Why? How? - ultimate truth

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
The laws of logic are simply abstract representations of the actual ways in which actual facts actually relate to each other. In this view, they are an emergent phenomenon arising from the nature of facts. Thus the more fruitful question to investigate is whether the nature of facts would be the same in all universes; that is, whether the nature of ...[text shortened]... k there is a good reason to deny that the laws of logic would be the same in another universe.

The doctor bonum is correct. The question we are asking -- where does logic come from or
can logic be different from universe to universe -- doesn't make sense because logic isn't a 'thing.'
Logic describes relationships between or among things. So, the 'things' which logic describe
will of course change, as will their relationships, but logic is merely a system of description.
That system entails some basic properties which cannot vary -- A = ~A doesn't even have the
possibility of making sense, for example. I'm not strong enough a logician to detail all the
immutable aspects of the system -- DoctorScribbles far outstrips my capacity in that regard.

As for a 'callout,' I doubt that LemonJello or Twitehead would dispute this or what DoctorScribbles
said.

Nemesio

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
The laws of logic are simply abstract representations of the actual ways in which actual facts actually relate to each other.

Surely there are whole branches of mathematics - Group Theory comes to mind - which do not have any facts whatsoever. I cant actually see how something like the real numbers or complex numbers are dependent on facts or on which universe they are in.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Must God have originated somehow?

No , and logic could be the same , but whitey and lemon aren't allowed that escape route , I am.

Originally posted by knightmeister
No , and logic could be the same , but whitey and lemon aren't allowed that escape route , I am.

You seem to be claiming that if there is something eternal then God must exist. Is that so?

Originally posted by twhitehead
Surely there are whole branches of mathematics - Group Theory comes to mind - which do not have any facts whatsoever. I cant actually see how something like the real numbers or complex numbers are dependent on facts or on which universe they are in.

Even group theory relies on rules, thus facts, thus logic can be extrapolated.

Originally posted by twhitehead
You seem to be claiming that if there is something eternal then God must exist. Is that so?

Not at all. It's you that claims that something can exist independently of the universe , which seems to me to be at odds with your belief system. You have yet to describe how logic manages this amazing feat.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Freaky you have probably summed it up well. Lemon and whitey have been suggesting that logic is totally independent of the universe to which I felt justified in asking how could that be. If it doesn't derive from the universe what on earth does it derive from?

Knightmeister, you're either not very adept at following simple discussions or you're just being disingenuous in your attributing certain ideas to me. I haven't stated anything about logic's being "independent of the universe" or whether or not it "derives from the universe" because I don't understand what those are even supposed to mean here. In part, what I was saying is just that I think, e.g., the validity of modus ponens is necessary in a way that the physical laws of our universe just aren't.

You're the one who started pistol-whipping outlandish claims about logic like you're some sort of logical cowboy. In particular, you claimed that logic "derives" from the universe in that it is based on our observation of the physical laws. I took that to mean that you somehow deny the a priori and that you think the principles of logic somehow supervene on the physical laws. That's all a bit ridiculous if you ask me.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
It's difficult to follow both of your ramblings, but I think I understand his question to you.

In your opinion:
1. What is logic?
2. What is logic based upon--- if anything?
3. Where does logic come from?

Even if I have his inquiries wrong, I'm curious to see your responses to the questions I have put to you.

And, again, I simply don't understand your questions (2) and (3). It's like you and knightmeister want causal explanation for articles of logic – in which case, you and knightmeister should come to realize that not all explanations are, or need to be, causal. If you find these questions easily comprehensible and interesting, we probably differ on what we think logic is.

Concerning your question (1), I would say logic is a grammar that concerns descriptions of proper inference and reasoning. Logic, in my opinion, does not concern the truth of propositions per se but rather concerns transitions and relationships between propositions. That would be a first pass I guess.

Originally posted by LemonJello
And, again, I simply don't understand your questions (2) and (3). It's like you and knightmeister want causal explanation for articles of logic – in which case, you and knightmeister should come to realize that not all explanations are, or need to be, causal. If you find these questions easily comprehensible and interesting, we probably differ on what w ...[text shortened]... cerns transitions and relationships between propositions. That would be a first pass I guess.

Would not the suggestion that there exists a possible universe in which modus ponens, for example, does not hold, be simply an incoherent suggestion?

Would it not be suggesting that there can exist some set of facts U(p,q), whose relationship can be such that [ p => q : p : ~q ] is, in that universe, a valid inference? But that is absurd. Similarly for Nemesio’s example of identity: to assert the possibility of some U(x), such that (x is not* x) is absurd on the face of it.

Note that I am not saying just that such universes would be incoherent, but that the very statement that such a universe could exist is itself incoherent. Any talk about a possible universe in which the laws of logical relationship would not hold is simply meaningless.

To rephrase Dr. Scribbles’ statement a bit: the laws of logic are representative statements of the fundamental coherency of the universe. If one wants to make the argument that the coherency of the universe itself requires a cause (a version of the cosmological argument), then one must perforce assume those very laws of logic if one wants such an argument to be—well, logical.

I confess that I am getting confused by some of these discussions: Is (the existence of) God supposed to be a conclusion based on certain premises (e.g. the coherency of the universe), a premise leading to certain conclusions (e.g. the coherency of the universe), or an assertion in search of some premises in order to turn it into a conclusion...?

* Replacement for the "not equals" sign, which did not post.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Not at all. It's you that claims that something can exist independently of the universe , which seems to me to be at odds with your belief system. You have yet to describe how logic manages this amazing feat.

Firstly I don't consider it to be physical existence as you seem to imply, and secondly you haven't yet shown why it is either amazing or at odds with my belief system. In fact I wasn't really aware that I had a belief system in the first place.

Originally posted by vistesd
Would not the suggestion that there exists a possible universe in which modus ponens, for example, does not hold, be simply an incoherent suggestion?

Would it not be suggesting that there can exist some set of facts U(p,q), whose relationship can be such that [ p => q : p : ~q ] is, in that universe, a valid inference? But that is absurd. Simila ...[text shortened]... turn it into a conclusion...?

* Replacement for the "not equals" sign, which did not post.

Hi. Nice post.

Would not the suggestion that there exists a possible universe in which modus ponens, for example, does not hold, be simply an incoherent suggestion?

Would it not be suggesting that there can exist some set of facts U(p,q), whose relationship can be such that [ p => q : p : ~q ] is, in that universe, a valid inference? But that is absurd. Similarly for Nemesio’s example of identity: to assert the possibility of some U(x), such that (x is not* x) is absurd on the face of it.

To say that there is some possible universe where (P --> Q) is true and P is true and Q is false is to say (by definition) that modus ponens (MP) is invalid. (I believe I am right in saying that because an argument is valid just in case it is not possible for its premises to be true and its conclusion false.) I don't think, however, that it would be equivalent to saying that the argument {(P --> Q) and P, therefore ~Q} is valid (by the definition of validity above) because to say that MP doesn't hold in some case(s) is not equivalent to saying that it doesn't hold in every possible case. But I do agree that it is incoherent to assert that MP is invalid because a clear contradiction follows from the conjunction of (P --> Q), P, and ~Q. Likewise, I think the example you reference to Nemesio is clearly incoherent because it is a direct contradiction.

Note that I am not saying just that such universes would be incoherent, but that the very statement that such a universe could exist is itself incoherent. Any talk about a possible universe in which the laws of logical relationship would not hold is simply meaningless.

I agree. For instance, although most equate omnipotence with the ability to do anything that is logically possible, some don't make this further qualification. I believe Descartes is one such example with his ideas regarding the "eternal truths". He seems to think it is possible for God to bring about logical impossibilities. To me, that clearly signals a boundary for coherent thought and I say chalk it up to meaninglessness.

I am getting confused by some of these discussions

I think the thread has gotten somewhat sidetracked from the original post where, to my mind, knightmeister is trying to cast doubt on the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Definitely I think considerations of the PSR are critical to many formulations of the Cosmological Argument.

Originally posted by LemonJello
And, again, I simply don't understand your questions (2) and (3). It's like you and knightmeister want causal explanation for articles of logic – in which case, you and knightmeister should come to realize that not all explanations are, or need to be, causal. If you find these questions easily comprehensible and interesting, we probably differ on what w ...[text shortened]... cerns transitions and relationships between propositions. That would be a first pass I guess.

And, again, I simply don't understand your questions (2) and (3).
Are not all abstracts based on reality or some form of the same? I think your response thus far is purposely understated, stopping short of admitting what has been charged; namely, that logic is only possible because it is based upon something real, if not altogether tangible.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Are not all abstracts based on reality or some form of the same?

No, 1+1=2 is not based on reality. It is totally abstract.

Originally posted by LemonJello
And, again, I simply don't understand your questions (2) and (3). It's like you and knightmeister want causal explanation for articles of logic – in which case, you and knightmeister should come to realize that not all explanations are, or need to be, causal. If you find these questions easily comprehensible and interesting, we probably differ on what w ...[text shortened]... cerns transitions and relationships between propositions. That would be a first pass I guess.

Lemonjello, I think the problem continues to be that some people are
viewing logic as a 'thing' rather than a function. It's like asking, 'Where
did addition come from?' Addition didn't come from anywhere because
it isn't a 'thing' that arises. Addition, like logic, describes the relationships
among things thus superficially appears to be predicated on them, but
the truth is it doesn't require them, since we can talk abstractly
about both numbers and logical forms. Of course, in the absence of
things, the utility of addition or logic is also removed because it becomes
entirely abstract. But then again, what wouldn't be abstract in the absence
of all things?

The observation and articulation of addition obviously arose when there
were beings intelligent enough to describe it (just as in logic).

So, the questions don't even make sense, not to me at least.

Nemesio

Originally posted by twhitehead
No, 1+1=2 is not based on reality. It is totally abstract.

Yes, totally abstract, but attached nonetheless to reality. It does not require physical tangibles in order to make it real; it is real because it conforms to rules.