Originally posted by bbarrQuibble - A shift from the point
It's not a quibble. The idea is that creatures with radically different natures than our own might nevertheless have the ability to reason as we do. A species of radically individualistic creatures, for instance, may not discern via reason that they are obligated to aid others in need, but merely to refrain from harming them directly (kinda like libertarian ...[text shortened]... g in part to our deeply social nature and to the fact that we are not robustly self-sufficient.
As this thread is discussing Natural Law as it applies to human beings, the differentiation between human nature and reason (which is a central part of our nature) is a quibble. What principles of Natural Law would apply to a completely individualistic species or a completely collective one (the Borg) or whatever permutations in between, is not relevant to the thread (though it might make an interesting conversation piece between beers and rounds of darts).
Originally posted by no1marauderFair enough. I just didn't want Coletti to start badgering you as follows:
Quibble - A shift from the point
As this thread is discussing Natural Law as it applies to human beings, the differentiation between human nature and reason (which is a central part of our nature) is a quibble. Wh ...[text shortened]... teresting conversation piece between beers and rounds of darts).
"You say Natural Law derives from reason, but reason requires premises because reason alone is empty, so you need premises and you haven't given any, so you have failed to answer my question."
Beer and darts sound pretty good right now, btw.
Originally posted by bbarrIf all [secular] ethicists but strict Kantians derive their ethical theories from sources other than reason alone, what would these sources be? I posit that all such sources are reducible to human conventions (refer back to my post on Utilitarianism), but I'm open to correction.
Why on Earth do you think that? Nobody but strict Kantians claim that ethics derives from reason alone, and even they are talking about practical rationality, not theoretical rationality.
As to Kantian ethics, how would a sado-masochist (for instance) interpret the Categorical Imperative? Would not the CI justify his being cruel to another human being?
Now, clearly this is a situation I would want to avoid. However, if I am to adopt CI as my ethical compass, I would have to permit (in fact, necessitate) universal acceptance of CI as an ethical compass - including the sado-masochist. Hence, according to CI, I must not adopt CI as my ethical compass.
I haven't worked out all the nuts & bolts yet, but it does seem like there is something self-refuting about Kantian ethics.
Originally posted by lucifershammerI have no idea what you mean when you say "reducible to human convention". Virtue theorists claim that some character traits reliably conduce to human flourishing, and which character traits these are are not a matter of human convention. If we thought, for instance, that cruelty reliably conduced to human flourishing, they would say we were mistaken. Hedonistic Utilitarians claim that pleasure is the only intrisically valuable thing, and that we ought to maximize the extent to which pleasure is manifested in the world. They do not think this is a matter of human convention; if we all disagreed with the hedonistic Utilitarians, they would say we are mistaken. These are just two examples.
If all [secular] ethicists but strict Kantians derive their ethical theories from sources other than reason alone, what would these sources be? I posit that all such sources are reducible to human conventions (refer back to my post o ...[text shortened]... o-masochist (for instance) interpret the Categorical Imperative?
I don't understand what you mean by "interpret the CI". Which formulation of the CI, the forumla of universal law, the forumla of humanity, or the formula of the kingdom of ends? Is the sado-masochist a philosopher? Has he read Kant?
EDIT: No, the CI does not justify the sado-masochist being cruel. That is one way in which the CI is superior to the so-called "Golden Rule".
This:
However, if I am to adopt CI as my ethical compass, I would have to permit (in fact, necessitate) universal acceptance of CI as an ethical compass - including the sado-masochist. Hence, according to CI, I must not adopt CI as my ethical compass.
Doesn't make sense. What do you think the CI says? Are you simply equating it with the Golden Rule?
Originally posted by no1marauderYou say Natural Law derives from reason, but reason requires premises because reason alone is empty, so you need premises and you haven't given any, so you have failed to answer my question.
Quibble - A shift from the point
As this thread is discussing Natural Law as it applies to human beings, the differentiation between human nature and reason (which is a central part of our nature) is a quibble. What principles of Natural Law would apply to a completely individualistic species or a completely collective one (the Bor ...[text shortened]... ad (though it might make an interesting conversation piece between beers and rounds of darts).
Originally posted by bbarrHow else could he act? He wouldn't have anything to base his reasoning on other than what he desired. Once he realizes that negative and positive consequences follow various interactions in the group he discovers there is a value system he has to consider.
It depends on whether he acted wantonly from impulse, or whether he was instrumentally rational at pursuing his ends, and whether his ends were malevolent.
Without group ethics we have "bellum omnium contra omnes" and you can imagine how sucky life in the group would be.
btw sucky is a term Philosophers ought to use.
Originally posted by bbarr
I have no idea what you mean when you say "reducible to human convention".
Either that the philosophy itself depends on human convention (as, for instance, an ethical theory that holds that good is whatever the majority hold to be good) or one that the philsopher based on his observations of human conventions around him (for instance, a modern philosopher attempting to use whatever rationale Aristotle used to construct his ethical theory would probably have a slightly different set of virtues - based on what he sees around him).
Virtue theorists claim that some character traits reliably conduce to human flourishing, and which character traits these are are not a matter of human convention. If we thought, for instance, that cruelty reliably conduced to human flourishing, they would say we were mistaken.
How would they justify such a claim? For one thing, it is not entirely self-evident that cruelty is not reliably conducive to human flourishing - some of the most successful civilisations have also been very cruel indeed (e.g. the Romans, the Europeans and, more recently, the Chinese). Nor is kindness reliably conducive to human flourishing - you will be hard-pressed to find an ethos kinder than Buddhists; but they were nearly wiped out of India (the birthplace of Buddhism). If neither cruelty nor kindness is reliably conducive to human flourishing, then can either be a part of any virtue theory?
For another, how would they know a certain character trait is conducive to human flourishing? They would have to rely on the experience of human history, or on the conventions of the time they live in (for instance, in the modern-day, treating everyone equally might be such a virtue).
Further, how would they define "human flourishing" without some reference to human convention on what "flourishing" is? Even Aristotle says, "We may define happiness as [a set of definitions follow]... That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees" (On Happiness, n.2.)
Hedonistic Utilitarians claim that pleasure is the only intrisically valuable thing, and that we ought to maximize the extent to which pleasure is manifested in the world. They do not think this is a matter of human convention; if we all disagreed with the hedonistic Utilitarians, they would say we are mistaken. These are just two examples.
Refer back to my post on Utilitarianism.
As an analogy, one can think of a philosophy as a C program that performs some mathematical calculation (say, a calculation of the cosine of a number, expressed in radians). The programmer can either design the program such that it accepts a user input number (the analogue of a subjective ethical theory) or hard-code an arbitrary value the programmer selected (the analogue of the examples provided above) - maybe on the basis of the most common preference of users in his peer-group. The fact that the value is not variable (an: subjective) once he has compiled his code in the second case does not mean it wasn't an arbitrary decision at all; or that the programmer might have chosen a different value to hard-code had he written the program a year later, or had some other programmer written the program. While the execution of the program (an: philosophy) is not variable, the program itself is!
I don't understand what you mean by "interpret the CI". Which formulation of the CI, the forumla of universal law, the forumla of humanity, or the formula of the kingdom of ends? Is the sado-masochist a philosopher? Has he read Kant?
Would that matter? I might be using the universal law formula.
EDIT: No, the CI does not justify the sado-masochist being cruel. That is one way in which the CI is superior to the so-called "Golden Rule".
What do you think the CI says? Are you simply equating it with the Golden Rule?
I might be. I'm using the following formulations of the CI:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kantmeta.htm#Kant's%20Ethics
1. "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (Ibid., 422)
2. "Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature." (Ibid)
3. "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (Ibid., 429)
Why does CI not justify the cruelty of the sado-masochist? AFAICS, (1) and (2) offer no opposition whatsoever. (3) might offer some opposition, but the s-m'ist is not apparently using either himself or the other as a means.
Originally posted by frogstompA follow -up:
How else could he act? He wouldn't have anything to base his reasoning on other than what he desired. Once he realizes that negative and positive consequences follow various interactions in the group he discovers there is a ...[text shortened]... uld be.
btw sucky is a term Philosophers ought to use.
Group ethics existed long before man had the concept of god to postulate on, and when we did it was a mother goddess about 35000bc that was our only god for about 20000 years, than came a bull god and the two were still around when Sumerian astronomers invented the creator god (c.4000 bc or earlier) An that winds up in the bible as El.
Originally posted by lucifershammerEither that the philosophy itself depends on human convention (as, for instance, an ethical theory that holds that good is whatever the majority hold to be good)…
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]I have no idea what you mean when you say "reducible to human convention".
Either that the philosophy itself depends on human convention (as, for instance, an ethical theory that holds ...[text shortened]... st is not apparently using either himself or the other as a means.[/b]
Only Normative Cultural Relativists make this claim.
…or one that the philosopher based on his observations of human conventions around him (for instance, a modern philosopher attempting to use whatever rationale Aristotle used to construct his ethical theory would probably have a slightly different set of virtues - based on what he sees around him).
This is a different sort of dependence on convention than the one above. An ethical theory such as NCR holds that a moral claim such a ‘murder is wrong’ is made true by convention; it is our agreeing that murder is wrong that makes murder wrong. On NCR moral facts are reducible to facts about what we in fact agree to; moral truths are nothing over and above our conventions. This sort of dependence on convention we may call ‘constitutive dependence’.
This second sort of dependence is evidential. A philosopher may look around and see that across cultures and across times certain conventions are in place. For instance, there are general prohibitions against lying, cheating, stealing, killing, and so on, that obtain in all cultures (although these rules are often only taken to apply to those within some favored group). A philosopher may take this as evidence that these sorts of activities are actually wrong, and then reason about what these activities have in common in virtue of which they are all wrong. The virtue theorist may claim that they result from character traits that do not conduce to eudaimonia. The Kantian may claim that they fail to respect the autonomy of others, and thereby violate the CI. The Utilitarian may claim that these activities tend to increase suffering. The Divine Command theorist may claim that these activities fail to correspond with God’s will, or violate some direct command of God.
Now, to each of these claims, one may ask why we should take the common property identified by the theorist to be that in virtue of which the activity in question is wrong. You may ask the virtue theorist “how do you know what eudaimonia consists in?”. You may ask the Kantian “how do you know that violations of autonomy are wrong?”. You may ask the Utilitarian “how do you know that pleasure is intrinsically valuable?”. You may ask the Divine Command theorist “how do you know the content of God’s commands, or the content of His character, or even that He exists?”.
None of the theories above are more relativistic than another. None of the theories above are more subjective than another. All the theories above claim that certain moral truths are universally binding, regardless of whether some individual believes them to be false. All of the theories above start by positing some property or collection of properties in virtue of which right acts are right and wrong acts wrong. All the theories above can be confronted by skeptical questions, because none of them proceed deductively from self-evident premises. Hence, all the theories above will be assessed according to their internal coherence, their concordance with our considered judgments, their completeness (do they leave out morally relevant considerations), their ontological commitments (do they require the postulation of unnecessary entities or properties or relations), and so on. That is, they will be assessed abductively, just like any other theory.
How would they justify such a claim? For one thing, it is not entirely self-evident that cruelty is not reliably conducive to human flourishing - some of the most successful civilisations have also been very cruel indeed (e.g. the Romans, the Europeans and, more recently, the Chinese). Nor is kindness reliably conducive to human flourishing - you will be hard-pressed to find an ethos kinder than Buddhists; but they were nearly wiped out of India (the birthplace of Buddhism). If neither cruelty nor kindness is reliably conducive to human flourishing, then can either be a part of any virtue theory?
It doesn’t need to be self-evident. It isn’t self-evident that God exists, or that scripture is reliable. Further, the claim above isn’t a necessary truth, so pointing out that some cruel people flourish is irrelevant. Finally, some environments may be such that no character traits reliably conduce to flourishing. In such cases, unluckily, eudaimonia may be impossible. You are making a mistake if you think that the virtue theorist is claiming that reliably conducing to flourishing is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for being a virtue. Think of the claim as analogous to the claim that if you want to be healthy, you ought exercise regularly, eat well, not smoke, etc. None of these are necessary or sufficient for being healthy, but they reliably conduce to health.
For another, how would they know a certain character trait is conducive to human flourishing? They would have to rely on the experience of human history, or on the conventions of the time they live in (for instance, in the modern-day, treating everyone equally might be such a virtue)
This is evidential dependence, not constitutive dependence. Why shouldn’t we take as evidence those who seem to be happy, sane, fulfilled, etc? Seems like pretty good evidence that they are getting something right.
Further, how would they define "human flourishing" without some reference to human convention on what "flourishing" is? Even Aristotle says, "We may define happiness as [a set of definitions follow]... That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees" (On Happiness, n.2.)
Again, this is evidential dependence, not constitutive dependence. How would you define “God’s will?” without reference to some convention concerning scripture, oral tradition, and their interpretation?
NOTE: Similar comments apply to Utilitarianism, so I’ll not rehearse the responses here. Suffice it to say that if you accuse the Utilitarian of not having any good reason for thinking that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, he will accuse you of not having any good reason for thinking that God’s commands or will ought to be followed; he will claim that when we look around, we see everybody wanting to be happy, and that this is good evidence that happiness is what we should promote (I’m talking in terms of the more inclusive ‘happiness’ rather than the more narrow ‘pleasure’ because I can’t stomach trying to defend such a naïve view as Hedonistic Utilitarianism). The point of the example is not that Utilitarianism doesn’t face skeptical challenges, only that it is not constitutively based on conventions nor is it relativistic in any manner that doesn’t also apply to a theistic ethical theory.
Would that matter? I might be using the universal law formula.
If you want to know how a sado-masochist interprets the CI, I need to know which version of CI you are referring to.
I might be. I'm using the following formulations of the CI:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kantmeta.htm#Kant's%20Ethics
1. "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (Ibid., 422)
2. "Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature." (Ibid)
3. "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (Ibid., 429)
1 and 2 are expressions of the Formula of Universal Law. 3 is an expression of the Formula of Humanity.
Why does CI not justify the cruelty of the sado-masochist? AFAIK, (1) and (2) offer no opposition whatsoever.
That is because you don’t understand the Formula of Universal Law. What would the SM’s maxim of action be? You need to supply that before we can see whether it passes the universalization test, or whether it results in a contradiction in conception (and hence a perfect duty) or a contradiction in will (and hence an imperfect duty). I’ll go through this step by step with you, if you wish.
(3) might offer some opposition, but the s-m'ist is not apparently using either himself or the other as a means; indeed he is treating humanity as an end (because he wants to spread pleasure as he understands it).
The Formula of Humanity doesn’t say that you ought to spread pleasure as you understand it. The point of the FH is that you ought to treat others as ends in and of themselves, and that means respecting their autonomy; their capacity to set their own ends. This is why it is a violation of the FH to deceive and coerce others, because you are usurping their control over the pursuit of their own ends. Giving somebody pain because you think it is pleasurable fails to take into account what they think is pleasurable, whether it is an end of their's that they experience pain
Originally posted by tdbarkScience has always existed.
I find it funny that my arguments on the development of human morality are ignored, but I again assert that religion was created to support burgeoning societal norms and to explain the "life, the universe, and everything" at a time before science existed.
lol, no it hasn't. Science is a study or way of discovering truths about the universe. The laws of nature and physics have always existed, but the way to discover them (science) did not exist until man developed the methods of science. Until that occurred, the sun was a chariot driven across the sky by Apollo, spiders were the offspring of Arachnae, the earth was made in six days, etc. etc.
Originally posted by lucifershammerYour first paragraph is merely "kicking the can" up from Natural Law to Eternal Law. As Eternal Law is reliant on the existence of a God of some sort and the evidence for such a thing is scant, there is no good reason to believe in the Eternal Law. Human beings do exist, do reason and seem to have similar general moral principles across cultures. Thus, there is good evidence that human beings act according to some underlying moral code and as the proof of Man having a nature is far greater than God existing, Natural Law is a more logical explanation than Eternal Law.
Originally posted by no1marauder
[b]If your argument is that Natural Law is a "human convention" because humans are the ones who ascertain it, then your point is meaningless as who else would?
I'm not making such a point. However, if you use the "majority vote" to validate Natural Law, then you do reduce NL to a human convention [ ...[text shortened]... ow exists (human reason)?[/b]
If it comes from human reason, then (1) or (2) above will hold.[/b]
Actually, Gravity DOES NOT hold at all levels of matter; it has no observable effects at the subatomic level for example. Your merely repeating yourself without adding any substantive content; yes, human beings may disagree about what the components of the Natural Law are as they disagree about what are the components of Divine Command Law are. So what? This doesn't prove that either doesn't exist and the logical outcome of this argument is that there is no Moral Law at all.
Your last sentence makes no sense at all; if there is a Natural Law derived from Human nature how can (1) No unique Natural Law exists - hold? As for the others, you need to define the term "reliable" as you seem to be using it in a non-standard way. To me, human reason is sufficiently reliable as regards the Natural Law if it can ascertain general moral principles to guide our actions by. Since it does in reality do this, I can't say that (2) is true by the standard definition of "reliable". If my Mercedes starts 99% of the time it is reliable, even if there is a 1% possibility it will not start. (3) gets the "So what" answer and the comparison to Divine Command above and you could substitute"Divine Command" for "secular NL theory" in your sentence. There are "serious questions about the usefulness or reliability" of ANY moral theory, but that doesn't stop human beings from relying on them even if they don't do it consciously.
Originally posted by no1marauder
Your first paragraph is merely "kicking the can" up from Natural Law to Eternal Law. As Eternal Law is reliant on the existence of a God of some sort and the evidence for such a thing is scant, there is no good reason to believe in the Eternal Law.
This is something we disagree on. There is plenty of evidence that points to the existence of a God of some kind (something even the one-time atheist Anthony Flew eventually conceeded) and hence there is good reason to believe in the existence of the Eternal Law.
That is not my point, however.
Human beings do exist, do reason and seem to have similar general moral principles across cultures.
But not exactly the same. For just about any moral precept (against killing fellow beings, cruelty, theft etc.) there are many cultures that do value the opposite.
As I said in the last post, deciding which values are in accordance with NL based on a "majority vote" reduces NL ethics to human convention.
Thus, there is good evidence that human beings act according to some underlying moral code and as the proof of Man having a nature is far greater than God existing, Natural Law is a more logical explanation than Eternal Law.
This is sufficient to show that some form of NL exists in each human being - but not necessarily the same NL in each. This is the point (1) I raised.
Think about it - you're saying that NL is a result of physical human nature. Now, no two human beings are exactly the same physically (not even twins). Why should you say that they share exactly the same Natural Law?
Actually, Gravity DOES NOT hold at all levels of matter; it has no observable effects at the subatomic level for example.
Gravitation is a property that exists at all levels of matter (where matter, by definition, has mass) - even the subatomic level.
Your merely repeating yourself without adding any substantive content; yes, human beings may disagree about what the components of the Natural Law are as they disagree about what are the components of Divine Command Law are. So what? This doesn't prove that either doesn't exist and the logical outcome of this argument is that there is no Moral Law at all.
I'm not arguing that at all! However, if some form of natural law exists in the nature of each human being, then one of the three consequences I listed will occur as a result of human disagreement.
Your last sentence makes no sense at all; if there is a Natural Law derived from Human nature how can (1) No unique Natural Law exists - hold?
Same way that two people can be both human, yet not share the same DNA profile.
As for the others, you need to define the term "reliable" as you seem to be using it in a non-standard way. To me, human reason is sufficiently reliable as regards the Natural Law if it can ascertain general moral principles to guide our actions by. Since it does in reality do this, I can't say that (2) is true by the standard definition of "reliable". If my Mercedes starts 99% of the time it is reliable, even if there is a 1% possibility it will not start.
You're right, I was using "reliable" in the sense of "absolutely or perfectly reliable".
However, if our reason is only "generally reliable", then the only way out of an ethical impasse is to take the "majority vote" (unless you posit a gold standard like the EL or DC).
(3) gets the "So what" answer and the comparison to Divine Command above and you could substitute"Divine Command" for "secular NL theory" in your sentence. There are "serious questions about the usefulness or reliability" of ANY moral theory
Does that mean that one moral theory is as good as another? Which one(s) is/are better?
Because DC posits the existence of a "gold standard", it is preferable in at least one aspect over secular NL - one does not have to resort to a majority vote to decide which actions are good and which are not.
Originally posted by lucifershammerI never said or implied a "majority vote" was sufficient to establish what the Natural Law is; you are grossly misrepresenting my position. I said that there is a Natural Law and the fact that human beings generally adhere to a certain set of similar moral principles is evidence of the existence of Natural Law. The components of the Natural Law are not subject to majority vote; they exist independently of any individual decision maker. Please re-read my posts as you seem to be making this mistake over and over again.
Originally posted by no1marauder
[b]Your first paragraph is merely "kicking the can" up from Natural Law to Eternal Law. As Eternal Law is reliant on the existence of a God of some sort and the evidence for such a thing is scant, there is no good reason to believe in the Eternal Law.
This is something we disagree on. There is plenty ...[text shortened]... ot have to resort to a majority vote to decide which actions are good and which are not.
[/b]