27 Jun '14 23:18>
In Thread 159660 we had some discussion regarding rational justification for theistic belief. One of the relevant questions is to what extent a theist (I think a similar question applies to, say, a strong atheist who claims the same god does not exist) should be able to present rational arguments and other evidence in support of that belief. If, say, the theist (or strong atheist) has no such arguments or evidential considerations to offer for his or her belief, does it follow that he or she is being irrational or noetically irresponsible in holding that belief? This concerns a basic evidentialist objection: that such belief is warranted only if it is believed on the basis of such evidence. So, this thread is meant to foster some discussion on this subject.
As food for thought, here is an example of work by philosopher Alvin Plantinga that argues that theistic belief can be warranted in the absence of evidence:
http://cla.calpoly.edu/~rgrazian/docs/courses/412/Plantinga_BeliefGodPBasic.pdf
In short, Plantinga argues for a model of warranted theistic belief that does not depend on evidence. To summarize briefly, this putatively warranted theistic belief forms directly and non-inferentially through a mechanism like Calvin's sensus divinitatis, in a way that is analogous to perception or memory beliefs. So, just like one forms beliefs based on perception or memory, such as that there is a tree before me or that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning or etc, Plantinga argues that one can also form beliefs about God in a similar fashion through a divine sensorium. These perception and memory beliefs are non-inferential (not inferred from other beliefs) and yet of course can be warranted for the individual. Similarly, Plantinga argues that the theistic beliefs delivered through the divine sensorium, while although non-inferential and thus based on no propositional evidence, are warranted for the individual, subject to the satisfaction of some further necessary conditions.
One problem here is that granting those "further necessary conditions" is basically just question-begging in any debate about God's existence, since one of those necessary conditions is that there exists some God who has imbued humans with, or otherwise provided for, such a divine sensorium. (After all, if there is no such God, then how would Plantinga's model make any sense?) At any rate, even if Plantinga's arguments here are successful, they do not show that theistic belief is warranted on the basis of no evidence; at best they show only that it is so warranted, if in fact such a God exists and some other conditions obtain. Not so interesting, then.
More importantly, there are good reasons to think that Plantinga fails to be even that successful. Under Plantinga's model, theistic belief is epistemically non-inferential, in the sense that its warrant does not depend on any considerations of argument or propositional evidence, etc. However, there are reasons to think this cannot be true even in principle. For instance, if you consider the analogs of perception or memory beliefs, the sensory predicates one employs can only be as warranted as the background theories in which they are imbedded, which in turn are inferentially structured, articulated, and framed. Here is a worthwhile paper that discusses this objection:
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/koonsj/papers/Plantinga.pdf
As food for thought, here is an example of work by philosopher Alvin Plantinga that argues that theistic belief can be warranted in the absence of evidence:
http://cla.calpoly.edu/~rgrazian/docs/courses/412/Plantinga_BeliefGodPBasic.pdf
In short, Plantinga argues for a model of warranted theistic belief that does not depend on evidence. To summarize briefly, this putatively warranted theistic belief forms directly and non-inferentially through a mechanism like Calvin's sensus divinitatis, in a way that is analogous to perception or memory beliefs. So, just like one forms beliefs based on perception or memory, such as that there is a tree before me or that I had oatmeal for breakfast this morning or etc, Plantinga argues that one can also form beliefs about God in a similar fashion through a divine sensorium. These perception and memory beliefs are non-inferential (not inferred from other beliefs) and yet of course can be warranted for the individual. Similarly, Plantinga argues that the theistic beliefs delivered through the divine sensorium, while although non-inferential and thus based on no propositional evidence, are warranted for the individual, subject to the satisfaction of some further necessary conditions.
One problem here is that granting those "further necessary conditions" is basically just question-begging in any debate about God's existence, since one of those necessary conditions is that there exists some God who has imbued humans with, or otherwise provided for, such a divine sensorium. (After all, if there is no such God, then how would Plantinga's model make any sense?) At any rate, even if Plantinga's arguments here are successful, they do not show that theistic belief is warranted on the basis of no evidence; at best they show only that it is so warranted, if in fact such a God exists and some other conditions obtain. Not so interesting, then.
More importantly, there are good reasons to think that Plantinga fails to be even that successful. Under Plantinga's model, theistic belief is epistemically non-inferential, in the sense that its warrant does not depend on any considerations of argument or propositional evidence, etc. However, there are reasons to think this cannot be true even in principle. For instance, if you consider the analogs of perception or memory beliefs, the sensory predicates one employs can only be as warranted as the background theories in which they are imbedded, which in turn are inferentially structured, articulated, and framed. Here is a worthwhile paper that discusses this objection:
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/koonsj/papers/Plantinga.pdf