Originally posted by vistesd
I did not understand “disparate”, I guess, as being strong enough to get it—once I saw that you were right that we had not nailed dualism down. I am happy to substitute it. But, would categorically different also work—or, what’s your understanding of the distinctions?
With regard to your second point: understood. I didn’t consider it a problem, becau use is understood, and hence it's meaning accessible (if I'm putting that clearly).
I think I understand your aim. The problem is that, even supposing you are successful in whittling down further and further, you will surely still be casting things in terms that some do not accept and do not have to accept. For example, some will deny your casting the world as some set of actual states of affairs (or facts or...whatever, it does not matter what goes here…the point is that whatever it is, this conception of the world will likely not constitute part of a
necessary "substructure" for the causal monotheism you have in mind). A similar thing will hold if you try to cast causation into terms, since there are many differing views concerning the metaphysics of causation.
Maybe the best we could do, at first pass, is lay out some very general minimal considerations of commitments for S (the causal dualist monotheist you have in mind). For instance, yes, S is committed to there existing some G. Yes, S is committed to there existing only one G. I think S is generally committed to there existing thing(s) that are not only distinct from G but fundamentally distinct in kind (or categorically different, as you mention) from G (although I see no reason at all why he could not also hold that there exist things that are distinct from G but not categorically different from G). And then S will generally have some view on how the things from the different kinds/categories can relate/interact with or effect (or not) each other.
For this last point, the views could be varied. For example, suppose S thinks there are distinct categories C1 and C2. Then S could think that things from C1 can causally effect things from C2 and that things from C2 can causally effect things from C1 (a form of interactionism). Or S could think that things from C1 can causally effect things from C2 but that things from C2 cannot causally effect things from C1 (an example could be epiphenomenalism). Or S could think that there are no causal interactions between C1 and C2 at all (some form of parallelism). Presumably, though, for the present purposes we could probably at least say that S is committed to the idea that the interaction goes at least one way: from C1 (the category containing G) to C2. S may even hold that all things in C2 owe their existence and properties in some way or another to the activity of G.
To give some example (this is certainly not meant to outline a totally minimalist or bare bones view or even a coherent one on the part of S, it is just to give some flavor), consider the following words of Richard Swinburne:
Theism claims that God is a personal being – that is, in some sense a person. By a person I mean an individual with basic powers (to act intentionally), purposes and beliefs….God is supposed to be like us, in having basic powers, beliefs and purposes – but ones very different from ours….God’s basic powers are supposed to be infinite: he can bring about as a basic action any event he chooses, and he does not need bones or muscles to operate in certain ways in order to do so. He can bring objects, including material objects, into existence and keep them in existence from moment to moment....God is not limited by the laws of nature; he makes them and he can change or suspend them – if he chooses….God cannot do what is logically impossible (what involves a self-contradiction). God can make the universe exist and God can make the universe not exist, but God cannot make the universe exist and not exist at the same time….God is eternal in the sense that he has existed at each moment of past time, exists now, and will exist at each moment of future time….All the other essential properties which theism attributes to God at each moment of time follow from the three properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect freedom. Thus God is supposed to be bodiless….he does not depend on matter to affect…the world. He moves the stars, as we move our arms, just like that – as a basic action. It follows too from his omnipotence that God is omnipresent (i.e. present everywhere), in the sense that he can make a difference to things everywhere and know what is happening everywhere just like that…But, although he is everywhere present, he is not spatially extended; he does not take up a volume of space – for he has no body. Nor, therefore, does he have any spatial parts: all of him is present everywhere, in the sense in which he is present at a place. It is not that part of him is in England, and another part in the United States….God being omnipotent could have prevented the universe from existing, if he had so chosen. So it exists only because he allows it to exist. Hence either he causes the existence of the universe, or he causes or allows some other agent to do so. In this sense, therefore, he is the creator of the universe, and, being – by the same argument – equally responsible for its continued existence, he is the sustainer of the universe. He is responsible for the existence of the universe (and every object within it) for as long as it exists….even if the universe has existed forever, its existence at each moment of time is due to the conserving action of God at that moment….God is supposed to be responsible, not merely for the existence of all other objects, but for their having the powers and liabilities they do….God…causes inanimate things to have the powers and liabilities they do, at each moment when they have them….And God is also responsible for the existence of humans. He could cause us to act of physical necessity. But, given that we have limited free will, God does not cause us to form the purposes we do. That is up to us. But God does conserve in us from moment to moment our basic powers to act, and thus ensures that the purposes we form make a difference to the world. God allows us to choose whether to form the purpose of moving a hand or not; and God ensures that (normally), when we form that purpose, it is efficacious – if we try to move our hand, it moves.
Is the view Swinburne outlines here reasonable or coherent? I think not on both counts. But, just considering the basic minimal considerations listed before the excerpt above, I do not see any reason on the face of it why they would be collectively inconsistent or incoherent. I think Swinburne touches on all of them here but also peppers everything with incoherency.
Not sure if this helps at all...😵