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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by epiphinehasepiphinehas,
Hello, all. Just had a thought stewing in my brain for the last several days and it finally came together for me.
Plantinga's argument fails, I think, simply because the mere possibility that we've inherited a flawed cognitive apparatus will never be enough of a reason to abandon a naturalistic worldview outright, since to rule out naturalism ...[text shortened]... espect to how the world ultimately works while being in pursuit of a naturalistic explanation?
I don't think that's why P's argument fails. Remember that the part of P's argument that you discussed in this thread boils down to this. If an agent holds that:
(N) naturalism – the view that there are no supernatural beings
(E) evolution - current evolutionary doctrine
are true, then they ought rationally to conclude that the probability that:
(R) our cognitive faculties are reliable and produce mostly true beliefs
is low or inscrutable.
So it isn't just a case of what you call 'the mere possibility'. It is that the rational conclusion is that to hold those premises is self-defeating.
I think the argument is valid, so if you don't want to give up in despair you have to go after the premises, which is why I think an attack on what you listed as 2) in the OP, is the correct response.
I think others on this thread have looked at how we use our cognitive abilities and concluded that it just isn't credible that our cognitive abilities are as unreliable as all that. Although that seems reasonable it doesn't directly defeat P's argument.
On the other hand, I'd argue that if we think we have good reasons to think our faculties are reliable then we can use those very same reasons to defeat 2) anyway, and that does undermine P's argument.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by twhiteheadOriginally posted by twhitehead
The whole issue of 'only random mutation and natural selection' is one of the many flaws in the argument. Most people who bring up that topic haven't got the first clue about how evolution works and thus make the most horrendous probability calculations. He would have done far better to simply say 'we don't know what the probability is' rather than try to ...[text shortened]... ould say that reality is that which we perceive and thus the reliability is by definition.
It just seems to me that we must take it as an assumption that we are reliable cognitive agents (to a point) or we might as well cease all inquiry.
I think this is in fact what we do as an answer to global scepticism.
But I think we should remember how limited in scope this part of Plantinga's argument is. Even if we accept that p(R|N&E) is very low, we are not obliged to accept that we are likely to be unreliable cognizers, or that God is the alternative explanation. We can choose to reject N or E, and even if we choose the former, it does not follow that the christian god is the answer.
However, I don't accept that p(R|N&E) is low, since a parsimonious solution is that evolution selects for a reliable belief-forming mechanism as opposed to a potentially vast set of ad-hoc belief-desire combinations, and that's before we notice that there are problems with consistency that would cast doubt on whether such an ad-hoc system would reliably produce behaviour that wouldn't get us killed.
10 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkJust a quibble. Doesn't saying 'evolution selects' imply some sort of agency at work? Surely a reliable belief-forming mechanism would simply be more successful than an unreliable one, the more reliable the better, with 'evolution' merely a descriptive term applied to the process of change? There's a sense in which saying 'evolution selects' implies some sort of reward -- bestowed by some strict but fair abstract entity -- for 'good adaptation' when I would think that what works merely works and what doesn't, dies.
However, I don't accept that p(R|N&E) is low, since a parsimonious solution is that evolution selects for a reliable belief-forming mechanism as opposed to a potentially vast set of ad-hoc belief-desire combinations, and that's before we notice that there are problems with consistency that would cast doubt on whether such an ad-hoc system would reliably produce behaviour that wouldn't get us killed.
10 Nov 09
Originally posted by Bosse de NageExactly. In a sense, it's almost tautological because the way you define "best adapted" can only be defined (identified) ex-post.
Just a quibble. Doesn't saying 'evolution selects' imply some sort of agency at work? Surely a reliable belief-forming mechanism would simply be more successful than an unreliable one, the more reliable the better, with 'evolution' merely a descriptive term applied to the process of change? There's a sense in which saying 'evolution selects' implies so ...[text shortened]... d adaptation' when I would think that what works merely works and what doesn't, dies.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Just a quibble. Doesn't saying 'evolution selects' imply some sort of agency at work?
No. It is just shorthand.
Surely a reliable belief-forming mechanism would simply be more successful than an unreliable one, the more reliable the better, with 'evolution' merely a descriptive term applied to the process of change?
The point is that it would be more successful and economical than belief-desire sets. But that point has to be argued for rather than assumed.
There's a sense in which saying 'evolution selects' implies some sort of reward -- bestowed by some strict but fair abstract entity -- for 'good adaptation' when I would think that what works merely works and what doesn't, dies.
When I use 'evolution selects' I assume that people understand about evolution and so this way of speaking is shorthand for the more accurate but cumbersome account of evolution by natural selection.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by PalynkaIt isn't tautological to suppose that evolution is more likely to select for reliable belief forming mechanisms than belief-desire combinations in which the belief is false but the behaviour aids survival.
Exactly. In a sense, it's almost tautological because the way you define "best adapted" can only be defined (identified) ex-post.
By 'evolution is more likely to select' I do not mean that evolution involves choice by an agent. I simply mean that the processes of evolution by natural selection are more likely to produce the former than the latter in the above example.
10 Nov 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkLikelihood has nothing to do with this. The "best adapted" are not the ones more likely to survive and reproduce, they are the ones that survived and reproduced! So methinks your shorthand is still muddling your thought.
It isn't tautological to suppose that evolution is more likely to select for reliable belief forming mechanisms than belief-desire combinations in which the belief is false but the behaviour aids survival.
By 'evolution is more likely to select' I do not mean that evolution involves choice by an agent. I simply mean that the processes of evolution by natural selection are more likely to produce the former than the latter in the above example.
Evolution describes the process by which the genes of a population changes between one generation and the next. It does NOT say anything about the differences of survival likelihood between two populations .
10 Nov 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkThe way the argument was presented on Wikipedia, there was a focus on belief rather than cognitive ability. In that case I am more or less inclined to agree with him that humans have a high probability of holding false beliefs - in fact it is obvious that the majority of the worlds population holds at least some false beliefs.
However, I don't accept that p(R|N&E) is low, since a parsimonious solution is that evolution selects for a reliable belief-forming mechanism as opposed to a potentially vast set of ad-hoc belief-desire combinations, and that's before we notice that there are problems with consistency that would cast doubt on whether such an ad-hoc system would reliably produce behaviour that wouldn't get us killed.
However, I am of the opinion that the scientific method avoids this problem and is not affected by probability. In many ways the scientific method is not about belief or dependent on belief so regardless of the probability of us holding false beliefs, results of the scientific method may remain reliable.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by PalynkaOriginally posted by Palynka
Likelihood has nothing to do with this. The "best adapted" are not the ones more likely to survive and reproduce, they are the ones that survived and reproduced! So methinks your shorthand is still muddling your thought.
Evolution describes the process by which the genes of a population changes between one generation and the next. It does NOT say anything about the differences of survival likelihood between two populations .
Likelihood has nothing to do with this. The "best adapted" are not the ones more likely to survive and reproduce, they are the ones that survived and reproduced! So methinks your shorthand is still muddling your thought.
Youthinks wrong then. If I say that evolution was more likely to select reliable belief systems than belief-desire sets, then it follows that we are more likely to have reliable cognitive systems than belief-desire sets, given the evidence available to us. The fact that evolution either did or did not go that way is nothing to do with how we approach the best explanation with limited knowledge. Just as, if I shake those dice in a cup then trap them underneath, then it is rational for you to consider probabilities if you want to bet on a given score, despite the fact that under the cup, the probability is either 1 or 0.
Evolution describes the process by which the genes of a population changes between one generation and the next. It does NOT say anything about the differences of survival likelihood between two populations .
I haven't said anything that should have led you to suppose I have been talking about survival likelihood between two populations. Rather, I have argued that evolution by natural selection is more likely to produce reliable cognizers than delusional possessors of belief-desire sets. This is compatible with how evolution works.
10 Nov 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkLOL! You don't see how that's a claim about survival likelihood between two populations? 😵
I have argued that evolution by natural selection is more likely to produce reliable cognizers than delusional possessors of belief-desire sets. This is compatible with how evolution works.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by twhiteheadWhilst I agree that that the majority of the world's population holds at least some false beliefs, that really isn't the point at issue.
The way the argument was presented on Wikipedia, there was a focus on belief rather than cognitive ability. In that case I am more or less inclined to agree with him that humans have a high probability of holding false beliefs - in fact it is obvious that the majority of the worlds population holds at least some false beliefs.
However, I am of the opinio ...[text shortened]... e probability of us holding false beliefs, results of the scientific method may remain reliable.
A reliable cognizer isn't somebody who never has a false belief. That would be more like a perfect cognizer.
P's argument has more of the character of arguments for global scepticism. You know the ones, the brain-in-a-vat or Matrix kind of epistemological black hole. P's argument attempts to undermine any connection between the content of belief and states of affairs in the world (other than the oblique causal connection between our largely false beliefs and behaviour that promotes survival, given said states of affairs.) What you say about the scientific method leads me to think that you haven't taken the consequences of this on board, since an appeal to the scientific method is circular.
Having said that, you might counter-argue that science provides its own justification in a way that is circular but in a non vicious way. (I think Hilary Putnam made such an argument). However, I'd reply again that such an argument is analogous to exactly the kind you need to undermine 2) and torpedo P's argument anyway.
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10 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaWell it just isn't, so if you think it is, you have misunderstood. There aren't two populations that we are talking about here. There is one. We are talking about the relative likilihood of two explanations of how one population got to be the way it is, being true. I hope that clarifies.
LOL! You don't see how that's a claim about survival likelihood between two populations? 😵
10 Nov 09
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkIt's the same. For you to say that evolution implies that one explanation is better than other is equivalent to make claims about the likelihood of survival of two populations that differ only by that trait. You can twist it as much as you want, but it's pretty obvious you don't understand the concepts of likelihood and evolution if you maintain there is a difference.
Well it just isn't, so if you think it is, you have misunderstood. There aren't two populations that we are talking about here. There is one. We are talking about the relative likilihood of two explanations of how one population got to be the way it is, being true. I hope that clarifies.
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10 Nov 09
Originally posted by PalynkaSigh, yet another miscommunication. Ok I take my side of the blame on the chin.
It's the same. For you to say that evolution implies that one explanation is better than other is equivalent to make claims about the likelihood of survival of two populations that differ only by that trait. You can twist it as much as you want, but it's pretty obvious you don't understand the concepts of likelihood and evolution if you maintain there is a difference.
I can't quite see how we are going to sort this one.
It isn't the same I'm afraid, and there is no twisting necessary to explain why. What might be necessary is a willingness on both our parts to refrain from attempts at point scoring and offer careful explanations of the concepts.
In my view natural selection produces shifts in the frequency of genes in populations over time. It does this because some individuals with some genetic configurations fail to produce offspring that in turn produce offspring. Insofar as genes code for proteins which build bodies, and bodies are what survive and have grandchildren or not, certain incorporated traits might persist and develop in populations over time, or not.
Now, nowhere have I assumed that a sub-population of humans developed that had belief-desire sets and were in competition with those who were developing reliable belief acquisition mechanisms. Not once. So I'm unclear as to what you mean by 'two populations'. Perhaps you could clarify?
11 Nov 09
Originally posted by Lord SharkI don't entirely understand what you are saying, and further I don't really know what P's argument is. Wikipedia implied he had rehashed it a couple of times.
P's argument has more of the character of arguments for global scepticism. You know the ones, the brain-in-a-vat or Matrix kind of epistemological black hole. P's argument attempts to undermine any connection between the content of belief and states of affairs in the world (other than the oblique causal connection between our largely false beliefs and beh ...[text shortened]... is analogous to exactly the kind you need to undermine 2) and torpedo P's argument anyway.
My claim is that Naturalism is not a belief but a rational deduction based on information from our reasonably reliable cognition. Therefore whether or not evolution is likely to lead to false beliefs is irrelevant. If our cognition is fatally flawed then we might as well give up all investigation - but nobody, not even P actually believes that to be the case.
Science is a process whereby through reason and repeated observation and experiment (to reduce the chance of flawed cognition) a unique result can be obtained by anybody regardless of their genetics.