Religious tolerance

Religious tolerance

Spirituality

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Hmmm . . .

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
Actually, this is something Aquinas argues in the Summa (I.4.2). Since God is the efficient cause of all beings, He must have in Himself the perfections of all beings - including intelligence, will etc. And, if He possesses an intellect and a will, then He is a person by definition.

Indeed, I think "ground of being" should lead you to the same conclusion.
GoB raises the question, and I have grappled with it. But there is nothing to say that will and intellect are manifest anywhere but in those existents, such as humans, who exhibit them as aspects of their configuration. In that case, will and intellect are not substances “given” to creatures by an external source (the creator). To use the ocean/wave metaphor beloved of monists: will and intellect may be part of the “shape” of the wave, which are dispersed when the wave collapses—they are not “in” the ocean except as potentialities which are actualized in the wave.

F

Unknown Territories

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Originally posted by LemonJello
If such a God existed, the world would be just as ridiculous as His essence -- essentially, exaggeration run amok.
you are completely and utterly ineffectual and lacking all form of persuasion.
Don't try to get on my good side with your empty flattery. I can see right through your Dale Carnegie manipulations.

By telling me that I cannot comprehend the ways of God until I first (compelled apparently by no reasons at all -- rather, in spite of reasons to the contrary) place my stamp of approval on them, you are advocating arbitrary actions and unwarranted beliefs.
Again, you place emphasis where it does not belong. You demand God to adjust to you, instead of the other way around.

From where does your sense of 'fair' originate? What is the template of 'justice?' By what standard do you measure whether a thing is right or wrong, good or evil?

As I posted previously, you see a part of the painting (although the part you are seeing is less than you think), and have drawn conclusions about the whole.

Even better? God's plan is so perfect, He doesn't rely on your ability to understand Him, His essence, or His character. He puts one simple thing forth, and one simple thing only:
* realize you are separated from Him (shouldn't be too hard)
* realize you can do nothing to close the gap between the two
* change your thinking, regarding Jesus Christ
* accept what He says is acceptable to God, namely, the work accomplished on the cross.
That is it. You don't have to reconcile your self-important standards with God's apparent shortcomings. You don't have to understand the totality of His character (impossible to do, from your current position anyway). Your perspicacity or lack thereof, is not the issue. The issue is faith in Christ.
You either realize you need it, or you don't.
I humbly submit that you not face God without it.

Chief Justice

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Originally posted by vistesd
I probably was very confusing. Some questions:

(1) If the set is empty, then is there really anything to talk about?

(2) Can we know whether the set is empty?

(3) Can you flesh out simply the way of nonsensory knowing? (I’m assuming you don’t mean simply reasoning. Are you speaking of something akin to Schopenhauer’s “subjective knowing?&rdquo😉

...[text shortened]... world. In the latter case, I’m back to the question of non-sensory knowing.

Thanks Bennett.
(1) Yes, if the set is empty, but that is the question.

(2) I don't know how to answer that question without actually undertaking an investigation into the synthetic a priori. I certainly wouldn't rule it out. I know the answer will depend on whether you are an internalist or externalist about justification.

(3) Well, there are any number of examples. I know mathematical and logical truths on the basis of reasoning alone; not based upon sensory experience (though sensory experience may be involved in the mode by which I come to believe these truths). I know that that
~(P&~P) is necessarily true based upon the results of a proof, and hence my knowledge is based upon an appreciation of the formal properties of this theorem, and its derivability from the rules of the propositional calculus. I know this theorem a priori, even though I may perceive the proof on a sheet of paper.

Zellulärer Automat

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
I think we differ in our definitions of 'ineffable'.
😞

😵

L

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Originally posted by FreakyKBH
you are completely and utterly ineffectual and lacking all form of persuasion.
Don't try to get on my good side with your empty flattery. I can see right through your Dale Carnegie manipulations.

By telling me that I cannot comprehend the ways of God until I first (compelled apparently by no reasons at all -- rather, in spite of reasons to t ealize you need it, or you don't.
I humbly submit that you not face God without it.
From where does your sense of 'fair' originate? What is the template of 'justice?' By what standard do you measure whether a thing is right or wrong, good or evil?

I think this is irrelevant in the current context. Whatever measure of good the theist employs can also be employed by the atheist, excepting Divine Command, which no right-thinking person takes seriously anyway. Moreover, I am perfectly willing to allow you to employ your own notion of good and evil in this discussion. Then, however, if you maintain that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (OOO), and essentially argue that this world is the best possible according to your ethical theory, I will just have to conclude that your ethical theory is mysterious too, just like your God.

As I posted previously, you see a part of the painting (although the part you are seeing is less than you think), and have drawn conclusions about the whole.

What I have drawn a conclusion about concerns the problem of OOO God's existence. My conclusion is that it is very likely that no such God exists, and this conclusion is based on rational argument stemming from an evidential form of the Problem of Evil. Evidently, your "refutation" of this Problem of Evil stems from mystical knowledge gained from secret rings found in boxes of Cracker Jack.

Even better? God's plan is so perfect, He doesn't rely on your ability to understand Him, His essence, or His character. He puts one simple thing forth, and one simple thing only:
* realize you are separated from Him (shouldn't be too hard)
* realize you can do nothing to close the gap between the two
* change your thinking, regarding Jesus Christ
* accept what He says is acceptable to God, namely, the work accomplished on the cross.
That is it. You don't have to reconcile your self-important standards with God's apparent shortcomings. You don't have to understand the totality of His character (impossible to do, from your current position anyway). Your perspicacity or lack thereof, is not the issue. The issue is faith in Christ.
You either realize you need it, or you don't.
I humbly submit that you not face God without it.


I will say that you seem consistent and strong in your faith. Where does that leave us? Impasse?

L

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Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
😞

😵
He heh. That's funny. I have always employed the following definition:

That which is ineffable = Ick flabble blurp gyaotuoa 4&%&&(* ,daie aven Ping!

l

London

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Originally posted by vistesd
GoB raises the question, and I have grappled with it. But there is nothing to say that will and intellect are manifest anywhere but in those existents, such as humans, who exhibit them as aspects of their configuration. In that case, will and intellect are not substances “given” to creatures by an external source (the creator). To use the ocean/wave metap ...[text shortened]... collapses—they are not “in” the ocean except as potentialities which are actualized in the wave.
Remember, we are talking about ground of being here, not ground of matter.

This is where I think the wave/ocean analogy can be misleading. The ocean, in itself, is not the [only] source of being for the wave - you also need the wind*. Without the wind, you would have only still water, not a wave on an ocean. What the ocean provides is the matter for the wave; i.e. the constituent elements of the wave. So, if your analogy is
wave:ocean::existent beings:ground of being

then you would be correlating matter in the first comparison to being in the second (which is a philosophically dangerous thing to do - you run the risk of inadvertent materialism). However, for our limited purposes, we can see that whatever is true of the matter of the wave is also true for the ocean. So, analogically, whatever is true of the being of existent beings (such as intelligence in humans) should also be true of the ground of being.

The 'ground of being' is the source of the entire being of existent beings (such as humans). The actualities of human beings are also actualities of the GoB; the potentialities of human beings are also potentialities of the GoB.

Another way of looking at it - the GoB ("all of all of it" ) can be looked at as the least common multiple of all existent beings. But then, all of the constituent elements (or factors) of existent beings are also constituent elements of the GoB.

Even if you think of intellect and will as 'epiphenomena' of the configuration of humans, the GoB also contains the same configuration within itself and so should exhibit the same epiphenomena.

---
* Which, in turn, needs solar energy, nuclear fusion etc. - but perhaps I'm getting carried away! 🙂

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
So, if your analogy is
wave:ocean::existent beings:ground of being

then you would be correlating matter in the first comparison to being in the second (which is a philosophically dangerous thing to do - you run the risk of inadvertent materialism).
😵:'(😵

d

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6. In the context of this discussion, where does the GTBGW (God/Tao/Brahman/Ground of Being/whatever) lie?
If you are asking about where God fits in Kant's philosophy, the answer is "uncomfortably".

Having (in his view) successfully done away with rationalist arguments for the existence of God (most famously the ontological argument, by pointing out existance is not a predicate), he then smuggled God back in via his moral philosophy (very roughly, we know and obey a duty-based morality whose end only makes sense if we postulate the existence of God). I'm no expert on Kant, and have forgotten more than I remember, but I think even Kant sympathisers will tell you this is one of the weakest aspects of his philosophy.

Hmmm . . .

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Originally posted by bbarr
(1) Yes, if the set is empty, but that is the question.

(2) I don't know how to answer that question without actually undertaking an investigation into the synthetic a priori. I certainly wouldn't rule it out. I know the answer will depend on whether you are an internalist or externalist about justification.

(3) Well, there are any number of e ...[text shortened]... ulus. I know this theorem a priori, even though I may perceive the proof on a sheet of paper.
Thanks; I'm going to go do some reading on internalist and externaslist views of justification.

l

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Originally posted by dottewell
If you are asking about where God fits in Kant's philosophy, the answer is "uncomfortably".

Having (in his view) successfully done away with rationalist arguments for the existence of God (most famously the ontological argument, by pointing out existance is not a predicate), he then smuggled God back in via his moral philosophy (very roughly, we know an ...[text shortened]... k even Kant sympathisers will tell you this is one of the weakest aspects of his philosophy.
You mean Anselm's Ontological Argument, right? I think there are more modern versions that do not suffer from this (I'm thinking of Godel and Plantinga).

In any case my question should've been more specific - is God of the noumenal realm or the phenomenal?

Hmmm . . .

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
Remember, we are talking about ground of being here, not ground of matter.

This is where I think the wave/ocean analogy can be misleading. The ocean, in itself, is not the [only] source of being for the wave - you also need the wind*. Without the wind, you would have only still water, not a wave on an ocean. What the ocean provides is turn, needs solar energy, nuclear fusion etc. - but perhaps I'm getting carried away! 🙂
Even if you think of intellect and will as 'epiphenomena' of the configuration of humans, the GoB also contains the same configuration within itself and so should exhibit the same epiphenomena.

I don’t confuse being with matter, although I understand the danger in using physical analogies—the Bible is full of them! And yes, any such analogy is limited.

However, for our limited purposes, we can see that whatever is true of the matter of the wave is also true for the ocean. So, analogically, whatever is true of the being of existent beings (such as intelligence in humans) should also be true of the ground of being.

The phrase “whatever is true of” is awfully general. Are you saying, for example, that the exact form of any existent must somehow exist as an actuality, separate from all other forms, in the ground prior to the manifestation of that existent. In terms of the limited analogy: the exact form of a given wave must exist “embedded” in the ocean as an actuality, and not just a potential form?

The actualities of human beings are also actualities of the GoB; the potentialities of human beings are also potentialities of the GoB.

This is confusing me (see above). I would say that will and intellect are potential in the ground until formed in the actual existent—I hate to use the word “parts” or “components” because that implies the ground is somehow a set of components, rather than a whole; maybe I can use colors, like strands of primary colors that blend to form the other shades...

Are you thinking in holographic terms?

Even if you think of intellect and will as 'epiphenomena' of the configuration of humans, the GoB also contains the same configuration within itself and so should exhibit the same epiphenomena.

I’m going to be away from here awhile, and will think about this. But if you could sort out my confusions, it would be helpful. I keep seeing in your analysis a ground full of tiny pre-formed existents that it keeps spitting up...

Be well.

l

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Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Even if you think of intellect and will as 'epiphenomena' of the configuration of humans, the GoB also contains the same configuration within itself and so should exhibit the same epiphenomena.

I don’t confuse being with matter, although I understand the danger in using physical analogies—the Bible is full of them! And yes, any such analogy is lim analysis a ground full of tiny pre-formed existents that it keeps spitting up...

Be well.[/b]
I don’t confuse being with matter, although I understand the danger in using physical analogies

Let me go back to something you said earlier:

But there is nothing to say that will and intellect are manifest anywhere but in those existents, such as humans, who exhibit them as aspects of their configuration. In that case, will and intellect are not substances “given” to creatures by an external source (the creator).

"Configuration" - of what (if not matter)?

The phrase “whatever is true of” is awfully general. Are you saying, for example, that the exact form of any existent must somehow exist as an actuality, separate from all other forms, in the ground prior to the manifestation of that existent. In terms of the limited analogy: the exact form of a given wave must exist “embedded” in the ocean as an actuality, and not just a potential form?

Granted - "whatever is true of" was rather awful construction. Rather, I should've said "in the material aspect, whatever is true of" etc.

Remember what I pointed out - for the analogy to hold, we must speak only of the material aspect of the ocean/wave. As far as material composition is concerned, clearly whatever is true of the wave is true of the ocean as well.

The "form" of the wave is provided by a third agent that is neither ocean* nor wave - the wind. So, unless you're about to embark on a spiritual quest for the "animating/creative force of being" (the 'bang!' to accompany your 'boom!'😉, we will have to limit ourselves only to that which the ocean is the source of respective to the wave - i.e. its material composition. To speak of the shape or "form" of the wave is to speak of something that has no analogue to reality.

EDIT: You keep well, too!

---
* The term ocean is being used in two different senses in this analogy - the whole ocean (including the wave) and the ocean minus the wave. This is an example of the "Beware of language games" message for you.

d

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
You mean Anselm's Ontological Argument, right? I think there are more modern versions that do not suffer from this (I'm thinking of Godel and Plantinga).

In any case my question should've been more specific - is God of the noumenal realm or the phenomenal?
Oops. Ignore this post.

Chief Justice

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Originally posted by lucifershammer
You mean Anselm's Ontological Argument, right? I think there are more modern versions that do not suffer from this (I'm thinking of Godel and Plantinga).

In any case my question should've been more specific - is God of the noumenal realm or the phenomenal?
According to Kant, the notion of God you employ derives its content purely from the phenomenal realm; it cannot refer to anything noumenal. This is why, generally, we can't think about the noumenal, and hence can't know anything substantial about it. The tension here is in using concepts that derive their conten from the phenomenal to refer, even in some very limited sense, to the noumenal. I have no idea how this is supposed to work, which is why I don't subscribe to Kant's view concerning conceptual content.