belief

Originally posted by twhitehead
What is the standard definition of fallibilism? I was taking it to mean 'I say I believe something even when I know it is simply highly unlikely (but still possible) that I am wrong.' Clearly that is not what you mean by the word.

The usage of 'fallibilism' you outlined only concerns some conditions about your utterances regarding some belief; whereas standard fallibilism is a thesis regarding conditions under which some belief can count as being justified or count as being knowledge or some such.

For example, under a standard view of fallibilism, it would hold that S's knowing that P does not require epistemic certainty. It would contrast with infallibilism. In other words, a general infallibilist thesis might be roughly that S's knowing that P requires S's satisfying some condition C, such that it is not possible both that S satisfies C and P is false; whereas fallibilism would deny this.

So, you could change what you said to something like "I can still know that P even when I know that it is highly unlikely but still possible that P is false". I think this would be more in line with what fallibilism means.

Originally posted by bbarr
I think that's right. It's the agglomerative principle that needs to be rejected. It's just like the 'Author's Preface Paradox'. But what a strange implication. We have sufficient reason to believe each of a set of propositions but not to believe their conjunction. The interesting question, I think, is just what sort of revised agglomerative principle we'l erivation, and in fact (((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F) > C), I may not be able to know C.

P1...Pn: (Some very large set of propositions)
F: (I am fallible when I infer conclusions that are entailed only by the conjunction of very large sets of propositions)

Now suppose I deductively infer C from ((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F), a very large set of propositions, and believe C on the basis of this inference, and C is in fact entailed by ((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F).

Even though I know ((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F), and I derive C from ((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F), and believe C on the basis of this derivation, and in fact (((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F) > C), I may not be able to know C.

For this I was thinking that if the proof is sufficiently complex, or n is sufficiently large, then the probability that bbarr carries out the derivation properly (conditioned on F and the fact that n is very large) may be very low or inscrutable: P[bbarr correctly derives C from (P1 & P2 & ...Pn) |( F & n >> 1)] << 1 or inscrutable. In that case, bbarr's belief that C on the basis of his derivation may not be justified (even if, in fact, bbarr did derive C correctly).

Originally posted by LemonJello
P1...Pn: (Some very large set of propositions)
F: (I am fallible when I infer conclusions that are entailed only by the conjunction of very large sets of propositions)

Now suppose I deductively infer C from ((P1 & P2 &...Pn) & F), a very large set of propositions, and believe C on the basis of this inference, and C is in fact entailed by ((P1 & P basis of his derivation may not be justified (even if, in fact, bbarr did derive C correctly).[/b]

number crunchers!

if p_1 => then the hyperbolic differential co-existent hypotenuse p_n*10^12* pomp + p_2 (x+y+z) where z=> wind, results in n <=> windbag*10^2 = bbar

Originally posted by robbie carrobie
number crunchers!

if p_1 => then the hyperbolic differential co-existent hypotenuse p_n*10^12* pomp + p_2 (x+y+z) where z=> wind, results in n <=> windbag*10^2 = bbar

Funny!

Originally posted by Suzianne
Oh really.

Could you supply the Book, Chapter and Verse of this "passage"?

Having supplied the aforementioned book chapter and verse,
do you have any further comment or are you just going to ignore the atrocities and immorality in your bible?

Originally posted by googlefudge
Having supplied the aforementioned book chapter and verse,
do you have any further comment or are you just going to ignore the atrocities and immorality in your bible?

what immorality are you referring to, i cannot be bothered to check the whole thread.

Originally posted by robbie carrobie
what immorality are you referring to, i cannot be bothered to check the whole thread.

In this particular instance, I am referring to Deuteronomy 22:28~29,


28 If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her,
and lie with her, and they be found;

29 Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of
silver, and she shall be his wife; because he hath humbled her, he may not put her
away all his days.


Women are considered property, and should be forced to marry their rapists.

I made reference to women being forced to marry their rapists and Suzianne told me
to quote chapter and verse (having missed the first/other posts where I did just that)
And so I responded by quoting chapter and verse.
Having done so, Suzianne has not responded further.

So I was wondering if Suzianne had any thoughts on this having been quoted chapter
and verse.

Originally posted by LemonJello
So, you could change what you said to something like "I can still know that P even when I know that it is highly unlikely but still possible that P is false". I think this would be more in line with what fallibilism means.

So why does it not follow that given a sufficiently large number of 'knowns', some are false? What am I missing?

Originally posted by googlefudge
In this particular instance, I am referring to Deuteronomy 22:28~29,


28 If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her,
and lie with her, and they be found;

29 Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of
silver, and she shall be his wife; because he hath humbled So I was wondering if Suzianne had any thoughts on this having been quoted chapter
and verse.

(Deuteronomy 22:28-29) . . ."In case a man finds a girl, a virgin who has not been
engaged, and he actually seizes her and lies down with her, and they have been
found out,  the man who lay down with her must also give the girl’s father fifty
silver shekels, and she will become his wife due to the fact that he humiliated her.
He will not be allowed to divorce her all his days". - New world translation of the
Holy scriptures

Yes indeed, this was the case in pressured seduction and/or fornication. If an
unscrupulous man felt at liberty to have sex relations with a virgin, she would be the
loser, every time. Besides the possibility of an illegitimate child, her value as a bride
was diminished, for the Israelites were rather insistent that a women be chaste
virgin prior to marraige.

If you actually look at the verse it shows that the option of divorce disappeared after
premarital fornication. This, then, might cause a man (or a virgin woman) to resist
a temptation to share in fornication. A man should not feel at liberty simply to use a
virgin with no consequence to his action, rather, this law would deter immorality by
causing any would-be offender to weigh the long-term consequences of fornication
having to stay with the other party throughout his life.

The Law also lessened the problem of illegitimacy for if a man who seduced a virgin
had to marry her, their fornication would not result in an illegitimate offspring among
the Israelites.

Clearly the verse is indicative of a different social setting, it was after all compiled
2500 years ago, and to claim that its immoral by our modern sensitivities is to
ignore the cultural aspects which govern it and demonstrates a degree of bias
towards scripture. Suizzianne for all her faults is not under duress to uphold the
Mosaic law, nor can it be termed 'immoral', under the circumstances. Rape is
condemned, this verse is merely a provision to make sure that if such an outrage
occurs, there are consequences.

Originally posted by twhitehead
So why does it not follow that given a sufficiently large number of 'knowns', some are false? What am I missing?

If a proposition is known (regardless of whether it is fallibly or infallibly so), then the proposition is not false. One cannot know a false proposition. Fallibilism definitely does not imply that some known propositions will be false -- that is absurd. It does imply that S can know some proposition despite its being epistemically possible for S that this proposition is false.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding your question?

Originally posted by LemonJello
If a proposition is known (regardless of whether it is fallibly or infallibly so), then the proposition is not false. One cannot know a false proposition. Fallibilism definitely does not imply that some known propositions will be false -- that is absurd. It does imply that S can know some proposition despite its being epistemically possible for S that this proposition is false.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding your question?

My problem with this is that your definition of knowledge requires external information.

For fallibilist knowledge, you don't know for certain that what you claim to know is true.
By definition this must be the case.

You are saying that the only things that count or qualify as knowledge must be true.

Yet for those things I can only claim to know with a degree (however small) of uncertainty
any one of (or in the unlikely extreme all of) the things I claim to know could be false.
Yet you can't tell without some external super knowledge that discerns true and false
propositions.

People usually/often bring god in at this point and claim him and his teachings as the external
super knowledge.

Now if some evidence comes up that disproves something I claim as knowledge, then it is now
proven false and can't be claimed as knowledge.

However until this happens (if or when) the fallibilist knowledge contains uncertainty about its
truth or falsity. So how can you claim to know anything if your definition of knowledge requires
truth?


I would say the definition (for fallibilist knowledge) must be that you can't claim to know a proposition
proven false.
And to claim knowledge of a proposition requires a given level of rigorous justification that it is true.

Thus fallibilism must imply that some claimed known propositions will be false.
Which is why fallibilist knowledge must be constantly challenged and tested to try to weed out the claimed
knowledge that is false.

Originally posted by googlefudge
My problem with this is that your definition of knowledge requires external information.

For fallibilist knowledge, you don't know for certain that what you claim to know is true.
By definition this must be the case.

You are saying that the only things that count or qualify as knowledge must be true.

Yet for those things I can only claim to kno ...[text shortened]... be constantly challenged and tested to try to weed out the claimed
knowledge that is false.

For fallibilist knowledge, you don't know for certain that what you claim to know is true.
By definition this must be the case.

No, that is false. Bbarr already addressed this misunderstanding of yours back on Page 9 (refer to the discussion related to periodic infallibilism). Again, in short, that S knows that P with epistemic certainty is still generally compatible with fallibilism, since it is still generally compatible with the idea that S would still know that P even without the certainty. So the terms of fallibilism do not imply that everything you claim to know (or do in fact know) is known without epistemic certainty; rather, it implies that epistemic certainty is not necessary for knowledge. It is not clear that you understand this difference.

You are saying that the only things that count or qualify as knowledge must be true.

Everyone will say that propositional truth is an external condition on knowledge, fallibilists and infallibilists alike.

Yet for those things I can only claim to know with a degree (however small) of uncertainty
any one of (or in the unlikely extreme all of) the things I claim to know could be false.

Yes, but I am not understanding what point you are trying to make, since this is just trivial. Obviously, if S does not have epistemic certainty about the truth of P, then there is some epistemic possibility for S that P is false.

Now if some evidence comes up that disproves something I claim as knowledge, then it is now
proven false and can't be claimed as knowledge.

S can still claim to know that P (perhaps even justifiably so) even when P is in fact false. But S would be mistaken in that claim (again, the claim could still be justified, however). Again, not understanding what your point is, or how this constitutes any sort of problem for the fallibilist. It seems perfectly understandable and natural that our knowledge claims would be defeasible and amenable to new evidence that we uncover.

However until this happens (if or when) the fallibilist knowledge contains uncertainty about its
truth or falsity. So how can you claim to know anything if your definition of knowledge requires
truth?

Again, fallibilism does not entail that knowledge is without epistemic certainty: this is still your own misunderstanding (see above). But, yes, fallibilism does hold that epistemic certainty is not required for knowledge. What exactly is your argument for the contrary? Just asking questions of this sort does not amount to an actual argument against fallibilism that I or bbarr or anyone else should take seriously. What actual reasons can you provide that would demonstrate that epistemic certainty is necessary for knowledge?

I would say the definition (for fallibilist knowledge) must be that you can't claim to know a proposition
proven false.

That makes no sense. How is that a definition for knowledge, let alone fallibilist knowledge? I vote that we stick to the standard definition of 'fallibilism' used by professionals like bbarr.

Thus fallibilism must imply that some claimed known propositions will be false.

No. Fallibilism implies that certainty is not requisite for knowledge. It does not imply that, as a descriptive fact, persons will be mistaken in their knowledge claims. Although, of course, that persons will be mistaken in their knowledge claims at times is pretty much a guarantee in practice.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]For fallibilist knowledge, you don't know for certain that what you claim to know is true.
By definition this must be the case.

No, that is false. Bbarr already addressed this misunderstanding of yours back on Page 9 (refer to the discussion related to periodic infallibilism). Again, in short, that S knows that P with epistemic certainty is s ...[text shortened]... will be mistaken in their knowledge claims at times is pretty much a guarantee in practice.[/b]

I am not going to do a full response now as its too late and I am too tired to do it justice.
I will do so later.

But I did want to say this.

You haven't grasped what I am saying.

Whether this is through me not being clear enough I don't know, it is entirely possible.

I have never studied (in any formal way) economics or philosophy, and thus am not conversant
with the terminology/jargon.
I studied physics which has lots of jargon of its own that I am conversant with.

I have often had arguments with economists about things where they were adamant I was wrong,
after going round and round many times I finally grasped enough of the jargon they insisted on using to
make my point in terms they understood....
Almost every time they then agreed with me that I had been right all along.

This was not always the case, and may very well not be here.

But it has been the case most of the time I have got into arguments with people who understood
the jargon where I didn't.

So for the moment I will simply say, You haven't grasped what I was saying, this may well be my fault,
but please bear in mind that your arguments don't apply because you are arguing against a position I don't hold.

I don't know if the knowledge that I am not saying what you think I am saying makes my post easier to read or not.

I will attempt to clarify properly, when I am sure I am awake enough not to make it worse.

I would ask that you bear in mind that I am evidently not up to speed with the jargon, but that doesn't mean I
can't understand the concepts.
If you could make your points without jargon that would perhaps make life easier, if possibly more verbose.

Originally posted by robbie carrobie
(Deuteronomy 22:28-29) . . ."In case a man finds a girl, a virgin who has not been
engaged, and he actually seizes her and lies down with her, and they have been
found out,  the man who lay down with her must also give the girl’s father fifty
silver shekels, and she will become his wife due to the fact that he humiliated her.
He will not be al ...[text shortened]... is merely a provision to make sure that if such an outrage
occurs, there are consequences.

What you are supporting here is abominable.

Try to work out why before I do it for you when I get time tomorrow.

Originally posted by googlefudge
What you are supporting here is abominable.

Try to work out why before I do it for you when I get time tomorrow.

It sure is, and he's not denying one bit!

He thinks women have their place and should stick to it because that's what scripture teaches him.

Abominable? very much so!!