09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioWhat if I say 'I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis,' and it turns out she is
I believe I follow what you're saying, but I'm still struggling with the following example:
What if I say 'I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis,' and it turns out she is
in fact not home (like, as you said, for some unlikely emergency to get medicine for a child who
has suddenly fallen ill), something I find out after the fact?
...[text shortened]... was, but it turns out...'
Again, I'm sorry if I'm fumbling around here...
Nemesio
in fact not home (like, as you said, for some unlikely emergency to get medicine for a child who
has suddenly fallen ill), something I find out after the fact?
All that would show is that you were, in fact, mistaken when you claimed to know that your wife was at home. Neither the fallibilist nor the infallibilist will allow that one can know a false proposition. You were, however, obviously correct when you claimed that your basis was fallible. A main difference is the following. Suppose instead your wife really was at home. The infallibilist will deny that you could know that, given that your basis for believing it was fallible. The fallibilist, on the other hand, does not hold that the fallibility of the basis precludes your knowing it, so long as other conditions are met (such as your belief being justified).
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by LemonJelloHmm.
[b]What if I say 'I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis,' and it turns out she is
in fact not home (like, as you said, for some unlikely emergency to get medicine for a child who
has suddenly fallen ill), something I find out after the fact?
All that would show is that you were, in fact, mistaken when you claimed to know th ...[text shortened]... es your knowing it, so long as other conditions are met (such as your belief being justified).[/b]
Maybe I'm an infallibilist, then? That is, I use the word 'know' like a fallibilist, but just because
day-to-day discussions about where my wife is don't require the sort of philosophical qualifications
that more complicated matters demand. But, in my mind and if pressed, I would exchange the
word 'know' for 'believe justifiably,' which I take to be a more accurate expression of my own
hermeneutic.
However, it seems that infallibilism can yield absurdities pretty quickly. That is, at present, I am
home. My wife is sleeping in our bed in a room just slightly out of my view. I went in there to
get my pajamas, as I am going to sleep shortly, and I saw her. Would an infallibilist say that, since
I am no longer looking at her, I cannot 'know' that she's in that room (that is, I cannot 'know'
that she didn't spontaneously wake up and silently climb out the window during the five minutes
since I left)?
Would an infallibilist say I can't know that she's in the room even if I am looking at her because
I cannot be certain that my eyes are not playing tricks?
(I am, truly, going to bed, so I'll read what you write later today. Thanks so much for the tutorial.)
Nemesio
09 Oct 08
2 edits
Originally posted by NemesioMaybe I'm an infallibilist, then?...if pressed, I would exchange the
Hmm.
Maybe I'm an infallibilist, then? That is, I use the word 'know' like a fallibilist, but just because
day-to-day discussions about where my wife is don't require the sort of philosophical qualifications
that more complicated matters demand. But, in my mind and if pressed, I would exchange the
word 'know' for 'believe justifiably,' which I take t read what you write later today. Thanks so much for the tutorial.)
Nemesio
word 'know' for 'believe justifiably,'
Nothing about that sounds infallibilist to me. I am certainly not an infallibilist and I would also exchange 'know' for 'believe justifiably' (provided that we also stipulate that the belief in question is in fact true and further stipulate whatever we need to stipulate to get around Gettier considerations -- such as requiring that the justification is not accidental in a Gettier sense).
Would an infallibilist say that, since
I am no longer looking at her, I cannot 'know' that she's in that room (that is, I cannot 'know'
that she didn't spontaneously wake up and silently climb out the window during the five minutes
since I left)?
Generally, infallibilism is the thesis that knowing requires some infallibility condition to be met. For instance, this infallibility condition may be evidential: the infallibilist may require that in order to know P our evidence must be such that it logically entails that P. In that case, the answer to your question is yes since your evidence would not be sufficient to logically entail that your wife is still in the room (for example, her having left the room in the way you describe is logically consistent with your evidence). This sort of infallibilism leads to vicious skepticism in which we know virtually nothing. For instance, any time you use inductive or abductive reasoning, the evidence is not such that it logically entails the conclusion; and thus such exercises cannot yield knowledge.
Other forms of infallibilism may hold something like that S knows that P on basis B only if it is not possible that S have B and P is false. In other words, in order to have knowledge the basis for belief must be such that it somehow guarantees truth of P -- although it may not be clear what type of "possibility" is presumed. Depending on the construal of possibility, the infallibilist may well hold that in this instance your basis is not strong enough to guarantee that your wife is still in the room (thus precluding your knowing).
Would an infallibilist say I can't know that she's in the room even if I am looking at her because
I cannot be certain that my eyes are not playing tricks?
Maybe, I think again it depends on the construal of possibility that the infallibilist assumes. It certainly seems broadly possible that in this instance your eyes are playing tricks, and I suppose some would hold that you cannot know things based on such appearances.
Nothing you have ever written would make me think you are an infallibilist. Further, your intuition seems fallibilist to me since you acknowledge that infallibilist notions lead to absurdities (and I fully agree with you on that).
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by LemonJelloLots of knowledge may be false. Certainty is only attainable once you have established that your knowledge is true.
Give me one good reason to think that certainty** is necessary for knowledge.
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**considering either psychological certainty, in the sense that the subject is maximally sure or convinced that P; or epistemic certainty, in the sense that the evidence or basis for belief entails or is otherwise sufficient to guarantee the truth of P.
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioYou can only have 100% certainty after you have established that your knowledge is true. (i.e. logically consistent, empirically adequate, experientially relevant etc.)
Are you conceding that I can have at least some body of knowledge with 100% certainty now?
Nemesio
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioBut, in my mind and if pressed, I would exchange the
Hmm.
Maybe I'm an infallibilist, then? That is, I use the word 'know' like a fallibilist, but just because
day-to-day discussions about where my wife is don't require the sort of philosophical qualifications
that more complicated matters demand. But, in my mind and if pressed, I would exchange the
word 'know' for 'believe justifiably,' which I take t ...[text shortened]... read what you write later today. Thanks so much for the tutorial.)
Nemesio
word 'know' for 'believe justifiably,' which I take to be a more accurate expression of my own
hermeneutic.
Looking back, I think I misinterpreted what you meant here. In the above post, I meant that I find it perfectly acceptable to use 'believe justifiably' in place of 'know', provided that the further conditions I mentioned are assumed. However, now I think you meant something different: you meant that with respect to our example you would feel more comfortable (or more accurate) asserting that you "believe justifiably" that your wife is at home rather than that you "know" your wife is at home. Is that correct?
If so, I'm not sure that points toward infallibilist mindset. Your concern is that the belief may in fact turn out to be false (due to some contingency like your wife rushing to the store for medication for your child, or some such). But, apparently you still feel even in that case that your false belief may still be justified. This still strikes me as fallibilist intuition. I would think that the infallibilist intuition would be more like "well I think my wife is at home, but I really cannot be certain".
09 Oct 08
1 edit
Originally posted by veritas101Lots of knowledge may be false.
Lots of knowledge may be false. Certainty is only attainable once you have established that your knowledge is true.
No, it's more like if a proposition you believe turns out to be false, then this belief of yours never constituted knowledge to begin with.
Certainty is only attainable once you have established that your knowledge is true.
If you are talking about psychological certainty, then this statement of yours is clearly false: for instance, there is nothing necessarily preventing one from being maximally convinced of the truth of a proposition that is actually false. If you are talking about epistemic certainty, then I am not sure what you mean.
09 Oct 08
If Nemesio is sitting at home looking directly at his wife, and holding her hands, is he 100% certain that she is at home? Obviously there is the possibility that the woman in front of him is his wifes twin sister, or that they are both in the Matrix, or that Nemesio is having a very vivid dream. But once you doubt reality, you must ask the questions: "Does it matter?" and "If I am wrong, can I do better?"
If we are in the Matrix, but have no evidence for it, then why not act to all intents and purposes as if we are not? Or a deeper way of seeing it, is if there is no evidence, then is it reality, or is what we perceive reality?
Is "Nemesio" the computer circuit simulating him, or is he the resultant simulation?
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by veritas101OK, so basically you're just repeating yourself.
Being 100% sure about something.
Originally posted by veritas101
My bad. I meant no 'absolute' certainty.
Which means you're still jumping here. You took 'we cannot know some things with certainty' and stretched it into 'we cannot know anything with certainty'.
10 Oct 08
Originally posted by veritas101And your standard for establishing knowledge as logically consistent, empirically
You can only have 100% certainty after you have established that your knowledge is true. (i.e. logically consistent, empirically adequate, experientially relevant etc.)
adequate, and experientially relevant is...what?
Nemesio