Culture
11 Apr 08
08 May 08
Originally posted by bjohnson407One answer will do for both: the way he writes.
I know this is vague, but if you tell me what draws you to Wittgenstein and repells you from Heidegger, I might be able to to be more specific.
Heidegger's Nazism doesn't weigh heavily in his favour, but I was repelled by him before I learnt about that.
I'm not sure that Heidegger's claim that philosophers from Plato onwards were entirely mistaken about Being until he came along is true. Montaigne gives a very readable and entertaining account of non-essentialism.
08 May 08
1 edit
Originally posted by bjohnson407I'm not touching the issue of metaphysics. I agree with the logical positivists there.
Me pretending to be a positivist:
Real knowledge (justified true belief) has always adhered to some sort of principle of emprical verification. If a religious person said "god exists but is invisible," then he does not have any "knowledge" but rather a meaningless utterance loaded with poorly defined concepts.
Seriously, what is this "knowledge" you're talking about? Are you saying that any old thought a person has counts as knowledge?
The notion of 'justified true belief' is a cop-out from the real question. The insertion of the word 'justified' is a way to render the argument almost tautological. But what is 'justified' can be defined in many ways, because the fact remains, that absolute knowledge is impossible. This is why we will always be discussing belief about propositions and what is 'justified' is merely itself a belief on the probability that the proposition is true.
That we can find a method (scientific method) that, we believe, maximizes our belief on the probability that a given proposition is true, doesn't mean that other methods aren't valid. In fact, if you notice, this implicitly states that knowledge is simply a change in the belief on the probability that a statement is true.
Do we agree up to here?
08 May 08
Originally posted by PalynkaMe pretending to be a positivsit:
I'm not touching the issue of metaphysics. I agree with the logical positivists there.
The notion of 'justified true belief' is a cop-out from the real question. The insertion of the word 'justified' is a way to render the argument almost tautological. But what is 'justified' can be defined in many ways, because the fact remains, that absolute knowledge ...[text shortened]... in the belief on the probability that a statement is true.
Do we agree up to here?
Not if you are saying that empirical verification is just one of many "valid" ways of justifying belief.
If X believes that god exists because god's existence is included in his concept, X's belief is not justified. It's falsely rationalized. And worse than that, the proposition "god exists" is meaningless because we have no conditions of what it would take for the proposition to be false.
Me, for reals:
I see what you're trying to say, but I don't think you've discredited the positivist in what you've said so far. You sound like a pragmatist, and I'm sympathetic to that view.
But I need to know more about what you mean when you say "knowledge." Could your disagreement with the positivists be simply definitional?
08 May 08
3 edits
Originally posted by bjohnson407But why is it not? What part of my previous argument would they reject?
Not if you are saying that empirical verification is just one of many "valid" ways of justifying belief.
How do you/they/anyone define "valid"? If the scientific method itself is used in such a definition, then the justification for using the scientific method is a circular argument.
PS: Again, I'm not touching the issue of metaphysics.
PS2: First we have to reach a definition of "knowledge" to then be able to define which, if any, other types of "knowledge" exist.
PS3: I don't know enough of pragmatism to say whether I'm sympathetic or not to that view...
08 May 08
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI wonder, sometimes, if Wittgenstein has better translators. Or is he just easier to translate.
One answer will do for both: the way he writes.
Heidegger's Nazism doesn't weigh heavily in his favour, but I was repelled by him before I learnt about that.
I'm not sure that Heidegger's claim that philosophers from Plato onwards were entirely mistaken about Being until he came along is true. Montaigne gives a very readable and entertaining account of non-essentialism.
Heidegger's political life was inexcusable and worse than most people want to admit. He even tried to get his colleagues in trouble with the party to boost his own career.
As for the critique of the history of ontology, I think it goes deeper than non-essentialism (but I admit I don't know Montaigne’s work). Heidegger illustrates the way we relate to the world by speaking to elements of lived experience instead of devising a theory of conscious rational subjects perceiving passive objects. This leads him to some profound insights about our relationship to being, death, technology etc.
08 May 08
I'd like to jump in on the Heidegger bit--I majored in philosophy (after flaming out of organic chemistry) and the absoltely stupidest book I was every forced to read was "What is a Thing" by Martin Heidegger. I finally wrote my essay on it, saying something on the line of "what an inane question! Did this guy really get paid for such double-talk gibberish?" I got a 'C'
08 May 08
Originally posted by Palynka"If the scientific method itself is used in such a definition, then the justification for using the scientific method is a circular argument."
But why is it not? What part of my previous argument would they reject?
How do you/they/anyone define "valid"? If the scientific method itself is used in such a definition, then the justification for using the scientific method is a circular argument.
PS: Again, I'm not touching the issue of metaphysics.
PS2: First we have to reach a definition of ...[text shortened]... I don't know enough of pragmatism to say whether I'm sympathetic or not to that view...
I thought you didn't want to start a metaphysical discussion. If not, then why suggest that there's more to reality than what can be verified empirically? The positivist would dismiss such metaphysics out of hand as being meaningless. The postiivist doesn't say that absolute knowing is impossible. He says that talk of absolute knowing is meaningless because there is no clear concept of its truth conditions.
"How do you/they/anyone define "valid"?"
You introduce this ugly word into the debate and expect me to define it? Not fair. I was just using it in what I took to be its common sense: legitimate/good/acceptable.
"Again, I'm not touching the issue of metaphysics."
My god discussion was an example of an illegitimate proposition, not an attempt to draw you into a metaphysical discussion. If you look at it, I tried to explain why logical positivists find such propositions illegetimate.
"First we have to reach a definition of "knowledge" to then be able to define which, if any, other types of "knowledge" exist."
I've been asking you to tell me what you mean by knowledge for some time now, but you refuse. the positivists had a clear idea of what the term meant. Justified true belief. What is justified is either what is logically true or empirically verified. What is not in principle verifiable is meaningless.
08 May 08
1 edit
Originally posted by bjohnson407This is boring. Did you notice that you haven't addressed one of my arguments from the start? You keep spouting the traditional views without relating them to any of my arguments AND misconstruing them to arguments that fit your comfort zone.
"If the scientific method itself is used in such a definition, then the justification for using the scientific method is a circular argument."
I thought you didn't want to start a metaphysical discussion. If not, then why suggest that there's more to reality than what can be verified empirically? The positivist would dismiss such metaphysics out of ha or empirically verified. What is not in principle verifiable is meaningless.
I defined knowledge as a belief on the probabilities. Did you address it? No. Did you offer any non-circular definition? No. Did you try to deflect this into metaphysics (perhaps your in your argument comfort zone )? Yes.
In that sense, you're much like Starrman. You need to know the label before you address the argument. Sorry, I find that boring and unproductive.
08 May 08
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Originally posted by PalynkaIf I appeared to be hanging out in my "comfort zone" it's because I had hoped you would give me a good reason to reject the logical positivist viewpoint. If I haven't moved from my original standpoint perhaps this is because your arguments aren't particularly persuasive.
This is boring. Did you notice that you haven't addressed one of my arguments from the start? You keep spouting the traditional views without relating them to any of my arguments AND misconstruing them to arguments that fit your comfort zone.
I defined knowledge as a belief on the probabilities. Did you address it? No. Did you offer any non-circular defin to know the label before you address the argument. Sorry, I find that boring and unproductive.
You seem to be suggesting that all attempts to justify beliefs are equally legitimate. If you are saying that, your wrong. Those who believe, on the basis of their spirituality, that illness can be cured by prayer are wrong. Those who think it can be cured by medicine are right, and they are able to verify their claims. If knowledge were simply a matter of playing with probabilities, then how probable is it that a cancer patients death is caused by the giant tumor in his brain and how probable is it that his death is caused by god punishing him for not praying enough? If you are not saying that all attempts to justify belief are equally valid, please clarify your earlier post.
I'm sorry I suggested you might be a pragmatist . I didn't know you hated lables that much.
08 May 08
Originally posted by PalynkaThis is the last I'm going to say about this, since, I know it's grown dull. Feel free to comment if you like, but I won't take offense if you don't:
This is boring. Did you notice that you haven't addressed one of my arguments from the start? You keep spouting the traditional views without relating them to any of my arguments AND misconstruing them to arguments that fit your comfort zone.
I defined knowledge as a belief on the probabilities. Did you address it? No. Did you offer any non-circular defin ...[text shortened]... to know the label before you address the argument. Sorry, I find that boring and unproductive.
My failure to follow your reasoning on this point might stem from one of the following causes. Either, in the first case, your ideas are so radically new that I am unable to understand them from within the framework of what you call my traditional views. Or I am correct in my understanding and simply not convinced.
To me it sounds like you are making the logical leap from the rather banal fact that science is not complete, to the incorrect conclusion that any method of belief justification is just as good as any other. If I am right in this characterization of what you have argued, then it is that latter cause which has lead us to this impasse. If I am wrong, then we might suppose it is the former. In either case, please don't judge me harshly because I am either not yet able to know what you know or I am rightfully unwilling to reject the better view for the worse one.
09 May 08
Originally posted by bjohnson407I've been following this with interest and frustration ...
This is the last I'm going to say about this, since, I know it's grown dull. Feel free to comment if you like, but I won't take offense if you don't:
It seems the key word here is 'empirical'. Palynka questions whether the scientific method is the only means of yielding what a logical positivist would consider empirical evidence. If that is the case, I would ask him what alternatives he has in mind. As a loose example, I have acupuncture in mind: a practice once derided by Western science as 'unscientific' but now apparently increasingly gaining in acceptance.
Your example of prayer is also interesting. The efficacy of such a healing modality aside, nobody doubts that it is the tumour that kills the patient, not the wrath of God for not praying properly (a weird construal of religious belief, but never mind). I'd be inclined to redirect such an enquiry into the ability of the mind/body to heal itself, with prayer as one possible, no doubt haphazard means of triggering this effect. I call to mind to vivid example of a dyed-in-the-wool Christian who had cancer; constantly visualised himself being 'injected by the blood of Christ'; and went into remission. Was there a causal relationship between these episodes?
09 May 08
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Originally posted by PinkFloydPerhaps Heidegger's Nazi past gave him the authority to make statements like this:
aaaaaaiiiieeeee!!! That WOULD be painful.!
Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.
I can't think of much to contradict this, charges of 'trivialising the Holocaust' aside. JM Coetzee would agree.
09 May 08
Originally posted by bjohnson407We're clearly having a problem of communication. I'm sorry if I sounded aggressive, but it was simply frustration and not directed anger at you.
To me it sounds like you are making the logical leap from the rather banal fact that science is not complete, to the incorrect conclusion that any method of belief justification is just as good as any other. If I am right in this characterization of what you have argued, then it is that latter cause which has lead us to this impasse. If I am wrong, then ...[text shortened]... to know what you know or I am rightfully unwilling to reject the better view for the worse one.
I'm not arguing what you think I'm arguing ("any method of belief justification is just as good as any other" is not my point at all), so I'm clearly failing to express my views. I guess it's best to let it lie then.