17 Oct '07 18:53>1 edit
KJ, in another thread you stated the following:
"I without hesitation say I don’t know what the age of the
earth or universe is, I have a belief about it, yet that isn’t a fact, I
acknowledge I can be wrong"
Several things about this confuse me greatly.
First, you hold a belief about the age of the universe, but you maintain that your own belief does not constitute knowledge. I don't understand this. If we say that knowledge is true, justified belief; then either you don't think your belief is true or you don't think your belief is justified, or both. But, presumably, if you didn't think the belief were likely true or if you didn't think the belief were justified, then you wouldn't hold it. So under this formulation of knowledge, your statement makes precious little sense to me. You must have some other idea of what constitutes knowledge. What is it?
Second, you say your belief isn't a fact. Of course, I fully agree we wouldn't want to notionally confuse beliefs and facts: I think beliefs are mental representations that, if true, correspond to facts about the world. So we wouldn't want to just conflate the two. But what's disturbing to me here is that I think what you're actually trying to say is that the propositional content of your belief doesn't correspond to fact. Based on my own concept of what constitutes truth (which is to first order a correspondence relation between propositional content and fact), this means to me that you think your own belief is not true. Again, that makes no sense. So I'm guessing you have some other idea of what constitutes truth. What is it? Or maybe we differ on what constitutes a fact. What do you think a fact is?
Third, and probably most disturbing to me, is that you seem to imply that your belief does not constitute knowledge merely because you acknowledge you may be mistaken, or "can be wrong". The idea that epistemic certainty is requisite for knowledge is ridiculous. And if you're going to claim as much, I am going to insist that you do so consistently. Example: you simply cannot be certain that you possess hands because the totality of your experience is broadly compatible with your being, in fact, handless -- you cannot rule out this mere possibility. You could be a handless brain in a vat, for instance. So, if you're going to claim that beliefs that are possibly mistaken cannot constitute knowledge, then you are committed to the claim that you don't know you have hands. Is that satisfactory for you? Are you consistent on this issue, or not?
"I without hesitation say I don’t know what the age of the
earth or universe is, I have a belief about it, yet that isn’t a fact, I
acknowledge I can be wrong"
Several things about this confuse me greatly.
First, you hold a belief about the age of the universe, but you maintain that your own belief does not constitute knowledge. I don't understand this. If we say that knowledge is true, justified belief; then either you don't think your belief is true or you don't think your belief is justified, or both. But, presumably, if you didn't think the belief were likely true or if you didn't think the belief were justified, then you wouldn't hold it. So under this formulation of knowledge, your statement makes precious little sense to me. You must have some other idea of what constitutes knowledge. What is it?
Second, you say your belief isn't a fact. Of course, I fully agree we wouldn't want to notionally confuse beliefs and facts: I think beliefs are mental representations that, if true, correspond to facts about the world. So we wouldn't want to just conflate the two. But what's disturbing to me here is that I think what you're actually trying to say is that the propositional content of your belief doesn't correspond to fact. Based on my own concept of what constitutes truth (which is to first order a correspondence relation between propositional content and fact), this means to me that you think your own belief is not true. Again, that makes no sense. So I'm guessing you have some other idea of what constitutes truth. What is it? Or maybe we differ on what constitutes a fact. What do you think a fact is?
Third, and probably most disturbing to me, is that you seem to imply that your belief does not constitute knowledge merely because you acknowledge you may be mistaken, or "can be wrong". The idea that epistemic certainty is requisite for knowledge is ridiculous. And if you're going to claim as much, I am going to insist that you do so consistently. Example: you simply cannot be certain that you possess hands because the totality of your experience is broadly compatible with your being, in fact, handless -- you cannot rule out this mere possibility. You could be a handless brain in a vat, for instance. So, if you're going to claim that beliefs that are possibly mistaken cannot constitute knowledge, then you are committed to the claim that you don't know you have hands. Is that satisfactory for you? Are you consistent on this issue, or not?