13 Mar 15
Originally posted by DeepThoughtHave you ever thought of the possibility that God could restrict His knowledge and power as was done with Jesus so that mankind could have free will to choose right from wrong and to love or hate man and God?
I'll number the paragraphs if you want to dispute bits as this is a little long.
(1)
The question in the earlier thread was "Is omniscient prescience logically incompatible with libertarian free will?". So, they formulated conditions for omniscient prescience, namely that:
S1) Necessarily, if God knows that I will do A, then I will do A.
...[text shortened]... sting our possible worlds are identical up until the point the agent is faced with the decision.
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by RJHindsYes, but then God is not omniscient, even if electively so.
Have you ever thought of the possibility that God could restrict His knowledge and power as was done with Jesus so that mankind could have free will to choose right from wrong and to love or hate man and God?
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by twhiteheadPossible world semantics do not rely on any particular rules for how the universe works, although they do place restrictions on it. Something can be logically possible, in other words not entail a contradiction in logic, but not physically possible. The necessity of the past does involve notions of causation, so we're getting to that.
But 'what is mean by necessity' apparently does hinge on how the universe works. The talk of 'possible worlds' has to do with how the universe works. That is why I am saying that trying to throw out causation and keep it strictly in logic is a mistake as all you are doing is hiding what you really want to say in definitions.
[b]If I boil the electric k ...[text shortened]... were killed.
4. Why can we not say that the soup getting cooked caused the germs to be killed?
What you said was if A causes B and A causes C then B does not necessarily cause C.
What you have here is if A causes B and B causes C, then A causes C. In this case you have a chain of causation, so it is the case. But there isn't necessarily a chain of causation.
13 Mar 15
1 edit
Originally posted by DeepThoughtNo. At no point do I intend to say that. I certainly don't think I have.
What you have here is if A causes B and B causes C, then A causes C.
What I think I did miss was saying 'necessarily'.
So let me try and rephrase:
1. A happening always results in B.
2. A happening always results in C.
3. B only occurs if A has happened.
Therefore C only ever happens if B has happened. But B is not said to have caused C. I am querying whether or not it is valid to claim no causation here.
[edit]If, whenever A happens, B happens later, and if we wish to say A causes B, what must we know before we can claim causation?
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by twhiteheadOk., with you now. Logical consequence and causation aren't the same. I've got a mental image of three boxes labelled A, B, and C with arrows between them showing causation. There isn't an arrow between B and C.
No. At no point do I intend to say that. I certainly don't think I have.
What I think I did miss was saying 'necessarily'.
So let me try and rephrase:
1. A happening always results in B.
2. A happening always results in C.
3. B only occurs if A has happened.
Therefore C only ever happens if B has happened. But B is not said to have caused C. I am q ...[text shortened]... appens later, and if we wish to say A causes B, what must we know before we can claim causation?
A is a sufficient condition for B, because A always causes B, so we can say: if A then as a logical consequence B.
Because B can only be caused by A it's a necessary condition, and we can also say if B as a logical consequence then A.
With A and C, you only have sufficiency, so if A then as a logical consequence C.
But seeing C doesn't automatically imply A, as it could be caused by something else.
Now the way you have it set up knowing B tells us that C must also have happened because B implies A implies C. But that in itself does not make it true that B causes C.
If we see C we cannot deduce anything about B because not necessarily A.
Causation is notoriously difficult. Essentially, correlation implies causation but doesn't prove it. You can't say A causes B with epistemological certainty. You can't even disprove causation. Suppose A happens but not B. All that shows is that A does not always cause B (e.g.: not all smokers get lung cancer). If B happens without A then all that shows is that A is not a necessary cause of B, B can have other causes (some people who have never smoked get lung cancer).
There's a classic example of this in medicine. They used to think HRT reduced heart disease, but a large randomised controlled trial ruled this out. What had happened was that women with higher socio-economic status were more likely to get HRT and women with higher socio-economic status have lower rates of heart disease. So there was a confounder producing the correlation.
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by RJHindsReally? Maybe not that term directly but read this:
Omniscient is not a word that is used in the Holy Bible to describe God. So you are trying to construct a strawman to argue against.
http://www.openbible.info/topics/omniscience
like this:
Jeremiah 1:5 ESV / 51 helpful votes
“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.”
Get that part? The writers of the bible screwed that one up big time since it sounds a whole lot like your god is supposed to be omniscient.
Before I formed you in the womb I knew you.
I guess you don't know your own bible as well as you thought..
13 Mar 15
2 edits
Originally posted by DeepThought
I've read most of the Plantinga paper, but not yet the Appendix, I should have finished it by tomorrow and then I'll have to reread it a few times on Saturday and might just have it. I want to check I've got what he's saying with the appropriately numbered condition (42), the single agent condition. I don't really understand the necessity of the multi- ...[text shortened]... can pass between them). There's a danger of begging the question, but a God outside time would
In symbols statement 42 is:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬∃x ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))]
To me this does not seem accurate.
Here again is Plantinga's statement (42):
"(42) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if p is true at t and it
is not possible both that p is true at t and that there exists an agent
S and an action A such that (1) A is basic for S, (2) S has the power
at t or later to perform A, and (3) necessarily if S were to perform
A at t or later, then p would have been false."
The bolded section in there is my own emphasis and highlights the main point that your redescription fails to capture faithfully, I think.
For better clarity, let W signify the set of all possible worlds wherein P is true at t; further, let Q signify the proposition "that there exists an agent
S and an action A such that (1) A is basic for S, (2) S has the power
at t or later to perform A, and (3) necessarily if S were to perform
A at t or later, then p would have been false."
So, what Plantinga is basically saying is that P is accidentally necessary at t just in case both of the following hold: the actual world is a member of W & Q is false in all members of W.
Whereas your redescription seems to say something different. Yours says that P is accidentally necessary at t just in case both the actual world is a member of W & Q is false.
The first condition of yours matches that of Plantinga, but the second does not. See, what Plantinga is trying to say is that the "accidental necessity" of P at t is constituted in part by the fact that in all possible worlds wherein P is true at t there is nothing within anyone's direct power to do anything about that after the fact; whereas, yours only seems to provide that in one particular possible world wherein P is true at t (which happens to be the actual world) there is nothing within anyone's direct power to do anything about that after the fact. Plantinga's is hence a stronger condition. This is of course my reading of it; please let me know if you think I am misrepresenting either Plantinga or you.
I don't really understand the necessity of the multi-agent condition, what it adds relative to the single agent version.
The point there is that there could be cooperative sets of free actions among multiple agents (perhaps such that performed alone in isolation they would be insufficient but in any case such that performed together they would be) collectively sufficient to have made P false. This seems like a minor point. Plantinga is just adding this in to account for the complication presented in an example like (43).
C(x,y,t) - x can do y at time t.
This is important as it is not that x necessarily does y, but that he could do y. If the agent does y then that changes the truth of the past proposition, it is enough that the agent can do y to render the past proposition non-necessary. I don't think that this could be expressed using the possibility operator. There is a possible world where x does y, but that could be due to something contingent to that possible world and not relevant to the actual world - do you agree with that point?
If I understand you correctly, yes I think I agree. There could be different cases. Perhaps C(x,y,t) is possible, in virtue of being true in some possible world wherein P(T) is false. In other words, perhaps C(x,y,t) is true in some non-member of W. But whether or not that is the case is irrelevant here. The relevant consideration is whether or not C(x,y,t) holds in the members of W; in other words, whether or not it holds in those possible worlds wherein P(T) is true. Again, it seems your redescription only considers C(x,y,t) as it relates to the actual world, and this differs from Plantinga's treatment.
I'm also wondering why it needs an agent, clearly to relate it to free will we need one, but is that fundamental to accidental necessity, or is it just needed to connect it to the will of an agent. Suppose x is just some event, E(x,t) means an event at time t, which may be a basic action by an agent.
I think this is a good point, and I would agree. I think Plantinga is overreaching a bit here. If we want to provide a criterion for accidental necessity, then I think it should be generalized to some event(s) E, as you mention, which of course would conceptually include actions or willings by agents. If, for the purpose of the fatalism discussion which is the natural focus of this paper, we want to specify it to the actions of agents such as in (42), then I think it should probably read more conservatively as "p is accidentally necessary at t only if…." (not if and only if). At any rate, to make his points that are relevant to the Ockhamite objection, I think he just needs the "only if" direction.
I see why he wants the necessity operator at the end. It protects the omniscience condition.
He wants that there to protect against cases like those he describes as "divine fore-cooperation". Plantinga adds this in at (39) to protect against these kinds of cases. The concern here is that there could be some unlikely but possible, circuitous route from S's performing A to the consequence that P would turn out false. For example, the route where S's performing A in turn would have meant God foresaw differently in turn would have meant God acted or created differently in some way, etc, etc, in turn would have meant P is false. The mere possibility of this kind of divine fore-cooperation has bad consequences concerning what sorts of propositions turn out accidentally necessary (or not) on a construal like (31). So Plantinga sees the need to guard against these cases. What he is requiring here, basically, is that S's performance of A at t or later entails P would have been false, which precludes cases of only circuitous, non-entailing relation between the two. The 'necessarily' here signifies that the falsity of P would follow with necessity from the antecedent.
Regarding the subject of time, there are lots of views on time. Some are reductionist with respect to time; others hold a Platonic view with respect to time; some think God exists independently of temporal relations; and yadda yadda yadda. As far as I understand, the general fatalist argument and/or subsequent objections need not endorse any particular view on this (or can be re-written to accommodate), which is something I think Plantinga does touch on at times, briefly.
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by RJHinds
Omniscient is not a word that is used in the Holy Bible to describe God. So you are trying to construct a strawman to argue against.
Now are we sure that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee: by this we believe that thou camest forth from God.This sounds like omniscience to me.
John 16:30
Authorized King James Version
If God is not infallible then any final judgement is potentially flawed. Omniscience is a sufficient condition for infallibility. It's a property that's traditionally been assigned to God. What causes the potential problem though is prescient omniscience - knowing everything including things that haven't happened yet. If God is only omniscient about things after they've happened then there isn't a problem.
What we are trying to establish is whether there is a contradiction between prescient omnipotence and libertarian free will. So far we haven't, if Plantinga's formulation of accidental necessity is correct then there still isn't (although I'm suspicious about part of it).
Suppose we do find a contradiction. Then either we do not have free will, which introduces several problems for theists, or God cannot be omniscient about things which haven't happened yet. This wouldn't prove that God didn't exist, just that there would be limitations on what he could know.
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by LemonJelloI've just read your reply. I agree that I missed the not possibly, or necessarily not condition. You're right about that as far as what I was saying, I'm not sure if you're misrepresenting Plantinga - I need to have a think about the implications.In symbols statement 42 is:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬∃x ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))]
To me this does not seem accurate.
Here again is Plantinga's statement (42):
[i]"(42) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if p is true at t and [b]it
is not possible both that p is true at t a ...[text shortened]... e-written to accommodate), which is something I think Plantinga does touch on at times, briefly.
I think we are saying the same thing about C(x,y,t), suppose some possible world where time travel is possible, in that possible world there is no necessity of the past. The criterion that it should be impossible in the collection of possible worlds where P(T) is true protects against time travel in possible worlds where it is possible ruling out the necessity of the past in all possible worlds - which is obviously nonsense.
I got my head around the multi-agent condition in the meantime.
So I need to think about your correction to my formula - if I can translate it correctly into symbols and interpret the symbols correctly I'm most of the way to understanding it. I need to look at Plantinga's justification of the necessity condition at the end (necessarily if D then ¬P) it seems to me (and I could be deceiving myself) that this does the same work as the necessity rule in □(God knows S does A -> S does A) & ¬□(S does A), it's the critical component that protects omniscience from doing damage to free will.
Regarding time, I think the formulation looks to be robust to different views of time, at least any that make any sense.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtBut did Jesus ever claim to be omniscient? No, He did not. 😏Now are we sure that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee: by this we believe that thou camest forth from God.This sounds like omniscience to me.
John 16:30
Authorized King James Version
If God is not infallible then any final judgement is potentially flawed. Omniscience is a sufficient conditi ...[text shortened]... ouldn't prove that God didn't exist, just that there would be limitations on what he could know.
Not being omniscient would not prove there would be limitations on what God could know. In fact, if God already knew everything, that would mean there was nothing else He could learn and then there would be a limit on His learning.
13 Mar 15
2 edits
Originally posted by RJHindsJeremiah 1:5 ESV / 51
But did Jesus ever claim to be omniscient? No, He did not. 😏
“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.”
Sounds like the writers were saying this alleged deity was omniscient to me.
I think that verse satisfies the definition of omniscience.
It is you who says Jesus and your god are one and the same. If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, chances are......
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by sonhouseThis is only referring to one prophet. The Holy Spirit has the ability to search all things, but if He already knew everything that He could search, there would be no need of searching.
Jeremiah 1:5 ESV / 51
“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.”
Sounds like the writers were saying this alleged deity was omniscient to me.
I think that verse satisfies the definition of omniscience.
It is you who says Jesus and your god are one and the same. If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, chances are......
For to us God revealed them through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God.
(1 Corinthians 2:10 NASB)
13 Mar 15
What do we mean when we say A caused B?
I think we mean: if A didn't happen, then B wouldn't have happened.
How does this fit with my A causes B and A causes C such that B implies C. If B doesn't happen, then neither does C.
So why can't we say B causes C?
1. Suppose God is omniscient, and God does knows that I will make coffee tomorrow.
2. If God doesn't know that I will make coffee tomorrow, does it follow that I will not make coffee tomorrow?
Why can't why say Gods knowledge causes the event?
13 Mar 15
Originally posted by twhitehead
What do we mean when we say A caused B?
I think we mean: if A didn't happen, then B wouldn't have happened.
How does this fit with my A causes B and A causes C such that B implies C. If B doesn't happen, then neither does C.
So why can't we say B causes C?
1. Suppose God is omniscient, and God does knows that I will make coffee tomorrow.
2. If God ...[text shortened]... ollow that I will not make coffee tomorrow?
Why can't why say Gods knowledge causes the event?
What do we mean when we say A caused B?
I think we mean: if A didn't happen, then B wouldn't have happened.
That is related to one possible take on it, which is related to so-called counterfactual theories of causation. But it is by no means the only take on it, and this line has several challenges and problems that go with it, requiring quite a bit of thought. As background, see for example:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/
How does this fit with my A causes B and A causes C such that B implies C. If B doesn't happen, then neither does C.
So why can't we say B causes C?
Under the same line of reasoning and given the symmetries involved, I suppose that C also causes B, then? After all, by the same reasoning: if C doesn't happen, then neither does B. So you're prepared to hold both that B causes C and that C causes B? That sounds problematic.
Further, this seems to lead to all sorts of absurdities. Suppose that an appliance shorts out and a fire ensues. A sprinkler system overhead engages and puts out the fire. Now, aren't the following both true: (a) if the short didn't happen, then the sprinkler system would not have engaged and (b) if the short didn't happen, then the fire would not have started? If so, then by your counterfactual account we should be able to say that the sprinkler system engaging caused the fire to start. But isn't this absurd?