Originally posted by Coletti
How do you separate knowledge from false propositions? Some one could claim that they know something you think is false. Do that person have no knowledge in this instance? Is knowledge a matter of opinion, probabilities, certainties, feelings?
I'm not trying to imply the there is false knowledge when I say true knowledge, I am emphasizing the knowledge is true - so accuse me of being redundant.
Suppose subject S knows a proposition K. It follows from this, minimally, that S believes K, that S is justified in believing K, and that K is true. In short, if you don't believe something, then you can't know it; if you believe something for no good reason, then you don't know it (this is what distinguishes knowledge from lucky guesses), if that which you believe is false, then you don't know it (even if you are justified in believing this falsehood). These are all necessary conditions for knowing something (though they are not jointly sufficient, as Gettier pointed out a few decades back). So, knowledge is not a matter of opinion nor feeling, because there are objective conditions on knowing (e.g., that the proposition known must be true).
So, again, when you ask for an 'ultimate account' of secular ethics, what exactly do you mean? As far as I can tell, theistic ethics is at least as worse off as most secular ethical theories when it comes to justifying its core claims about morality being dependent on God's will or character, God being able to make acts right or wrong by fiat, etc.
Out of curiousity, where do you get your information about secular ethical theories?