Theological Fatalism Revisited

Originally posted by twhitehead
Would you agree that it is incoherent to say that a computer program has a 'choice' at an IF statement when referring to a particular static run that has already been completed?

Of course it is , but what's your point. Your analogy doesn't work on all levels. People are not proven to be automated machines and the world is not proven to work like a computer program.

I would say that it is coherent to say that after a static run has been completed that the possibility of that run having been a different run still remains. The computer may not have a choice after the run is completed but at the time there was a choice at that point in the program and that's all that matters. I have never disputed that the past cannot be altered only that time can only be influenced in the present moment. The fact that leonardo painted the mona lisa does not prove that he might not have painted her.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Of course it is , but what's your point. Your analogy doesn't work on all levels. People are not proven to be automated machines and the world is not proven to work like a computer program.

Whether people are automated machines is irrelevant. The key factor is that the universe is a static completed run (if your God exists). To talk of 'possibilities' with regard to reality is incoherent.

I would say that it is coherent to say that after a static run has been completed that the possibility of that run having been a different run still remains.
What? Are you now invoking a higher level timeline? Are you perhaps saying that the possibility that God will decide not to create the universe still remains?

The computer may not have a choice after the run is completed but at the time there was a choice at that point in the program and that's all that matters.
But only if more than one program run is under consideration. You first accept that something is incoherent then backtrack. Please make up your mind.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Whether people are automated machines is irrelevant. The key factor is that the universe is a static completed run (if your God exists). To talk of 'possibilities' with regard to reality is incoherent.

[b]I would say that it is coherent to say that after a static run has been completed that the possibility of that run having been a different run still ...[text shortened]... tion. You first accept that something is incoherent then backtrack. Please make up your mind.

If determinisim is totally true then your argument holds. If there is some free will in human choices then the possibility of different runs occuring is not prevented by knowingt one completed run.

You have spectacularly been unable to prove how knowing the run of the person we call Hitler proves it was the only run possible simply by knowing that run. You can only prove it by pre assuming determinism. Your "proof" is incomplete . You are aware of Goedel are you not?

Originally posted by knightmeister
God knew what Hitler would do before Hitler did it. ----no1 marauder---


Yes ,yes , but think a little harder now. Hitler is travelling along a timeline and God knows what will happen in HITLER'S future but this does not mean that God is also travelling alongside Hitler "in time". Hitler's future is not THE future for God.

If I had a time machi ou can. It's hard I know but if you give it a chance it becomes easier.

How many times do I have to address this fallacious reasoning?? You continue to ignore that God knew what Hitler was going to do BEFORE Hitler ever even existed! IF God cannot change what Hitler will do, then God IS existing in the same timeline. For the 100th time, a human in the future is not the same as God; he did not create the universe knowing EXACTLY IN EVERY DETAIL what would happen forever. But your God supposedly did. That conceit means he is utterly powerless to do anything or change anything that happens. Thus, he's not omnipotent; in fact, he's not very potent at all.

You are quite simply wrong about this; the type of universal omniscience you and most theists espouse lead inexorably to predestination.

Please stop with the pretentious nonsense like your last paragraph. You haven't found some deep understanding that us mere mortals are having difficulty grasping; you simply are unable to grasp the necessary implications of universal omniscience. And that is a God who has that attribute cannot be omnipotent or possess free will. The "box" is one you have made.

EDIT: A simple and direct question: Could God make it so Hitler never starts WWII?

Originally posted by knightmeister
If determinisim is totally true then your argument holds. If there is some free will in human choices then the possibility of different runs occuring is not prevented by knowingt one completed run.

Why do you insist on missing the point?
Tell me, in my computer program scenario, how, within the context of the one and only completed run, there is still a possibility of different runs occurring.
Also tell me what determinism has to do with anything. I have not claimed that my computer is deterministic. In fact I think I did say it did not have to be ie external input to the program was allowed.

Originally posted by no1marauder
How many times do I have to address this fallacious reasoning?? You continue to ignore that God knew what Hitler was going to do BEFORE Hitler ever even existed! IF God cannot change what Hitler will do, then God IS existing in the same timeline. For the 100th time, a human in the future is not the same as God; he did not create the universe knowing EXAC ...[text shortened]... made.

EDIT: A simple and direct question: Could God make it so Hitler never starts WWII?

A simple and direct question: Could God make it so Hitler never starts WWII? ---marauder----

Of course he could but then he would have to take away Hitler's free will in the process.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Why do you insist on missing the point?
Tell me, in my computer program scenario, how, within the context of the one and only completed run, there is still a possibility of different runs occurring.
Also tell me what determinism has to do with anything. I have not claimed that my computer is deterministic. In fact I think I did say it did not have to be ie external input to the program was allowed.

Once the run is completed then other runs are not possible , however , as the run is taking place in a series of present moments the possibility for different runs still exist in those present moments. It all depends on where you are in time. For God your life is already over , but for you you still have many choices to make.

Why is this such a problem for you?

Originally posted by no1marauder
How many times do I have to address this fallacious reasoning?? You continue to ignore that God knew what Hitler was going to do BEFORE Hitler ever even existed! IF God cannot change what Hitler will do, then God IS existing in the same timeline. For the 100th time, a human in the future is not the same as God; he did not create the universe knowing EXAC ...[text shortened]... made.

EDIT: A simple and direct question: Could God make it so Hitler never starts WWII?

You continue to ignore that God knew what Hitler was going to do BEFORE Hitler ever even existed! ==no1 marauder----

I'm not ignoring it at all , I just don't think it's true . If you have been following any of my threads on this you will know that I do not believe that God predicts anything in the way you think he does.

What you need to do is try to hold two conflicting thoughts in your head at the same time...

Thought A) God knows from eternity and beyond what Hitler will and choose to do

Thought B) Hitler has to exist and be alive in 1939 for God to know what happens in 1939 - unless Hitler chooses God cannot know it.

These two thoughts seem to contradict each other for us in 4 dimensions but for God they can both be true because God is not trapped in time like us. God knows what Hitler will do before he exists and is created BUT this is only possible because Hitler is EVENTUALLY created and does exist. If Hitler is not created then God cannot know what his life will be.

In my time machine I can know what choices the president of USA in the early 22nd Century will make before this president is even born BUT I can only know this if this particular president eventually IS born and DOES exist. I cannot know a future that does not exist. If I decided that I did not like this president and so killed his great grandfather to stop him existing then this president would never exist BUT also my knowledge of his future would dissappear as well.

Do you understand that God can only know Hitler's future if Hitler actually has a future?

I don't believe that God knew exactly what would happen if he created the universe the way it is. In one sense God is waiting to see how us humans will turn out , but in another he doesn't have to wait very long at all (LOL)

Originally posted by knightmeister
You continue to ignore that God knew what Hitler was going to do BEFORE Hitler ever even existed! ==no1 marauder----

I'm not ignoring it at all , I just don't think it's true . If you have been following any of my threads on this you will know that I do not believe that God predicts anything in the way you think he does.

What you need to do is t w us humans will turn out , but in another he doesn't have to wait very long at all (LOL)

Then you don't believe in a 3 O God. You don't believe in a God who is either omnipotent or omniscient.

KM: I don't believe that God knew exactly what would happen if he created the universe the way it is.

If you can't see that this sentence makes no sense whatsoever if you believe, as you do, that God "exists outside of time" then you are hopelessly confused by your own beliefs.

Originally posted by twhitehead
My thoughts on the matter are as follows:
1. It is not clear from my knowledge of physics whether a) we live in a single timeline or b) a universe with infinitely branching timelines of which our past is only one and our future is an infinite subset.
2. The existence of God, external to our universe and its timeline(s) tells us something about the natur ...[text shortened]... at Schrödinger's cat is dead then he has effectively killed it himself by his very observation.

I'm not sure how enabling my physics background will be here either, but if by "single timeline" you are referring to a strict deterministic view of the universe, then I do not believe that is the case. For instance, I think quantum indeterminacy entails that no current state of the universe fully determines any future state of the universe. So I'm not a determinist. However, even though you present it as a sort of dichotomy, I also don't know how useful I find the "branching" or divaricate timeline notion. The divaricate timeline makes me think of sets of probabilistically indexed paths that diverge from common points, and I don't really understand if or how that is supposed to capture events that are truly metaphysically random. It would seem to me that it would be more like from any given current state, there would be something like a continuum of possibilities. I really don't know.

Concerning your point 2, I am deeply skeptical about the coherency of such God conceptions. I believe such concepts are typically self-contradictory and almost certainly not instantiated. I'll return to this point later when I reply to one of knightmeister's posts. As an aside, though, the basic fatalist argument I presented does not assume that we are talking about some conception of God in which he putatively exists outside of temporal relations.

Concerning your point 3, I generally don't agree with the notion that foreknowledge should entail anything about determinism or about necessitating future events. I say this because any reasonable account of knowledge is fallibilist, meaning that it is not considered a necessary condition for knowledge that the belief be held in such a way that it is not possible for the belief to be mistaken. For instance, let's suppose that you believe on the basis of good evidence that event E will transpire tomorrow; and suppose further that tomorrow comes and event E does transpire, indicating your belief to have been correct. Under a fallibilist account, we would say that you had foreknowledge of event E – and that is regardless of whether or not it could have been the case that events transpired differently to prove you wrong (though they didn't). The key point is this: ordinary (fallibilist) foreknowledge does not entail that the belief is held in such a way that it could not be mistaken. As a result, I do not think foreknowledge of events entails that those events could not "be otherwise" in the libertarian sense. This is one reason why I am continually baffled when people suggest that foreknowledge of future actions would preclude freedom of a libertarian sort. There is no reason I see to think it would. However, I think the discussion becomes much more complicated when the supposition is that infallible foreknowledge is held.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
When we look into outer space using a telescope, we are able to see upwards of millions of years into the past by virtue of the speed of light across a vast universe. If some distant star explodes before the end of this sentence, it could be years before we get the news. Any probes we have out in space closer to the source will know of the explosion prop ...[text shortened]... whole knowledge in no way compromises, alters, or impacts man's willing on any level.

So which premise(s) of the fatalist argument are you rejecting?

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]1. If God knows in advance that S will do A, then it must be the case that S will do A.

If knowledge is being construed here in the standard sense of “justified true belief”, then I think your statement of premise 1 is tautological. But I am not sure how you are using the word “must” here—so let me rephrase a bit:

1a. God knows in advance tha ...[text shortened]... From G’s perspective, of course, there is no differentiation between T(0) and T(0-t) either.[/b]

Everything you have said in your first section (above the first dividing line) is correct within the interpretation you have laid out. However, I submit again that this particular interpretation does not faithfully preserve premise 1 of the fatalist argument. This is the point I was trying to address in an earlier post when I made the distinction between two different interpretations: 1) the consequent following with necessity from the antecedent and 2) the necessity of the consequent following from the antecedent. I probably didn't make my point very clearly there. But at any rate, let us just consider both interpretations because I don't think it matters either way: I don't think the argument succeeds under either interpretation.

Consider Premise 1: "If God knows in advance that S will do A, then it must be the case that S will do A".

As you say, the difficulty is what to make of the phrase "it must be the case that" and, particularly, what to make of the term 'must'. Your interpretation considers the "must" to be immaterial in the sense that it can just be dropped without loss. However, I submit that to preserve faithfully this fatalist argument, we cannot simply disregard this term 'must'. Rather, I think it is being used here in a material way as a modal term. Regardless, let us just consider both interpretations because, again, I don't think the argument establishes anything of interest under either interpretation.

Interpretation 1: The interpretation you outlined, in which Premise 1 is basically "tautological" (the premise becomes necessarily true since propositional truth is necessary for knowledge). In this case, we can drop, without any loss, the whole "must" phrase. The argument becomes the following:

1’. If God knows in advance that S will do A, then S will do A.
2’. If S will do A, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A.
3’. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A, then S is not free with respect to A.
4’. Hence, if God knows in advance that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to A.

Now Premise 1’ is necessarily true. But Premise 2’ just seems ridiculous. I have to think that no libertarian is going to accept Premise 2’, and how can I blame him? I see no reason for accepting it as it is.

Interpretation 2: This interpretation considers the role of the modal term 'must' in Premise 1 and, I think, is the interpretation that preserves the fatalist intention in this particular argument.

1’’. If God knows in advance that S will do A, then it is necessary that S will do A.
2’’. If it is necessary that S will do A, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A.
3’’. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A, then S is not free with respect to A.
4’’. Hence, if God knows in advance that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to A.

In this case, I have some problems with both Premise 1’’ and 2’’. First, it is just not clear to me what exact sort of necessity is being established about S's doing A. Presumably, Premise 1’’ is trying to establish some sort of "necessity" about the event that is contingent upon the truth of the proposition "S will do A" (and, relatedly, it's NOT just trying to say that the event itself is a necessary event). Fair enough, but I firmly believe that whatever sort of necessity this is, it is NOT a sort that establishes the preclusion of libertarian free will. Consider first that this above sort of "necessity" establishes nothing about causation (and nothing about determinism). The claim that this "necessity" of S's doing A (that happens to be contingent upon the truth of the proposition) holds is still perfectly compatible with the event itself being uncaused. So, it leaves open the question of the existence of libertarian free will. One could counter here that I am neglecting something about the argument: the argument doesn't simply stipulate that the proposition "S will do A" is true but rather stipulates further that it the proposition is known. But, as I remarked earlier to twhitehead, ordinary (fallibilist) foreknowledge should not pose a threat to libertarian free will because when such knowledge is held it is not thereby the case that the belief is held in a way such that it cannot be mistaken. In my mind, this leaves open the question of whether S's doing A could in principle be otherwise, thus leaving open the question of libertarian free will.

To recap this post since it is kind of messy: First, I disagree that the "tautological" interpretation of Premise 1 is the interpretation that faithfully preserves the fatalist argument. Second, I don't think the argument works under either interpretation.

But, I think a potentially stronger argument (that is still consistent with standard theological claims about God's nature) that should be considered is the following:

1’’’. If God infallibly knows in advance that S will do A, then it is necessary that S will do A.
2’’’. (same as Premise 2’&rsquo😉
3’’’. (same as Premise 3’&rsquo😉.
4’’’. (same as Premise 4’&rsquo😉.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Imagine I had a working time machine and could travel into your future.

Now , whether you had free will or no free will would make no difference to my knowledge of your choices. I would be able to know what you will choose in 2011 quite easily and you having free will would make no difference at all to me. Why? Because , if I had said time machine weird or quite shocking but I can also see how it's also highly logical on another level.

In short , whether compatibilism is true or free will is true has no bearing on me and my time machine or my knowledge.

😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵😵🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄🙄😴😴😴😴😴😴😴😴😴😴😴😴

I don't really know whether to laugh or cry when you just habitually cast compatibilism in diametric opposition to free will (and when you, for some bizarre reason, keep thinking you're justified in using determinism and compatibilism interchangeably -- and after all the countless times bbarr, Nemesio and others have corrected you on that particular point). It just blows my mind. Whatever, this is off topic. Moving on...

Originally posted by knightmeister
Imagine I had a working time machine and could travel into your future.

Now , whether you had free will or no free will would make no difference to my knowledge of your choices. I would be able to know what you will choose in 2011 quite easily and you having free will would make no difference at all to me. Why? Because , if I had said time machine weird or quite shocking but I can also see how it's also highly logical on another level.

The real question here is not "is an eternal omniscient God incompatible with free will? " but " could an eternal being exist?"

Good, let's talk about this question. I think that your God conception is incoherent and that such a God simply cannot exist.

When you talk of God as "eternal", I understand that to mean substantively two things. First, that everything is "present" for Him in the sense that, as you indicate, He sees all of the universe's past/present/future events simultaneously. Second, that He exists "outside of time" – that is, His existence is independent of temporal relations. I'm not at all convinced even at this point that your view of an "eternal" God is coherent (if anything I think it is already incoherent). Regardless, I just want to focus on this latter point of your God's putative atemporality. I will try to show here that this claim of God's timelessness contradicts other claims you also make about God, such as His being a causal agent.

I don't know what sort of conception of time you hold, but I am a reductionist with respect to time. I don't think there is any such thing as time that exists independently of the events (changes) that fill it. Relatedly, I think all meaningful talk of time can be reduced to talk of events/changes. When you say that God exists outside of time (that His existence is independent of temporal relations), I think that can only sensibly mean one thing: that God is changeless, that He is simply not subject to change. But, any such entity simply cannot be a causal agent: an agent is one who acts; actions are events; and events must occur in time.

This is why I find your conception of an "eternal" God incoherent. On one hand you claim that God exists outside of time; on the other hand you claim that God acts within time (that He is causally responsible for certain things, that He interacts with temporal things, etc. For instance, you want to claim that He is responsible for acts of creation, that He interacts with His creation, etc). You simply cannot have it both ways. Your conception of God entails contradiction (that He is both subject to change and not subject to change), and concepts that entail contradiction are never instantiated.

So, no, your eternal God doesn't and couldn't exist.

EDIT: To be clear. As to your question: could an eternal being exist? I don't see why not, but it would be a changeless being. And this being simply could not be an agent, and it would not be compatible with the agency you otherwise ascribe to God.

Originally posted by knightmeister
One idea I have got (and it's only guess work) is that although God is outside of time (which in reality means independent of time in this universe) there is still a sequence of events one after another in eternity. The idea of eternity is that God is not trapped in our universe repleat with it's causal sequences and 4 dimensions. This may or may not mean that God exists outside of any time altogether.

I'm still not getting it. So now you claim God exists outside of time...but not really?