27 Mar 16
Originally posted by twhiteheadHere's a definition of free will for you then: I wish for a some outcome, out of a number of outcomes, and bring it about independently of external constraints. On another day I might choose for another outcome. I will it. This is essentially Hume's position.
No, I do not know what they mean and it would appear that you do not know either, hence my suggestion that a definition be given.
Moonbus specifically states that randomness "wouldn't be freewill--it would be caprice". That suggests that randomness is not a requirement in his understanding of 'free will' but it is in yours.
Lets stop the mind reading ...[text shortened]... d state your definition, and let them state theirs then we at least can communicate effectively.
27 Mar 16
Originally posted by DeepThoughtWould your own memories be considered 'external constraints'?
Here's a definition of free will for you then: I wish for a some outcome, out of a number of outcomes, and bring it about independently of external constraints. On another day I might choose for another outcome. I will it. This is essentially Hume's position.
Would a fully deterministic brain mechanism not have free will?
27 Mar 16
Originally posted by twhiteheadThere is no such thing as "the exact position and velocity of an electron," so obviously one cannot measure it. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is simply a consequence of the formulation of quantum mechanics; wave functions live in a particular type of function space wherein the product of the variance of position and momentum cannot drop below a certain value.
You cannot measure the exact position and velocity of an electron.
27 Mar 16
Originally posted by DeepThoughtIndeed. I therefore expect this matter to not be settled conclusively using empirical means although the occurrence of "true randomness" might be made more plausible in the future (by performing more precise measurements).
Well yes, but that's true of any empirical result.
28 Mar 16
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadexactly.
Would your own memories be considered 'external constraints'?
Would a fully deterministic brain mechanism not have free will?
Often the concept of 'free will' many people have is self-contradictory because it it taken to simultaneously mean BOTH the ability of someone to make a choice not determined by anything AND for that that same someone to determine his own choice. How can your choice be determined by self and yet not be determined? That is a contradiction. Talking about 'self determination' rather than 'free will' would make a bit more sense but, even with 'self determination', there are both conscious and unconscious outside influences on your choices you make.
28 Mar 16
Originally posted by KazetNagorraIt would appear I was wrong. In my defence, the confusion appears to be common place.
There is no such thing as "the exact position and velocity of an electron," so obviously one cannot measure it. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is simply a consequence of the formulation of quantum mechanics; wave functions live in a particular type of function space wherein the product of the variance of position and momentum cannot drop below a certain value.
28 Mar 16
Originally posted by KazetNagorraI think you are talking about "hidden variables". It seems that the possibility of local hidden variables has been ruled out (Bell's theorem).
Of course it may well be that the non-randomness of radioactive decay, if it is indeed not a truly random process, is beyond our capability to measure at this point.
And if there are non-local hidden variables, that seems to me to disprove reductionism!
28 Mar 16
Originally posted by apathistI'm not talking about hidden variables. Bell's theorem rules out that (for instance) a particle has a definite momentum and position at the same time (as described by a hidden variable theory), but the absence of a definite momentum and position does not imply randomness.
I think you are talking about "hidden variables". It seems that the possibility of [b]local hidden variables has been ruled out (Bell's theorem).
And if there are non-local hidden variables, that seems to me to disprove reductionism![/b]
28 Mar 16
Originally posted by twhiteheadVolition is the act or an instance of making a conscious choice or decision.It is a voluntary decision. That's a standard type of definition.
Well then you have to define 'will'. Certainly nothing in the article in the OP really has any direct bearing on volition or lack thereof. It may have bearing on what types of 'will' may be possible.
More technically, volition (or will) is the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action. It is defined as purposive striving and is one of the primary human psychological functions.
That stuff is from wikipedia, but I see the same or similar wording in other standard, philosophy, and psychology dictionaries.
The definitions implicate some sort of top-down causation, don't they?