Plantinga's ontological argument

Originally posted by JS357
[quote]It's true that you can come up with a description of reality that involves no maximal greatness. But, as explained earlier, I can go from "possibly MG" to "possibly necessarily ME" to "necessarily ME" to ME = true under the axioms of S5. ME is now instantiated in every possible description of reality, and thus, so is MG. Yes, I know. I had the same init d say S5 is not the analytical system to use, or it is misunderstood.

Well, LJ answered most of this, so I'll hit the one point he didn't answer.

The definitional problem of P2 is that saying a being exists in a PW is, by the definition you provided, saying that there is a description of reality that includes the statement that there is a MGB. Of course there can be a statement like that. But it is not valid to equivocate between "There is a statement that there is a MGB in a PW" (which is the same as 'A MGB is possible"😉 and "there is a MGB in a PW." The latter IS the statement. No progress is made by acknowledging that there is this statement.

So the direct re-wording of the statement (via substitution) is this:

If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then* a maximally great being exists in some possible world
If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then* there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement "MG exists" as part of that description.

I think your missing element is that the statement "MG exists" is not just a statement, but a true statement (otherwise it would not be part of a description of reality). Once this this change is made, "There is a statement that there is a MGB in a PW" -> "There is a true statement that there is a MGB in a PW" -> a MGB exists in a PW - back to the original P2 wording, with no equivocation involved.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
You're welcome. Thanks for working with me on this argument.

However, I work from the reasonable suggestion that people arguing in favour of God's existence are usually trying to prove the truth of what they already believe.

That's probably true in a lot of cases, but according to the Stanford website, Plantinga himself does not believe this ...[text shortened]... itted to the many-worlds theory, so I'll stop here.

Before I compare weightings, I'd like to know which many-worlds hypothesis is in play...is it the Multi-World interpretation from QM?

Yes

Philosophically speaking, there is nothing in the idea of possible worlds/descriptions of reality that says that all the 'worlds' must actually exist.

My point exactly. It is only in the Many Worlds interpretation that they are asserted to exist.

I get where he is going with the idea of algorithmic complexity, but I need some proof that these various levels of Multiverses are actually less computationally complex, as well as some explanation as to how so many worlds could all exist (at the same time?!)

For now this seems a diversion. The algorithm argument either works for you or not. However, the point I underlined was that in reality there are many issues which can be explained more simply with a multiverse model than without. For that reason it is not in conflict with Occam's Razor. After that, I have demanded the return of my book on the topic but it may be few days before it arrives with my awfully-busy-and-important daughter in tow.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
def. [b]God: a being which is "maximally excellent" in every possible world. Maximal Excellence includes such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. A being which has maximal excellence in every possible world would have "maximal greatness."

Premises:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is pos ...[text shortened]... accept the argument entirely. For my atheist brethren: which premise(s) would you reject?[/b]

A Maximally Great Being cannot exist.
To exist requires a differentiation.

To be a Functional Unit amongst
and transcending
other functional units,
means it can never be maximal.
It must be All and Absolute.

To be a Functional Unit alone,
means no differentiation.
Does it then "exist"?

A Maximally Great Being cannot not-exist.
To not-exist requires also a differentiation.

Maximally Great is a comparative.
How can that which is comparative
be maximally great?

A Maximally Great Being neither exists
nor does it not-exist.
Nor does it exist and not-exist at the same time,

If unto "itself" alone, it remains undifferentiated.

If a Being amongst other beings, it is comparative
and not maximally great.

What manifestation can ever name its Source?
Is "God" finally nameable?
Many sacred ways question that possibilty.

Does that which is unnameable and without form "exist" or equally, shown not to exist?

Many words whirling about a false premise from the start.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Well, LJ answered most of this, so I'll hit the one point he didn't answer.[quote]The definitional problem of P2 is that saying a being exists in a PW is, by the definition you provided, saying that there is a description of reality that includes the statement that there is a MGB. Of course there can be a statement like that. But it is not valid t ...[text shortened]... exists in a PW - back to the original P2 wording, with no equivocation involved.

I see what you are saying, but I took "there is a description of reality" (under the meaning of "possible" ) to allow that there might be differing, even contradictory, descriptions of reality, that differ from one another and from a "true" description of reality. I could elaborate, but I will be researching this more, while awaiting any reply.

Originally posted by JS357
I see what you are saying, but I took "there is a description of reality" (under the meaning of "possible" ) to allow that there might be differing, even contradictory, descriptions of reality, that differ from one another and from a "true" description of reality. I could elaborate, but I will be researching this more, while awaiting any reply.

I agree with all of that. P2 only establishes that the statement "MGB exists" is true in one specific description of reality.

Originally posted by finnegan

Before I compare weightings, I'd like to know which many-worlds hypothesis is in play...is it the Multi-World interpretation from QM?

Yes

Philosophically speaking, there is nothing in the idea of possible worlds/descriptions of reality that says that all the 'worlds' must actually exist.

My point exactly. It is only in the ...[text shortened]... ut it may be few days before it arrives with my awfully-busy-and-important daughter in tow.

For now this seems a diversion. The algorithm argument either works for you or not.

I would not make such a crass assertion! 😉 Not only are there different degrees of effectiveness of an argument, and questions of when it is proper to use the argument, but it must be weighed against other competing arguments.

I rate the effectiveness of the algorithmic complexity argument fairly high, partially because I'm biased by its effectiveness in my chosen profession. However, when I see someone misapplying an argument [as my set-generating example showed], I tend to be more suspicious of further claims they make based on that argument.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I believe the universe is non-deterministic and that therefore omniscience and omnipotence are impossible.

I think you leave out restraint when you think about omnipotence, getting the
proper end result doesn't mean one must FORCE the issue. So having the power
to MAKE something happen doesn't mean one needs to.
Kelly