A Brute Fact ?

Originally posted by apathist
But I understand that our knowledge can be wrong, so your example doesn't disturb me. I'm not an idealist!

Here is why your usage can be rejected: we have a discipline that studies physical reality (the world, the terrain) and has done so well that it separated from philosophy into what we call science. And science does not claim that physical reality co ...[text shortened]... nt that I'm right, you'll find that normative usage of the word completely supports my position.

",,does not outweigh science.."

I'm sorry but that is not a slam dunk.

Just because most people think something does not make it any more truer. More evidence than that is needed for a jam . Perhaps you made a sound block instead?

Originally posted by apathist
But I understand that our knowledge can be wrong, so your example doesn't disturb me. I'm not an idealist!

Here is why your usage can be rejected: we have a discipline that studies physical reality (the world, the terrain) and has done so well that it separated from philosophy into what we call science. And science does not claim that physical reality co ...[text shortened]... nt that I'm right, you'll find that normative usage of the word completely supports my position.

But I understand that our knowledge can be wrong, so your example doesn't disturb me. I'm not an idealist!

The example has nothing to do with idealism. It has to do with confusing discourse.

And science does not claim that physical reality consists of objects and facts.

Is that a fact?

“In science, a fact is a repeatable careful observation or measurement (by experimentation or other means), also called empirical evidence. Facts are central to building scientific theories. Various forms of observation and measurement lead to fundamental questions about the scientific method, and the scope and validity of scientific reasoning.

“In the most basic sense, a scientific fact is an objective and verifiable observation, in contrast with a hypothesis or theory, which is intended to explain or interpret facts.[20]”

—https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact (My emphasis)

And from The National Center for Science Education:

“Science uses specialized terms that have different meanings than everyday usage. These definitions correspond to the way scientists typically use these terms in the context of their work. Note, especially, that the meaning of “theory” in science is different than the meaning of “theory” in everyday conversation.

• Fact: In science, an observation that has been repeatedly confirmed and for all practical purposes is accepted as “true.” Truth in science, however, is never final and what is accepted as a fact today may be modified or even discarded tomorrow.

• Hypothesis: A tentative statement about the natural world leading to deductions that can be tested. If the deductions are verified, the hypothesis is provisionally corroborated. If the deductions are incorrect, the original hypothesis is proved false and must be abandoned or modified. Hypotheses can be used to build more complex inferences and explanations.

• Law: A descriptive generalization about how some aspect of the natural world behaves under stated circumstances.

• Theory: In science, a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that can incorporate facts, laws, inferences, and tested hypotheses.

—https://ncse.com/library-resource/definitions-fact-theory-law-scientific-work (My emphasis)

NOTE: Observations are observations of what is the case in the natural world, the “terrain”—i.e. empirical evidence; hypotheses and theories are the interpretations—the “map”. An observation can of course be in error--but that does not change the facts; it just means the observation was factually incorrect..

See also: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/scientific-fact

As for common usage: “The common usage of "something that has really occurred or is the case" dates from the middle of the sixteenth century.[2]” [From Wiki above]

As for philosophical usage: “A "fact" can be defined as something that is the case—that is, a state of affairs.[12][13]” [From Wiki above]

_______________________________________________

I could go on. But you can surely persist in your uncommon usage—you’ll just have to keep explaining to folks that what you mean by a fact is not what most everyone else does, including scientists.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]But I understand that our knowledge can be wrong, so your example doesn't disturb me. I'm not an idealist!

The example has nothing to do with idealism. It has to do with confusing discourse.

And science does not claim that physical reality consists of objects and facts.

Is that a fact?

“[i]In science, a fact is a repeatable car ...[text shortened]... to folks that what you mean by a fact is not what most everyone else does, including scientists.

Addendum to above post: If you want to identify facts with observations (in the strict context of scientific discourse), I don’t have as much of a problem as with identifying facts with our understanding/interpretations (e.g., hypotheses)—as you originally presented it. The observations are what embody empirical evidence; there is no other way we can acquire it. (My background, by the way, is in a social science, not philosophy.)

By the way, philosophy (e.g., philosophy of science) does sometimes affect the scientific community—for example, I believe it was the philosopher Karl Popper who led the scientific community to adopt falsificationism rather than verificationism as the proper methodology.

EDIT: I'm going to ask a couple of my physical scientist friends if they think they observe facts. Or maybe we could inquire on the Science Forum?

Originally posted by apathist
But I understand that our knowledge can be wrong, so your example doesn't disturb me. I'm not an idealist!

Here is why your usage can be rejected: we have a discipline that studies physical reality (the world, the terrain) and has done so well that it separated from philosophy into what we call science. And science does not claim that physical reality co ...[text shortened]... nt that I'm right, you'll find that normative usage of the word completely supports my position.

And science does not claim that physical reality consists of objects and facts.

What do you mean by this? If you mean that science does not claim that the universe is made of theories, then I agree, the description is not the thing. But you cannot possibly think that science does not make claims that objects exist? Physical theories make ontological claims. Fundamental physics does make the claim that there really are things like electrons and quarks. Biology divides life into archeae, prokaryotes, and eukaryotes - this categorization includes the implicit claim that the objects being classified actually exist.

But more importantly, it doesn't matter a flying fig to this discussion whether science makes ontological claims or not. Your usage of the word "fact" to mean anything other than a sentence about the world which is true is incorrect.

If you suppose for a moment that I'm right, you'll find that normative usage of the word completely supports my position.

This is an amazing sentence, you are actually asking a debating opponent to beg the question in the hope that . Clearly, if vistesd assumes you are right then he's going to find that you are right, but if the assumption that you are right is in fact wrong then his conclusion will be faulty.

In the case of a sentence whose truth isn't known with certainty you might want to call it a provisional fact, but most of us just put up with the possibility that something we think is a fact isn't. Since we do not expect truth tests to be infallible we have to put up with the risk that some of what we think are facts aren't in fact facts. Basically, a sentence that has passed some reasonable truth test is treated as a fact until shown to be otherwise. That there's some uncertainty surrounding facts does not mean that they can be both wrong and facts.

Originally posted by DeepThought
[b]And science does not claim that physical reality consists of objects and facts.

What do you mean by this? If you mean that science does not claim that the universe is made of theories, then I agree, the description is not the thing. But you cannot possibly think that science does not make claims that objects exist? Physical theories make ont ...[text shortened]... there's some uncertainty surrounding facts does not mean that they can be both wrong and facts.[/b]

Following a bit on your last post in the science thread—but stepping back for a moment from the question of special usage in science that I asked about there—consider the following sentence:

“Fred is next to John.” That sentence states a relationship: call it f-R-j.

Now, when Wittgenstein in the Tractatus says that the world is made up of facts, not things, I don’t see him as meaning that the world is made up of sentences (though, I confess that I have not waded through it for awhile—and I’m drawing a bit on a book I was reading some time back that is analysis of the Tractatus; I likely need to do some review before I continue further). Rather, a fact is what is the case—in the above example, the case that f-R-j. A sentence (or a belief, if unexpressed) either accurately reflects the facts, or it does not.

My copy of the Tractatus has gone maddeningly walkabout—so I can’t quote at the moment (am looking for it).

The later Wittgenstein (i.e., of the Philosophical Investigations) holds that words—and expressions—draw their meaning from their contextual usage “language games” ). A sentence such as “Fred is next to John” can refer to a relationship of physical proximity, for example, or an ordering of some kind, or perhaps something else.

I took apathist as saying that a “fact” means something different in scientific discourse than in philosophical discourse—or everyday common discourse. And one of his claims was: “Your usage comes from a source that does not outweigh science when it comes to searching for an explanation of physical reality.” I asked the question in the Science Forum on the chance that there is simply a different language game in play. (Thanks for your responses there, by the way.)

Originally posted by vistesd
Following a bit on your last post in the science thread—but stepping back for a moment from the question of special usage in science that I asked about there—consider the following sentence:

“Fred is next to John.” That sentence states a relationship: call it f-R-j.

Now, when Wittgenstein in the Tractatus says that the world is made up of facts, no ...[text shortened]... ere is simply a different language game in play. (Thanks for your responses there, by the way.)

Well, if there's a thing which has no relationship to anything else then it may as well not exist as far as everything else is concerned. "I see it." means there's a relationship between "it" and "I", so a thing without relationships to other things is undetectable. Since Wittgenstein cannot literally have meant that there are no "things", otherwise there is nothing for the relationships to be between, he must have meant that the world has things in it, but what makes it a world that is interesting is the relationships between the things.

I may have to do some reading to see what people have actually written about this. We need two words to express the candidate meanings of fact. Candidate meaning (1) A state of affairs. Candidate meaning (2) is a statement about the World. I think in actual usage there is considerable blurring between meanings 1 and meaning 2. The Oxford Dictionary gives definition 1 as "A thing known or proved to be true.", now on the one hand it says "thing", which seems to support meaning (1), but it also says it is "true" which implies that the thing is a truth-bearer which implies meaning (2). It gives some subsidiary meanings, in 1.1 it specifies information, which again implies meaning (2), in 1.2 it gives "used to refer to a particular situation under discussion" which is more like meaning (1). The other meaning is given as chiefly law and distinguishes between a fact and its interpretation, I think the kind of distinction they're making is along the lines of that a defendant was seen going to a place where a crime was later committed (the fact) does not necessarily mean that the defendant was going there in order to commit the crime (the interpretation).

In the light of that I'm altering my stance. The word "fact" has two meanings. The division between a statement about a thing and the thing itself is blurry. I feel it ought to denote a statement that is true, the problem is that it is used in this equivocating way. The constraint on the statement is that it is true, in other words says something which corresponds to actuality, so there is this confusion between the map and the territory.

Originally posted by DeepThought
In the light of that I'm altering my stance. The word "fact" has two meanings. The division between a statement about a thing and the thing itself is blurry.

In the term 'brute fact', which meaning is applied? Or do both meanings work?

From Wikipedia:

Henri Poincaré distinguished between brute facts and their scientific descriptions, pointing to how the conventional nature of the latter always remained constrained by the brute fact in question.[3]

Pierre Duhem argued that just as there may be several scientific descriptions of the same brute fact, so too there may be many brute facts with the same scientific description.

Both the above would appear to be taking 'fact' to refer to what is actually the case rather than statements about what is the case.

Originally posted by twhitehead
In the term 'brute fact', which meaning is applied? Or do both meanings work?

This is 1.3 in the Oxford dictionaries' list of definitions (a fact as distinct from its interpretation). However, whether it refers to a sentence or the state of affairs itself, or both, depends on the speaker. There's a lot of context missing with the term "brute fact" in isolation.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Well, if there's a thing which has no relationship to anything else then it may as well not exist as far as everything else is concerned. "I see it." means there's a relationship between "it" and "I", so a thing without relationships to other things is undetectable. Since Wittgenstein cannot literally have meant that there are no "things", otherwise th ...[text shortened]... ng which corresponds to actuality, so there is this confusion between the map and the territory.

Well, if there's a thing which has no relationship to anything else then it may as well not exist as far as everything else is concerned. "I see it." means there's a relationship between "it" and "I", so a thing without relationships to other things is undetectable. Since Wittgenstein cannot literally have meant that there are no "things", otherwise there is nothing for the relationships to be between, he must have meant that the world has things in it, but what makes it a world that is interesting is the relationships between the things.

Well, I’m not sure what it would mean for a thing to exist in absolute isolation—but we could know nothing of such a thing, including its existence. So I suspect that is what W. was getting at—not, as you note, that there are no things.

1. The world is everything that is the case.
1.1 The word is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and whatever is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

The following may help a bit (from Michael Morris, Wittgenstein and the Tractatus, Routledge, 2008):

“Facts are composed of things; and a fact is not just an assemblage of things: it has a certain organic unity of its own.”

“A fact is, as it were, a that such and such is the case . . . . “ (my italics)

“Logical space is the space of possibilities . . . The actual facts are only some of the possible facts; they exist, in a sense, among all the possible facts. What is possible maps out the extent of logical space.” (italics in original)

Okay, that’s as far as I’m willing to go on the Tractatus until I get back into my studies of it—so maybe all that’s just annoying. I agree with the rest of what you wrote. So, I’ll leave the issue for now. Thanks for your help. 🙂

Originally posted by DeepThought
Well, if there's a thing which has no relationship to anything else then it may as well not exist as far as everything else is concerned. "I see it." means there's a relationship between "it" and "I", so a thing without relationships to other things is undetectable. Since Wittgenstein cannot literally have meant that there are no "things", otherwise th ...[text shortened]... ng which corresponds to actuality, so there is this confusion between the map and the territory.

Methinks every state of affairs is a statement about the World😵

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Well, if there's a thing which has no relationship to anything else then it may as well not exist as far as everything else is concerned. "I see it." means there's a relationship between "it" and "I", so a thing without relationships to other things is undetectable. Since Wittgenstein cannot literally have meant that there are no "things", otherwise there ...[text shortened]... e with the rest of what you wrote. So, I’ll leave the issue for now. Thanks for your help. 🙂

I have the feeling that "fact" to W. is merely a picture that corresponds to the territory, thus sharing the form of the logical space with the fact itself. To him, ALL the pictures (the objects of our 6 senses) stand to one another in the internal relation of the bond between language and the World, and all of them have a common logical structure.

Hope you and yours are good, my feer. Best!
😵

Originally posted by black beetle
I have the feeling that "fact" to W. is merely a picture that corresponds to the territory, thus sharing the form of the logical space with the fact itself. To him, ALL the pictures (the objects of our 6 senses) stand to one another in the internal relation of the bond between language and the World, and all of them have a common logical structure.

Hope you and yours are good, my feer. Best!
😵

And I hope you and yours are well too, old friend.

Originally posted by black beetle
Methinks every state of affairs is a statement about the World😵

No, or at least I didn't intend that. When I said "state of affairs" I wanted a phrase that implied "what actually is" rather than our description of it. If there is no way of expressing that then discourse about the world becomes impossible, all we talk about then is our own statements.

Originally posted by DeepThought
No, or at least I didn't intend that. When I said "state of affairs" I wanted a phrase that implied "what actually is" rather than our description of it. If there is no way of expressing that then discourse about the world becomes impossible, all we talk about then is our own statements.

"What actually is", is impossible to exist inherently and in no dependence on the language-World bond. "What actually is" gets a meaning solely through a conceptual or non-conceptual state of affairs😵