Our Identity

Originally posted by Scriabin
Let me pose a hypothetical problem:

Suppose a device existed that could allegedly transport you from one place to another instantaneously without your having actually to travel between the point from which you depart and the point to which you arrive.

The device would disassemble you, atom by atom, and commit to a computer's memory the pattern of your ...[text shortened]... rded a the departure point -- so it would make no difference.

Would there be a difference?

An interesting thread, thanks.

If i had gone through the machine and been replicated at the other end (lets say in the same room) by an identical arrangement of different atoms, and my original self was no longer in one piece but billions; then I would have to say that I was dead and a replica stood in my place. In fact if it was possible in that instant to ask me how I felt i would say - dead! Have i been murdered when clearly on the other side of the room stands another me?

Let’s say I could also survive the process, so there was two of me in the room. Who is divegeester? If you asked each of me the question both would say "me". However, we know that the latest edition is a new fabrication and not the original me and therefore not a real person. So having made the replica would we then have the moral position to destroy it again?

An interesting physical, and moral dilemma.

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., so you are a skeptic about personal identity. Fair enough.

However, I am not that skeptic; I would rather accept that I prefer to separete not myself from the truth of my insubstantiality😵

Originally posted by bbarr
True, but if personal identity is a transitive relation then these eventual differences are irrelevant. Suppose s1 is the cell before twinning. Suppose twinning results in s2 and s3. Had s2 not been created, most folks would say s1 and s3 are numerically identical (i.e., they are the same thing, in the same way that my desk is the same desk it was 10 minutes tic twins are each a half of one person). Similar comments apply to the hemispherectomy case.

I see. I think the hemispherectomy case is more damning, as it cannot be avoided by considerations about what an organism (and therefore life itself) is. I'm tempted now to add some constraints to my concept to avoid that, but I have to think them through.

What's your personal view on personal identity?

Originally posted by divegeester
An interesting thread, thanks.

If i had gone through the machine and been replicated at the other end (lets say in the same room) by an identical arrangement of different atoms, and my original self was no longer in one piece but billions; then I would have to say that I was dead and a replica stood in my place. In fact if it was possible in that in ...[text shortened]... en have the moral position to destroy it again?

An interesting physical, and moral dilemma.

Wait, why is your duplicate not a real person? There are literally billions of real people in the world that are not identical to you.

Originally posted by bbarr
Wait, why is your duplicate not a real person? There are literally billions of real people in the world that are not identical to you.

...leaving aside the fact that a Christian is always supposed to conceive deeply the concept of the Ressurection every time s/he glances at the eyes of her/ his not identical to her/ him neighbour🙂

Originally posted by Palynka
I see. I think the hemispherectomy case is more damning, as it cannot be avoided by considerations about what an organism (and therefore life itself) is. I'm tempted now to add some constraints to my concept to avoid that, but I have to think them through.

What's your personal view on personal identity?

I think personal identity tracks continuity with regard to a certain important core set of psychological capacities, dispositions and states. We should start by thinking about what we take to be important about ourselves; about those properties of our psychology that constitute who we take ourselves to essentially be. When there is relative stability over time with respect to these properties, we can talk meaningfully about being the same person we were before. We shouldn't care about the possibility of duplication, because the moral problems it raises disappear when when we adopt the correct moral theory (some version of virtue ethics, though I'm not going to defend that claim here), and we should reject the claim that personal identity is transitive. The hemispherectomy patients, on my view, start off being personally identical but gradually cease to be so as they go on (since psychological continuity will probably not be preserved). I think this view also allows us to make sense of the notion of shared identities within the context of particularly intimate relationships, and how such relationships often involve a blurring of the boundaries of the self, and how the dissolution of such relationships can be seen as a real loss of one's identity. This is all very vague and hand-wavy, I know, but I have yet to systematize my views on this issue. What do you think?

Originally posted by bbarr
I think personal identity tracks continuity with regard to a certain important core set of psychological capacities, dispositions and states. We should start by thinking about what we take to be important about ourselves; about those properties of our psychology that constitute who we take ourselves to essentially be. When there is relative stability over ti hand-wavy, I know, but I have yet to systematize my views on this issue. What do you think?

Sounds potentially very reasonable, but if anything this thread shows that it's the nitty-gritty of the details that tend to cause problems.

What bothers me about the stability of traits is that when I look at a picture of when I was 7 or 8, I like to think that is indeed "me". What I am now is clearly not independent of what I was "then", but of course the question is whether that independence is enough. I'm also very comfortable with a constantly changing self.

On the other hand, I'm pretty comfortable with the idea that my "self" would be destroyed after a lobotomy (something I didn't address with my previous definition).

This makes me want to tie the constraint of stability of traits to a temporal interval. If events lead to a gradual change of personality that leads to large differences over 50 years, I find that normal. But such large changes in a short interval with an event such as a lobotomy, I'm less comfortable with it.

To finish, I'm obviously not a scholar on this issues so my approach is just "intuitive", which is probably not the best way to go about it. I throw an idea on the table and then just try to find inconsistencies and adjust...

If you know of a good, not too technical, book recommendation about this I would appreciate it.

Originally posted by Palynka
I already been through that. Please read my initial post and why past history cannot be perfectly copied. Since the present and the future history depend on my past history, then there is no point in time where I am identical to any copy.

But you quite clearly assign an identity to the history of a sequence of your 'selves' through time but fail to apply that sequence to the sequence of selves followed by the sequence of copies. At the point of copying there is clearly a relationship between both the original and its past instantiation and the copy and the originals past instantiation yet you choose to assign one relationship greater significance than the other based apparently on the physical identity of the atoms not on any similarity between the entity and past entities.
So let us add another thought experiment: Over a period of time the physical atoms in your body are in a constant state of change. Considering that your body is over 50% water, we could in theory collect all your sweat and urine over a period of time and purify it and drink it until over 50% of myself consists of atoms that were formally part of you. In fact a blood transfusion combined with an organ or two would achieve a much greater degree of transference.

This actually adds a little to the monozygotic twins issue that bbarr was discussing. It is now known that mothers frequently retain cells from their fetus throughout their body for the rest of their lives. The same may happen with people who have blood transfusions or organ transplants. Further we are to some extent in a symbiotic relationship with many organisms such as the bacteria in our stomachs. There is also no real barrier to having brain cells from another individual placed in our bodies and retaining them as part of our brains for life. Even at the DNA level, virus' may quite happily go through our body and essentially add part of themselves to our DNA. All this essentially means that biologically speaking it makes no sense to attach identity to the decedents of a given cell or to a particular DNA pattern.

Originally posted by twhitehead
But you quite clearly assign an identity to the history of a sequence of your 'selves' through time but fail to apply that sequence to the sequence of selves followed by the sequence of copies. At the point of copying there is clearly a relationship between both the original and its past instantiation and the copy and the originals past instantiation yet ...[text shortened]... no sense to attach identity to the decedents of a given cell or to a particular DNA pattern.

I already conceded the point of the hemispherectomy but, for the rest, I do not choose based on the physical identity of the atoms at all.

Originally posted by Palynka
I already conceded the point of the hemispherectomy but, for the rest, I do not choose based on the physical identity of the atoms at all.

I create a machine which analyses the configuration of your body and makes a copy of you. Granted the copy is not perfect but it is capable of consciousness. The machine simultaneously rearranges parts of the original you to such an extent that one day after the operation the copy is closer in every conceivable way to the 'original' than the new original is - except for the individual atoms involved.
Why do you attach a concept of a continuous identity to the original and not the copy? Both are dependent on the past version of the original for their existence and have a shared 'history'.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I create a machine which analyses the configuration of your body and makes a copy of you. Granted the copy is not perfect but it is capable of consciousness. The machine simultaneously rearranges parts of the original you to such an extent that one day after the operation the copy is closer in every conceivable way to the 'original' than the new original ...[text shortened]... pendent on the past version of the original for their existence and have a shared 'history'.

I said:

For example, our brain is in constant activity, with neurons being fired all the time and electrical impulses flowing across it. I would imagine that at some point it would be impossible to perfectly replicate this, as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle would apply.

Originally posted by Palynka
I said:

For example, our brain is in constant activity, with neurons being fired all the time and electrical impulses flowing across it. I would imagine that at some point it would be impossible to perfectly replicate this, as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle would apply.

I agree with that, but perfect replication is not part of my thought experiment is it?
What about discontinuity in your opinion? If we were to successfully freeze a human being such that all thought activity stopped for say a month and were able to de-thaw them and get them talking again (I believe this has been done with some animals capable of thought). Would the thawed person be a new entity?

Originally posted by twhitehead
I agree with that, but perfect replication is not part of my thought experiment is it?
What about discontinuity in your opinion? If we were to successfully freeze a human being such that all thought activity stopped for say a month and were able to de-thaw them and get them talking again (I believe this has been done with some animals capable of thought). Would the thawed person be a new entity?

But without perfect replication the question doesn't even pose itself. The copy would never be me, not in any meaningful sense that I can think of. So your question is basically about whether I can still be me after re-arrangement of some parts. That falls under the same category as the lobotomy discussed above.

For the rest, I'm not sure to what extend the cells are freezed in an absolute sense. I'm sure they aren't because there is a limited time-frame for which resurrection is possible. In that sense, history still matters throughout.

Originally posted by Palynka
But without perfect replication the question doesn't even pose itself. The copy would never be me, not in any meaningful sense that I can think of. So your question is basically about whether I can still be me after re-arrangement of some parts. That falls under the same category as the lobotomy discussed above.

I disagree. You are different from your past self every second of the day. Why does an imperfect copy have no meaningful connection but an imperfect continuation remain entirely part of your whole history? Surely your concept of self is based on a historical causation chain and thus the imperfect copy also shares a causation chain with you.

It may be easier to understand my point if you think about a computer document. You write a letter on a computer then make an imperfect copy of it. You would still probably consider the copy to be the same letter (with modifications), would you not? What about a perfect copy whose only difference is the location that it is stored in?

For the rest, I'm not sure to what extend the cells are freezed in an absolute sense. I'm sure they aren't because there is a limited time-frame for which resurrection is possible. In that sense, history still matters throughout.
I believe virus' can survive millions of years in a dormant state. I also believe that it is possible to freeze certain cells indefinitely. I am not sure though what the limits are on freezing mammalian brain cells but I know of no theoretical limit.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I disagree. You are different from your past self every second of the day. Why does an imperfect copy have no meaningful connection but an imperfect continuation remain entirely part of your whole history? Surely your concept of self is based on a historical causation chain and thus the imperfect copy also shares a causation chain with you.

It may be e gh what the limits are on freezing mammalian brain cells but I know of no theoretical limit.

*sigh* We're clearly not communicating, tw.

Please see my point about the self being continuously dynamic and not just an interconnected sequence of static states. The copy can never be a continuous continuation of my self.

Edit - This point, IMO, is exactly why bbarr "accepted" the first objection, but pointed out that it wasn't enough for the other two thought experiments.