Moral Principles for Catholic Voters

Originally posted by dottewell
To avoid quibbling, a better (certainly more widely used) example might be that an 11-year-old does not have the right to vote simply by virtue of being a "potential adult".

Yeah, that's a good example.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I think the senior citizen example is fine, provided we are talking about potentiality. The point is, given this discount exists and there are certain conditions under which the theater is obligated to honor it, no such obligation exists based merely on potential status. Similarly, regardless of what privileges a company may bestow upon potential employ ...[text shortened]... al employees.

Regardless, now I think I am a little confused what you mean by "in potency".

The DOP definition of 'potency' is "the capacity of being or being thus".

The point I'm making with your senior citizen example is:
1. That a theatre is under no obligation to provide even senior citizens discounts, so we're not talking of rights per se.
2. That there are routine cases where potential status is considered.

Nevertheless, this is someway off the point because I'm not talking of zygotes as potential persons -- I'm saying they are persons.

Originally posted by bbarr
[b]By Data's own account, what you call "Data's suffering" is nothing more than his recognition of a state of decreased efficiency and/or damage.

No, this is false. Data's suffering is not merely cognitive, it is affective as well. It is functionally related to Data's motivational states (e.g., the desire to alleviate the condition). Further, Data's ...[text shortened]... e in or, minimally, no psychological state would motivate them to change their state.[/b]

In other words, it means nothing more than the creature has a preference for certain states over others and will attempt to obtain those states.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
In other words, it means nothing more than the creature has a preference for certain states over others and will attempt to obtain those states.

Those are minimal conditions, not a definition.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
The DOP definition of 'potency' is "the capacity of being or being thus".

The point I'm making with your senior citizen example is:
1. That a theatre is under no obligation to provide even senior citizens discounts, so we're not talking of rights per se.
2. That there are routine cases where potential status is considered.

Nevertheless, this ...[text shortened]... because I'm not talking of zygotes as potential persons -- I'm saying they are persons.

It's not off the point. There are two questions - whether one can define a zygote as a person in view of its "potency", but also whether such a "person" would have the same rights as a human being that had realised (to a different degree) this "potency".

Originally posted by lucifershammer
The DOP definition of 'potency' is "the capacity of being or being thus".

That's not going to work, is it? On what grounds can you say that the zygote at conception has the "capacity" for an intellect and a will? These capacities are something it may develop over time; and based on induction, we could probably say something about the likelihood that it will develop certain capacities.

So I'm still confused about "in potency".

Originally posted by LemonJello
That's not going to work, is it? On what grounds can you say that the zygote at conception has the "capacity" for an intellect and a will? These capacities are something it may develop over time; and based on induction, we could probably say something about the likelihood that it will develop certain capacities.

So I'm still confused about "in potency".

a zygote has only what it has , a pope has less than a zygote so I suggest they abort the pope and stop worrying about that papist drivel.

Originally posted by frogstomp
a zygote has only what it has , a pope has less than a zygote so I suggest they abort the pope and stop worrying about that papist drivel.

"in papacy"?

Originally posted by whiterose
It can't. It would be like saying that you should not be allowed to cut off your finger because it would not be in the best interest of the cells in the finger, as they would die.

I agree with your "It can't".

Concerning the rest, I see what you mean, but it's probably not the best analogy to abortion. Even if it's not yet viable, the fetus is biologically distinct from the woman's body, unlike her finger.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I agree with your "It can't".

Concerning the rest, I see what you mean, but it's probably not the best analogy to abortion. Even if it's not yet viable, the fetus is biologically distinct from the woman's body, unlike her finger.

Why is that of any importance? Can she use mouthwash to kill germs that cause bad breath?

Originally posted by no1marauder
Why is that of any importance? Can she use mouthwash to kill germs that cause bad breath?

It's not really important to this discussion -- it was an aside. But cutting off a finger is not a good analogy to aborting a fetus. There is no reason to give any credence to the false notion that the fetus is just "part of" her body. I like your analogy of a tapeworm better, at least as it relates to the early fetus.

Can she use mouthwash to kill germs that cause bad breath?

Of course she can. She can abort the young fetus, too, if she wants to.

Originally posted by bbarr
Those are minimal conditions, not a definition.

If you accept that Data is a person, then no more is necessary.

Indeed, the only thing the whole "capacity for suffering" bit does is appeal to our empathy/compassion. It is clearly not sufficient for personhood; based on the discussion of creatures like Data, it is not necessary either. There may be some other condition you may want to put instead (e.g. that the person have preferences and will choose to act in accordance with them to the extent possible).

Originally posted by LemonJello
That's not going to work, is it? On what grounds can you say that the zygote at conception has the "capacity" for an intellect and a will? These capacities are something it may develop over time; and based on induction, we could probably say something about the likelihood that it will develop certain capacities.

So I'm still confused about "in potency".

Well, a zygote at conception carries the genetic blueprint for an intellect and a will and the necessary biochemical processes that will (if uninterrupted) lead to the realisation of those powers. In that sense, it has the "capacity" for an intellect and will.

What do you understand by "capacity for intellect and will"?

Originally posted by bbarr
So, if a fetus is aborted, then prior to its being aborted it was still, in potency, an adult human. If so, then the following claim is false:

If X is in potency Y, then X will at some point be Y.

But I doubt you want to interpret potency as follows:

If X is in potency Y, then it is logically possible that X will at some point by Y.

This would be ...[text shortened]... in potency Y, by completing the following conditional for me?

If X is in potency Y, then....

What does 'nomological' and 'mereological' mean? Could you define these please?

If X is in potency Y, then X is in the process of becoming Y.

That's the simplest way of putting it. It might be more or less the same as your third formulation. But a simple sum of some particular sperm and some particular ovum would not qualify as in potency anything because potency is a quality of substantial beings -- random, unconnected bits of matter do not substantial beings make. Once the sperm and the ovum combine, of course, we can speak of a new substantial being (the older sperm and ovum cease to exist).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
A person is a being with the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering.

The following cases are about rational, sentient beings (human or otherwise).

1. X is injured in a car accident and is in a coma. X's brain seems to be physically undamaged, but X shows no signs of responsiveness.

a. Is X a person?

The experts say this phenomenon is quite routine and fully expect X to wake up any time.

b. Is X a person?

Suppose the experts gave X a 50-50 chance of recovering.

c. Is X a person?

Suppose the experts gave X a very small (but non-zero) chance of recovering.

d. Is X a person?

2. X is injured in a car accident and is in a coma. X's brain has been damaged and is in need of surgery; otherwise X will continue to remain in a coma.

a. Is X a person?

Suppose the experts say that, while the operation would be successful in terms of reviving X, X will almost certainly have lost his memories and personality. He will, nevertheless, still have (or develop) intelligence and sentience.

b. Is X a person?

3. X is injured in a car accident and is in a coma. X's brain has been damaged but will heal naturally if X is allowed to convalesce. X will retain his memories and personality.

a. Is X a person?

Suppose the experts say that X will almost certainly lose his memories and personality in the process, but retain intelligence and sentience.

b. Is X a person?