Originally posted by Lord Shark
Ok I think I see what you're getting at now. I'll have a think about whether there's a better term.

twhitehead,

Having thought about it, I'm afraid I can do no better than my initial suggestion, which was 'moral patient'. Sorry.

Originally posted by twhitehead
If you wring a chickens neck it would be less morally wrong.

Chickens are people too you know!

Originally posted by twhitehead
My point is that the rules surrounding morality do not change, what changes is who we consider 'equals'. I think it is an important distinction.
A related point would be that two people may both agree on the rules, but come to different conclusions on particular instances especially in cases where there is a balance between two opposing cases. For exampl ng, but did nothing because they recognized the personal benefit as outweighing the morality.

My point is that the rules surrounding morality do not change, what changes is who we consider 'equals'. I think it is an important distinction.

You seem to indicate that there is a distinction to be made between "who we consider equals" and "equals" as in your rule, i.e., "It is wrong to harm your equals." However, when asked to define "equals" in the latter, you provided the following:
"By 'equals' I mean someone we respect as being equal to us".
"I intended 'equal in our eyes' sense".

Simply substituting the above definitions into "It is wrong to harm your equals" leaves the following:
"It is wrong to harm those 'we respect as being equal to us'".
"It is wrong to harm those 'equal in our eyes'".

Both of which seem, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to:
"It is wrong to harm those 'we consider equals'".

So under those definitions it would seem that your rule changes with "who we consider equals".

This leaves us with the problem of "who our 'equals' actually are" which seems to be your intent in your rule. You seemed reluctant to define it as "humans". So what is the criteria for determining "who our 'equals' actually are"?

I hope this clarifies what I'm trying to get at.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
[b]I may have missed something, but it seems like, by your definition, changing "who we accept as equals", also changes what is "moral".

Not necessarily. It might mean that our laws become more or less moral depending on who we accept as equals i.e. people. What is our equal and what we accept as equal are different ideas.[/b]

See my attempt at clarification above.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
So under those definitions it would seem that your rule changes with "who we consider equals".

No, the rule does not change, only the results. However, it does mean that different people will have different results and consider different sets of things moral or immoral.
The question then is whether I can consider a slave owner who believes his slaves are little better than animals to be morally wrong. From my perspective his actions are morally wrong, but from his perspective they aren't.
I think many people struggle with this question and it is part of the reason for people frequently saying things like "in the past slavery was acceptable".

Originally posted by Lord Shark
twhitehead,

Having thought about it, I'm afraid I can do no better than my initial suggestion, which was 'moral patient'. Sorry.

I still think that there needs to be a term that identifies those moral patients that we give the maximum allowance too. But having thought it over, that may end up being us. The rule of preference might be something like the following for most people:
1. Self first. (right to self defense).
2. Family.
3. Friends.
4. Local group (work/clubs/congregation etc)
5. Tribe/race/country.
6. Species.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I still think that there needs to be a term that identifies those moral patients that we give the maximum allowance too. But having thought it over, that may end up being us. The rule of preference might be something like the following for most people:
1. Self first. (right to self defense).
2. Family.
3. Friends.
4. Local group (work/clubs/congregation etc)
5. Tribe/race/country.
6. Species.

Perhaps one candidate term could be 'person'?

Originally posted by twhitehead
Can you explain further? Does your moral obligation to be a good steward, inform your moral obligation not to hurt? I guess it is possible, but I don't see it that way.

I see morals as the (or, at least a) better good--- our attempts at the best good. As such, the "oughts" find their motivation in seeking that best, most perfect good and across all lines.

The only affinity between good stewardship of resources and not sleeping with my neighbor's wife is the pursuit of the best good.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Perhaps one candidate term could be '[b]person'?[/b]

That is a good one, as it is often used in that sense. "A persons a person, no matter how small" says Dr Seus' elephant.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I see morals as the (or, at least a) better good--- our attempts at the best good. As such, the "oughts" find their motivation in seeking that best, most perfect good and across all lines.

The only affinity between good stewardship of resources and not sleeping with my neighbor's wife is the pursuit of the best good.

I on the other hand would not use the term 'morals' for many such pursuits. For example I think it is good to do well in an exam, or good to try to do well, I do not call it immoral to either fail, or not try.
I see sleeping with your neighbors wife as wrong (and immoral) because you are harming your neighbors feelings. Sleeping with another unattached consenting adult you are not married to (and if you are not married) is another matter altogether and is only immoral on social grounds, and I see that as a very different category of morality.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]My point is that the rules surrounding morality do not change, what changes is who we consider 'equals'. I think it is an important distinction.

You seem to indicate that there is a distinction to be made between "who we consider equals" and "equals" as in your rule, i.e., "It is wrong to harm your equals." However, when asked to define "equals" ...[text shortened]...

I hope this clarifies what I'm trying to get at.[/b]

I could have phrased it better:
"So under those definitions it would seem that the results of your rule changes with "who we consider equals".


The question then is whether I can consider a slave owner who believes his slaves are little better than animals to be morally wrong. From my perspective his actions are morally wrong, but from his perspective they aren't.
I think many people struggle with this question and it is part of the reason for people frequently saying things like "in the past slavery was acceptable".

So it seems like you are saying that what is moral is completely dependent on the perspective of the observer.

So is your objection to people saying things like "in the past slavery was acceptable" that there was never complete agreement amongst all observers that "slavery was acceptable"? And at a higher level, that there is nothing that can be deemed "moral" or "immoral" so long as all observers do not agree?

Originally posted by twhitehead
I on the other hand would not use the term 'morals' for many such pursuits. For example I think it is good to do well in an exam, or good to try to do well, I do not call it immoral to either fail, or not try.
I see sleeping with your neighbors wife as wrong (and immoral) because you are harming your neighbors feelings. Sleeping with another unattached c ...[text shortened]... nd is only immoral on social grounds, and I see that as a very different category of morality.

I see sleeping with your neighbors wife as wrong (and immoral) because you are harming your neighbors feelings.
A few exceptions to your rule.
His feelings would not be hurt if:

1. he doesn't know.
2. he encourages such behavior.
3. he doesn't care, one way or another.
4. he is engaged in such illicit activities on his own and cannot condemn what he condones for himself (provided he doesn't maintain a double standard)

If feelings be the new rule for morality, we're in a heap of trouble. I'm getting my feelings hurt just considering the ramifications!

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
I could have phrased it better:
"So under those definitions it would seem that the results of your rule changes with "who we consider equals".

Yes, thats correct.

So it seems like you are saying that what is moral is completely dependent on the perspective of the observer.
Yes and no. I am more leaning towards "what we believe is moral".

So is your objection to people saying things like "in the past slavery was acceptable" that there was never complete agreement amongst all observers that "slavery was acceptable"? And at a higher level, that there is nothing that can be deemed "moral" or "immoral" so long as all observers do not agree?
My objection is centered around my claim that it is not morals that have changed but our interpretation of them. For example, we did not change the rule "do not harm others unnecessarily" but rather changed who we considered others to be.
I think there are things that can be deemed moral or immoral, but I do not expect all observers to agree. But I think the disagreements are due to how we view the subjects of the morality, not what we believe about the basics of morality.
If you want to convince me that it is immoral to kill a mosquito, you will get nowhere by trying to tell me about some moral rule for mosquitos, but if you convince me that mosquitos are deserving of my respect, then it might work. If you convince me that they are 'persons', I might even treat them with the same morals I use for other persons.

Back to my objections regarding slavery in the past, it is often stated that it was morally acceptable and thus morals are relative, and the slave owners are not guilty of being immoral. I on the other hand believe they were morally wrong, and the reason they did not see it, was their lack of respect for slaves as 'persons'.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I on the other hand would not use the term 'morals' for many such pursuits. For example I think it is good to do well in an exam, or good to try to do well, I do not call it immoral to either fail, or not try.
I see sleeping with your neighbors wife as wrong (and immoral) because you are harming your neighbors feelings. Sleeping with another unattached c ...[text shortened]... nd is only immoral on social grounds, and I see that as a very different category of morality.

Thats the kind of example where in practice there could be a lot of variables that may make the act not immoral.