Faith can never conflict with reason

Faith can never conflict with reason

Spirituality

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i

Felicific Forest

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Nemesio
Well, Ivanhoe, a Moslem, Mormon, Jew and atheist (among
others) would disagree with this. The first three would maintain
that their notion of 'natural law' was the reasonable one and
that yours is unreasonable.

And, so, faith conflicts with reason all the time. It's only within
the context of a single faith that it might not. The second
...[text shortened]... io

Edit: so the subject should read 'My Roman Catholic faith never
conflicts with reason.'
Nemesio: "Edit: so the subject should read 'My Roman Catholic faith never
conflicts with reason.'[/b]

??????

I assume you are presenting a view drawn from cultural relativism here. Are you ?

i

Felicific Forest

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Nemesio
I always thought that 'reasonable' meant something proveably true,
or at least very likely to be true.

What do you think 'reasonable' means, Ivanhoe?

Nemesio
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/reasonable

reasonable
One entry found for reasonable.


Main Entry: rea·son·able
Pronunciation: 'rEz-n&-b&l, 'rE-z&n-&-b&l
Function: adjective
1 a : being in accordance with reason b : not extreme or excessive c : MODERATE, FAIR d : INEXPENSIVE
2 a : having the faculty of reason b : possessing sound judgment
- rea·son·abil·i·ty /"rEz-n&-'bi-l&-tE, "rE-z&n-&-/ noun
- rea·son·able·ness /'rEz-n&-b&l-n&s, 'rE-z&n-&-/ noun
- rea·son·ably /-blE/ adverb

Ursulakantor

Pittsburgh, PA

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Coletti
"The golden gate bridge is orange." Well when I looked at it last, it looked red to me. And some people are color blind. And then you can define color by some measure of a light spectrum. So the truth of "the golden gate bridge is orange" can is subjective - depending or other premises that may not be agreed upon.

This is starting to sound like global skeptism. If we accept that
the color red is defined by reflections of light waves within the band
of particular wavelengths, then, no, the claim 'the golden gate bridge
is orange' is not subjective. If you want to redefine everything around
the claim such that it might be true, what you have done is broken
down language into a meaningless series of phonemes, the combination
of which have no reasonably fixed meaning.

Coke taste better than Pepsi. If we are talking about my taste - this is true. So it is a proposition, but it is not knowledge. To be knowledge it must be universally true, not subjectively.

Propositions have definitive truth values. That what a proposition
is! If propositions can be either true and false depending on who is
asking, it ceases to be a proposition, and comes an opinion.

All propositions are either true of false - but not all propositions constitute knowledge. A proposition must be universally true to be knowledge. Opinions are true subjectively.

Well, then the statement 'Pepsi tastes better than Coke' is not a
proposition, because you will say 'false' and I will say 'true.' It is
not 'either true or false.' It is both (or neither).

Nemesio

C
W.P. Extraordinaire

State of Franklin

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I would have to pimpslap anybody who would agree with you about this.

Opinions and knowledge do not lie on the same spectrum. They are different beasts altogether. One cannot have opinions about factual matters. One cannot have knowledge of subjective matters, but only knowledge about subjective claims, such as "It is Nemesio's opinion that ...[text shortened]... t opine that ice cream melts, or that it doesn't melt.

Ivanhoe can't opine that I'm white.
But you can believe "chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" and so it is an opinion. You claimed "chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" had no true/false value. Are you still confused about the definition of "proposition"?

Ursulakantor

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Nemesio: "Edit: so the subject should read 'My Roman Catholic faith never
conflicts with reason.'


??????

I assume you are presenting a view drawn from cultural relativism here. Are you ?[/b]
No. You are. You put 'Faith can never conflict with reason.'

Is it reasonable that women should wear burkas and that it
is immoral for them to be seen in public without them? I would
guess that you would say 'no,' but super-mega conservative
Moslem would say 'Absolutely.'

Thus, a conflict that arises from faith. Thus, your statement is
false. The only way your statement can be true is if you introduce
something which limits the discussion, such as 'My Roman Catholic
faith can never conflict with reason.'

Nemesio

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Coletti
But you can believe "chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" and so it is an opinion. You claimed "chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" had no true/false value. Are you still confused about the definition of "proposition"?
"Chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" is not something that can be believed. It has no truth value. I assure you, the confusion lies with you.

Ursulakantor

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
"Chocolate is a good tasting ice cream" is not something that can be believed. It has no truth value. I assure you, the confusion lies with you.
Perhaps, Doctor, you might define truth value. You have greater
fluency in the vernacular of logic than I.

Obviously, if you ask me this question, I can provide a T/F answer:
'Is chocolate a good-tasting ice cream?'

However, just because I can provide an answer that uses the term
'true' or 'false' doesn't mean that it has a truth value.

Nemesio

C
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State of Franklin

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12 Nov 05
1 edit

Originally posted by Nemesio
Originally posted by Coletti
[b]"The golden gate bridge is orange." Well when I looked at it last, it looked red to me. And some people are color blind. And then you can define color by some measure of a light spectrum. So the truth of "the golden gate bridge is orange" can is subjective - depending or other premises that may not be agreed u ...[text shortened]... ll say 'true.' It is
not 'either true or false.' It is both (or neither).

Nemesio
[/b]
"Propositions" do not to have definite truth values - they have truth values by definition. One does not need to determine the truth value of a proposition to make it a proposition.

A is B. That is a proposition. It may be true or false, but it can not be both. That's all a proposition needs in order to be a proposition. The laws of logic dictate a proposition is either true or false. It does not say which. It does not say we necessarily know which. The whole point of logic is to determine if the FORM of arguments are valid so that we can say IF the premises are true, the conclusion is true. But we don't necessarily know if the premises are true.

Knowledge, on the other hand, is comprised of propositions that DO have a definite truth value - that is they are definitely true*. Knowledge is comprised of true propositions.

Opinions are propositions where the truth value is indeterminate or subjective. It is not that they do not have a truth values - it is that the truth value is uncertain.

Propositions can be the objects of opinion or knowledge depending on if the truth is justified true or indeterminate.

You see the difference. It not that opinions are not true or false - it is that the true/false value is subjective or uncertain.


* If a proposition is definitely false - then logic say the contradiction of the proposition is definitely true. We can deduce true propositions from false ones.

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12 Nov 05
2 edits

Originally posted by Nemesio


Obviously, if you ask me this question, I can provide a T/F answer:
'Is chocolate a good-tasting ice cream?'

However, just because I can provide an answer that uses the term
'true' or 'false' doesn't mean that it has a truth value.

Nemesio

Obviously, if you ask me this question, I can provide a T/F answer:
'Is chocolate a good-tasting ice cream?'


When you answer, which question are you really answering:
Is it the case that the facts of the universe are such that chocolate is a good-tasting ice cream, or
Is it the case that the facts of the universe are such that your opinion about chocolate ice cream is that it tastes good?

You are giving an answer of true, but your answer corresponds to a proposition, namely "It is Nemesio's opinion that..." and not to your opinion "Chocolate is a good-tasting ice cream."

A proposition's truth value simply indicates how it relates to the facts of the world. If it is implied by the facts of the world, it has a value of true.
If it is denied by the facts of the world or the rules of logic, it has a value of false. If it is neither implied not denied by the facts of the world or the rules of logic, then it has no truth value and isn't a proposition at all.

In a universe of discourse that deals only with properties of various fruits, propositions about potatoes have no truth value.

Ursulakantor

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Coletti
A is B. That is a proposition. It may be true or false, but it can not be both. That's all a proposition needs in order to be a proposition. The laws of logic dictate a proposition is either true or false.
You've just exploded your own case:

'Pepsi tastes better than Coke.'

I say true, and, to my mouth, this is right.
You say false, and, to your mouth, this is right.

It has both values with equal validity, not 'either'
value. Therefore it is an opinion, not a proposition.

Nemesio

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1 edit

Originally posted by Coletti
"Propositions" do not to have definite truth values - they have truth values by definition. One does not need to determine the truth value of a proposition to make it a proposition.

A is B. That is a proposition. It may be true or false, but it can not be both. That's all a proposition needs in order to be a proposition. The laws of logic dictate a ...[text shortened]... diction of the proposition is definitely true. We can deduce true propositions from false ones.
This post is complete nonsense. Anybody who is seriously interested in the matter at hand would do well to ignore it.

i

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by Nemesio
No. You are. You put 'Faith can never conflict with reason.'

Is it reasonable that women should wear burkas and that it
is immoral for them to be seen in public without them? I would
guess that you would say 'no,' but super-mega conservative
Moslem would say 'Absolutely.'

Thus, a conflict that arises from faith. Thus, your statement is
f ...[text shortened]... the discussion, such as 'My Roman Catholic
faith can never conflict with reason.'

Nemesio
You are simply claiming the popular notion that all faiths are eqally true and all cultures are equally "valuable". Right ?

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12 Nov 05

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
This post is complete nonsense. Anybody who is seriously interested in the matter at hand would do well do ignore it.
Why don't you do it better and present the notions Coletti presents in the way you think is correct.

i

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12 Nov 05

Dear Dr.Scribbles, is Nemesio making any sense ?

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2 edits

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Why don't you do it better and present the notions Coletti presents in the way you think is correct.
Do you think Coletti's ideas on the matter at hand are accurate? Why don't you rebuke him for his nonsense like I do, if you are such a man of reason? If faith must always be in harmony with reason, then it must be your finding that Coletti cannot really be a man of faith, because he has such a warped notion about elementary principles of reason. Why don't you tell him so?