far as I can tell this whole argument is based on misusing definitions. ie you define fallibilism one way, then use it another way, then prove that it is inconsistent.
Either:
1. Fallibilism recognises that some claims will be false.
or
2. A fallibilist would not claim to know that a lottery ticket is not a winner.

No, look, you can't know something that is not true. Whatever the criteria for knowledge are, they must include this condition: If S knows P, then P is true. Everybody agrees about this. False propositions can't be known. False propositions can, however, be believed with good reason; that is, they can be justifiedly believed. The dispute between fallibilists and infallibilists concerns the extent to which one's evidence or justification for believing a proposition must render that proposition probable in order for that belief to qualify as knowledge.

Suppose it is true that my cat is on his mat. Suppose that I believe that my cat is on his mat. Suppose that I believe this because I remember my cat was recently on his mat, that he prefers to be on his mat, that I seem to currently see him on his mat, etc. Suppose, in short, that I have very good evidence that my cat is on his mat. The fallibilist will probably say that I know my cat is on his mat. But, despite my evidence, it is possible that my cat is not on his mat. I could be misremembering, hallucinating, or whatever. My evidence is really, really good, but not sufficient to absolutely prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it is certain that my cat is on his mat. So, because my evidence fails to render my belief certain, the infallibilist will claim that I do not know my cat is on his mat. The dispute here is not really about truth. The dispute is about how strong evidence must be for the belief of a true proposition to count as knowledge; the dispute is about what being warranted or justified in a belief requires in order to count as knowledge.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Your going to have to clarify if you want me to agree that S can Know P but not know that S knows P.
as written (1) entails (2)

And if S knows P, then it must be reasonable for S to claim to know P.
So as written (1) entails (3)

If (2) is true, then (1) must be true. If (1) is true, (3) must be true.

However I will grant that (3) may well be t ...[text shortened]... so, I may be wrong or mistaken, or have misunderstood what you are saying...
I am not confused.

I don't care if you agree. I'm telling you what is the case. The claim "If S knows P then S knows that he knows P" is called the KK thesis. The KK thesis is false. If you want to know why, think about it for a bit. If you can't figure out why, then ask me again and I'll give you a bunch of reasons. Seriously, just take a day and think about what these different propositions are saying. Try to imagine cases where one is true but the others are not. I mean, you said pages ago that you thought reliabilism was OK for some types of knowledge. What would the reliabilist say about the relationships between these different propositions?

Originally posted by bbarr
No, look, you can't know something that is not true. Whatever the criteria for knowledge are, they must include this condition: If S knows P, then P is true. Everybody agrees about this. False propositions can't be known. False propositions can, however, be believed with good reason; that is, they can be justifiedly believed. The dispute between fallibilist about what being warranted or justified in a belief requires in order to count as knowledge.

Everybody evidently does not agree about this.
Otherwise we would not be disagreeing.
Also everyone agreeing on something is not logical justification, everybody can be wrong.

I agree with you (to a point) about what the dispute is between fallibilists and infallibilists.

But you say the dispute concerns
"...the extent to which one's evidence or justification for believing a proposition must render that
proposition probable in order for that belief to qualify as knowledge."

"...must render that proposition probable... ...to qualify as knowledge."

What I am saying is that if you subscribe to fallibilism.
Ie the probability required is not 1.
Then you will almost certainly have things you claim as knowledge that turn out not to be true.
But until such time as the evidence arises that demonstrates those claims are not true.
There is no practical way of knowing if what you claim to know is true or not.

you say that;

"The dispute is about how strong evidence must be for the belief of a true proposition to count as knowledge"

But from the point of view of S. How do you know that P is true?
For fallibilist knowledge, you can't.
As we are all in the position of S, and we don't have special privileged information about P's truth or not.
The question is about how strong evidence must be for the proposition to be counted as true.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, look, you can't know something that is not true.

I don't think I have claimed otherwise.

The dispute is about how strong evidence must be for the belief of a true proposition to count as knowledge; the dispute is about what being warranted or justified in a belief requires in order to count as knowledge.
I am in full agreement so far, so what am I getting wrong? What am I being criticised for? What is the point of the lottery example? All it seems to do is demonstrate the fact that a fallibalist should fully expect some of the things he claims to 'know' are in fact false. But surely that is why he calls himself a fallibalist? He knows he is fallible.

Whereas you seem to take it that fallibalism may be such that whatever a fallibilist believes is innerrantly true.

Originally posted by bbarr

Let's suppose that fallibilism is true. Then, S can know P without being certain that P.

This makes no sense to me, and the word 'fallible' clearly doesn't fit at all.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I cannot see how it cannot imply that, and the lottery example is nothing more than a proof of this. As far as I can tell this whole argument is based on misusing definitions. ie you define fallibilism one way, then use it another way, then prove that it is inconsistent.
Either:
1. Fallibilism recognises that some claims will be false.
or
2. A fallibilist would not claim to know that a lottery ticket is not a winner.

I cannot see how it cannot imply that, and the lottery example is nothing more than a proof of this

The lottery example proves no such thing. You do understand that within the lottery example it is not the case that all the Pn are known, right? The fallibilist will think that S can justifiably claim to know all the Pn, but the fallibilist will of course deny that S does in fact know all the Pn, since Pm is false for some particular m. So, it is just bizarre to me that you would think the lottery example demonstrates that fallibilism implies that some known propositions are false. That's a head-scratcher for sure.

As far as I can tell this whole argument is based on misusing definitions. ie you define fallibilism one way, then use it another way, then prove that it is inconsistent.

That's a disastrous interpretation of bbarr's earlier argument. He only defines fallibilism in one way; he only uses it in the same way; and the argument he put forth purports to show that it is the conjunction of fallibilism and epistemic closure that is inconsistent, not fallibilism itself.

Either:
1. Fallibilism recognises that some claims will be false.
or
2. A fallibilist would not claim to know that a lottery ticket is not a winner.

No. As has been spelled out numerous times, fallibilism is a theoretical justificatory component. It "recognizes" that S can know P without being certain that P.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Only because you know that Pf is false.
S doesn't know Pf is false (and Pf is only false) when the lottery is run and Pf wins.
You can only claim S doesn't know Pf because you have privileged external information that Pf is going to win.

From the perspective of S, Pf is just as justified and true as Pt and until S discovers that Pf won S can claim
you can
now know Pt infallibly, which renders the fallibilist definition of knowledge mute.

As we are all S, and not god, requiring the external knowledge of truth as part of our definition of knowledge
means you can't know anything not absolutely certain.
Which means you can only know infallibilist things, which rules out any knowledge of the world.


In the lottery example you can gain the external knowledge after running the lottery and finding out which ticket wins,
but in thought experiment world (where evil demons don't exist) where this lottery is being run, this means you can
now know Pt infallibly, which renders the fallibilist definition of knowledge mute.

What a bizarre argument. I am not sure where to begin. Everyone will hold that truth is an external condition on knowledge, since it is absurd to think that one could know a false proposition. Right? How again does it follow that one cannot know anything except "infallibilist things"?

And the next paragraph is frankly just as bizarre. Yes, in the lottery example S does not have certainty that Pt is true. How does that "render the falliblist definition of knowledge mute"? The fallibilist claims that S can know Pt despite not having certainty that Pt.

Originally posted by LemonJello
It "recognizes" that S can know P without being certain that P.

An I totally fail to see how that can be possible under the definition of 'know' given earlier. If P can be false, even if it is infinitesimally unlikely that it is, then S cannot know P by definition.