I thought it might be interesting to have a look at Spinoza's view of God as put forth in his Ethics. It's a fairly different view to that which we see here most of the time. I'll make no judgement on it until we've started a discussion, but I thought the easiest thing would be to list his premises and then assess his conclusion. I'm ignoring his axioms on purpose as I think it will cause too much disagreement wihtout enough purposeful discussion, we'll see. In the first part we'll look at how Spinoza considers god as substance in premises 1-15. If that takes off I'll post 16-25 where he considers cause and then 26-36 which is the thesis of determinism.
DEFINITIONS:
i) Cause of itself: that whose essencesinvolves existence or that whose nature cannot be concieved except as existing.
ii) Finite in its own kind: that which cannot be limited by another of the same nature.
iii) Substance: that which is in itself and is concieved through itself
iv) Attribute: that which intellect percieves of substance, as constituting its essence
v) Mode: the affectations of substance
vi) God: An absolutely infinite entity, a substance consisting of of infinite attributes, each expressing infinite eternal essence.
vii) Free: That which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature
viii) Eternity: Existence itself flowing necessarily solely from an eternal thing
PREMISES:
1) Substance is prior to its affectations
2) Two substances which have different attributes have nothing in common with one another
3) Of things which have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of another
4) Two or more disinct things are distinguished from one another by a difference of attributes , or their affectations
5) There cannot exist 2 substances of the same attribute
6) A substance cannot be produced by another
7) It belongs to the nature of a substance to exist
8) Every substance is necessarily infinite
9) The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes belong to it
10) Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself
11) A substance consisting of infinite attributes each of which expresses infinite essence necessarily exists (God)
12) No attribtue of a substance can truly be conceived from which it follows that substance can be divided
13) An absolutely infinite substance is indivisible
14) Besides god no substance can exist or be conceived
15) Whatever exists exists in god and nothing can exist or be conceived without god
Any takers?
Originally posted by Starrman#1, he didn't know of the big bang theory obviously.
I thought it might be interesting to have a look at Spinoza's view of God as put forth in his Ethics. It's a fairly different view to that which we see here most of the time. I'll make no judgement on it until we've started a discussion, but I thought the easiest thing would be to list his premises and then assess his conclusion. I'm ignoring his axioms ...[text shortened]... er exists exists in god and nothing can exist or be conceived without god
Any takers?
#2, He knew nothing about modern atomic particle theory, like a set of 6 quarks making up every kind of atom.
#3, not much knowledge of quantum theory or transmutation of elements, like uranium spontaneously turning into lead, etc.
#4, #5 can't find fault with those.
#6 violates known atomic theory, see #3.
#7 nobody knows the validity of that statement, there are some theories which say all the attributes in the universe is just a vast ordering of data, like a giant hologram.
#8, The whole universe is finite, but unbounded, but still finite.
#9 sounds like unmitigated BS. How can some things have less reality? Even Dark matter hidden in the galaxies around us have reality.
#10, Not sure I understand that statement, sounds like it presupposes some kind of intelligence inherent in all matter.
#11, like to see him prove that one.
#12, again, modern atomic particle theory blows that one out of the water, every atom can be subdivided into common constituent sub-particles, called quarks.
#13, show me some.
#14, Prove it.
#15, I'm sure Intelligent Designers would agree with that one, but it gets blown away if there is no god.
Originally posted by sonhousePerhaps you should look at the definitions and then look at the premises afresh. Spinoza was writing hundreds of years ago, I'd like to discuss his views regardless of his scientific ignorance.
#1, he didn't know of the big bang theory obviously.
#2, He knew nothing about modern atomic particle theory, like a set of 6 quarks making up every kind of atom.
#3, not much knowledge of quantum theory or transmutation of elements, like uranium spontaneously turning into lead, etc.
#4, #5 can't find fault with those.
#6 violates known atomic theory, s ...[text shortened]... e Intelligent Designers would agree with that one, but it gets blown away if there is no god.
Originally posted by StarrmanHis mind set is from such a long time ago, its in the era of debate about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. It's such a remote intellectual time I can't get into it. Still think he is an unmitigated BS artist though.
Perhaps you should look at the definitions and then look at the premises afresh. Spinoza was writing hundreds of years ago, I'd like to discuss his views regardless of his scientific ignorance.
Originally posted by StarrmanSonhouse's comments aside, I cannot conceive of the universe as not existing. No doubt that's because I'm part of it and to conceive of one's one non-existence is impossible while one still exists. Or am I already on the wrong track?
i) Cause of itself: that whose essencesinvolves existence or that whose nature cannot be concieved except as existing.
Originally posted by Starrman2) Two substances which have different attributes have nothing in common with one another
I thought it might be interesting to have a look at Spinoza's view of God as put forth in his Ethics. It's a fairly different view to that which we see here most of the time. I'll make no judgement on it until we've started a discussion, but I thought the easiest thing would be to list his premises and then assess his conclusion. I'm ignoring his axioms ...[text shortened]... er exists exists in god and nothing can exist or be conceived without god
Any takers?
14) Besides god no substance can exist or be conceived
________________________________
If #2 and #14 are both premises, does not #14 obviate the need for #2? Or is #14 a conclusion?
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI believe he means conceived as in brought into being, rather than as in mentally considered.
Sonhouse's comments aside, I cannot conceive of the universe as not existing. No doubt that's because I'm part of it and to conceive of one's one non-existence is impossible while one still exists. Or am I already on the wrong track?
Originally posted by vistesdYes, I should have mentioned there are steps of discussion between each premise to show how he arises at them. Unfortunately I don't have the time or finger strength to transcript them here. Perhaps if people had time they could read the first part of the ethics:
2) Two substances which have different attributes have nothing in common with one another
14) Besides god no substance can exist or be conceived
________________________________
If #2 and #14 are both premises, does not #14 obviate the need for #2? Or is #14 a conclusion?
http://www.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/ethica1.html
Perhaps we should take the premises one at a time and discuss his proofs and notations.
Originally posted by StarrmanOkay: I’ll take a look at it, but it’ll probably be a bit later.
Yes, I should have mentioned there are steps of discussion between each premise to show how he arises at them. Unfortunately I don't have the time or finger strength to transcript them here. Perhaps if people had time they could read the first part of the ethics:
http://www.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/ethica1.html
Perhaps we should take the premises one at a time and discuss his proofs and notations.
Initially, with regard to #1—it might be argued that a substance is simultaneous with its affectations. That is, is it conceivable that a substance has no mode whatsoever? One can argue that Brahman precedes all manifestations in a causative sense, I suppose, but it seems quite possible that the nature of the one substance is essentially expressive. One can speak of the one substance as being ontologically prior to affectations, but I’m not sure what that means.
I might caution that in our manner of speaking about it, we not “sneak in” a kind of dualism between substance and mode.
Originally posted by vistesdI agree, alas I fear Spinoza has no such caution, we'll see. In the end he's saying god is everything and the affectations his ultimate reality has are infinite. Which may be to say everything just 'is' which isn't actually saying much, and yet taking a massive detour to do it. I still can't work out if he's saying god is different from the totality of existence. If he is then how? If he isn't then why call it god and also, who cares?
Okay: I’ll take a look at it, but it’ll probably be a bit later.
Initially, with regard to #1—it might be argued that a substance is simultaneous with its affectations. That is, is it conceivable that a substance has no mode whatsoever? One can argue that Brahman precedes all manifestations in a causative sense, I suppose, but it seems quite possible t ...[text shortened]... ner of speaking about it, we not “sneak in” a kind of dualism between substance and mode.
Originally posted by StarrmanI've just printed out the Appendix to read a bit later.
I agree, alas I fear Spinoza has no such caution, we'll see. In the end he's saying god is everything and the affectations his ultimate reality has are infinite. Which may be to say everything just 'is' which isn't actually saying much, and yet taking a massive detour to do it. I still can't work out if he's saying god is different from the totality of existence. If he is then how? If he isn't then why call it god and also, who cares?
I find it can be damned difficult to keep a creeping (substance) dualism out of one's language: one of the reasons I always try to refer to not only that from which and in which we are, but of which we are as well. For me, the illusion (maya) is not that the forms exist, but that they are separable from the substance.
Originally posted by vistesdThat's a precursor of human perception, I think, and (time for some more Bad Zen© ) unfortunately also a barrier to enlightenment. When you can perceive that which you are instead of that which you perceive, you're a step closer.
I've just printed out the Appendix to read a bit later.
I find it can be damned difficult to keep a creeping (substance) dualism out of one's language: one of the reasons I always try to refer to not only that from which and in which we are, but of which we are as well. For me, the illusion (maya) is not that the forms exist, but that they are separable from the substance.