21 Aug '11 04:55>1 edit
Here's the unhijacked version of black beetle's shootdown of Aquinas, with responses by yours truly.
bb said:
Sure thing;
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, he hopes to establish as factual the hypothesis that G-d cannot be directly observed although it is an existent entity.
A couple of points here:
1) Strictly speaking God is not an existent observer, so Aquinas cannot have suggested that He is. Being existence itself, He cannot be said to exist in the same sense as ordinary observers. Besides, what requirement is there that an existent observer himself be observable by anyone, either to exist, or to observe, or to be real?
2) Why do you call the incomprehensibility of God a "trick?" Are you asserting that Aquinas is some kind of closet atheist, and is merely positing the incomprehensibility of God to pull the wool over the eyes of his students and colleagues?
So Aquinas states that the incomprehensibility of G-d is given because, for one, to comprehend is to understand perfectly; for two, to understand perfectly is to understand a thing as well as it can be understood; and, for three, G-d is incomprehensible because is infinitely understandable, due to the “fact” that G-d's incomprehensibility is rooted in a part of this entity that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding. Incomprehensibility, according to Aquinas, is caused because G-d cannot be seen as perfectly as intrinsically he is visible, whilst in the beatific vision incomprehensibility results from its fullness which overwhelms the finite intellect. Aquinas roots G-d’s incomprehensibility in God's unlimited ability to be comprehended, and on the other hand he claims that, if God's incomprehensibility resulted merely from an ontological disproportion, then the final happiness of the human person would not be achievable. Of course, according to Aquinas, if G-d were ultimately comprehensible in the beatific vision, the human subjectivity in comprehending the entity would transcend G-d.
This appears to come at least partly from James L. Frederick's article "The incomprehensibility of God: a Buddhist reading of Aquinas," which appears to me to be a misreading 🙂.
Fredericks paraphrases three statements from Aquinas's Commentary on John as follows: "(1) God's incomprehensibility is the result of an ontological disproportion between the finitude of the created intellect and the infinity of God; (2) God remains incomprehensible even in the beatific vision; and yet (3) the human person's final happiness in the immediate vision of God must be affirmed as a revealed doctrine of faith." He then goes on to claim a contradiction derived from them: "On the one hand, if God's incomprehensibility resulted merely from an ontological disproportion (statement 1), then the final happiness of the human person would not be achievable (a violation of statement 3)," but reading both the relevant parts of the Commentary on John and the Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 12, Article 7, there is clearly no contradiction between the incomprehensibility of God in the beatific vision and the "final happiness of the human person" in the knowledge of God. It's simply that the Beatific Vision is as complete a vision of God as the created intellect is capable of. There's no "overwhelming" of the finite intellect; in Heaven each intellect knows God to its utmost capacity, and is thus completely satisfied, as it could be by no one else. And yet only God can comprehend Himself: "... we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known."
I'll spare you (and myself) all the cutting-and-pasting from the works cited, but here are links to online versions if you're interested:
Commentary on John: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/John1.htm (scroll down to Lecture 11)
Summa Theologica: http://newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm#article7
This way, Aquinas speaks of the incomprehensible G-d as the infinitely understandable God; and he feels quite comfortable, probably because he thinks he is not obliged to explain how exactly and by what means “the part of G-d that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding” became an epistemic object.
Why should he feel obliged to explain what he says can't be explained, especially since he didn't contradict himself? You might as well challenge somebody who says "Aleph-null exists" to count to it.
And that quote is fron Fredericks, not Aquinas; the latter would never speak of any "part of God." Another indication of faulty understanding of Aquinas on Mr. Fredericks's part.
But all this jazz is not justified, because Aquinas merely accepts blindly as existent an “epistemic object” (G-d) out of the blue (“blue”, over here, are the so called Holy Scripture and everything else that the beleiver has to accept blindly because it comes from an authoritative agent, because it is supposed to be the Word of G-d). Aquinas does not have a honest way to establish the existence of his G-d by means of using his mind, he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma and then he is using it as the cornerstone on which his Summa is constructed.
But no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
😵
Hmm. Somebody misreads Aquinas (surprise, surprise) and thinks he's caught him out, and then goes on an atheistic "blue" streak of name-calling and accusations of dishonesty. Very rational. 🙂
(But thanks for making me get off my duff and do a little thinking this weekend 🙂 )
bb said:
Sure thing;
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, he hopes to establish as factual the hypothesis that G-d cannot be directly observed although it is an existent entity.
A couple of points here:
1) Strictly speaking God is not an existent observer, so Aquinas cannot have suggested that He is. Being existence itself, He cannot be said to exist in the same sense as ordinary observers. Besides, what requirement is there that an existent observer himself be observable by anyone, either to exist, or to observe, or to be real?
2) Why do you call the incomprehensibility of God a "trick?" Are you asserting that Aquinas is some kind of closet atheist, and is merely positing the incomprehensibility of God to pull the wool over the eyes of his students and colleagues?
So Aquinas states that the incomprehensibility of G-d is given because, for one, to comprehend is to understand perfectly; for two, to understand perfectly is to understand a thing as well as it can be understood; and, for three, G-d is incomprehensible because is infinitely understandable, due to the “fact” that G-d's incomprehensibility is rooted in a part of this entity that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding. Incomprehensibility, according to Aquinas, is caused because G-d cannot be seen as perfectly as intrinsically he is visible, whilst in the beatific vision incomprehensibility results from its fullness which overwhelms the finite intellect. Aquinas roots G-d’s incomprehensibility in God's unlimited ability to be comprehended, and on the other hand he claims that, if God's incomprehensibility resulted merely from an ontological disproportion, then the final happiness of the human person would not be achievable. Of course, according to Aquinas, if G-d were ultimately comprehensible in the beatific vision, the human subjectivity in comprehending the entity would transcend G-d.
This appears to come at least partly from James L. Frederick's article "The incomprehensibility of God: a Buddhist reading of Aquinas," which appears to me to be a misreading 🙂.
Fredericks paraphrases three statements from Aquinas's Commentary on John as follows: "(1) God's incomprehensibility is the result of an ontological disproportion between the finitude of the created intellect and the infinity of God; (2) God remains incomprehensible even in the beatific vision; and yet (3) the human person's final happiness in the immediate vision of God must be affirmed as a revealed doctrine of faith." He then goes on to claim a contradiction derived from them: "On the one hand, if God's incomprehensibility resulted merely from an ontological disproportion (statement 1), then the final happiness of the human person would not be achievable (a violation of statement 3)," but reading both the relevant parts of the Commentary on John and the Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 12, Article 7, there is clearly no contradiction between the incomprehensibility of God in the beatific vision and the "final happiness of the human person" in the knowledge of God. It's simply that the Beatific Vision is as complete a vision of God as the created intellect is capable of. There's no "overwhelming" of the finite intellect; in Heaven each intellect knows God to its utmost capacity, and is thus completely satisfied, as it could be by no one else. And yet only God can comprehend Himself: "... we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known."
I'll spare you (and myself) all the cutting-and-pasting from the works cited, but here are links to online versions if you're interested:
Commentary on John: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/John1.htm (scroll down to Lecture 11)
Summa Theologica: http://newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm#article7
This way, Aquinas speaks of the incomprehensible G-d as the infinitely understandable God; and he feels quite comfortable, probably because he thinks he is not obliged to explain how exactly and by what means “the part of G-d that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding” became an epistemic object.
Why should he feel obliged to explain what he says can't be explained, especially since he didn't contradict himself? You might as well challenge somebody who says "Aleph-null exists" to count to it.
And that quote is fron Fredericks, not Aquinas; the latter would never speak of any "part of God." Another indication of faulty understanding of Aquinas on Mr. Fredericks's part.
But all this jazz is not justified, because Aquinas merely accepts blindly as existent an “epistemic object” (G-d) out of the blue (“blue”, over here, are the so called Holy Scripture and everything else that the beleiver has to accept blindly because it comes from an authoritative agent, because it is supposed to be the Word of G-d). Aquinas does not have a honest way to establish the existence of his G-d by means of using his mind, he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma and then he is using it as the cornerstone on which his Summa is constructed.
But no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
😵
Hmm. Somebody misreads Aquinas (surprise, surprise) and thinks he's caught him out, and then goes on an atheistic "blue" streak of name-calling and accusations of dishonesty. Very rational. 🙂
(But thanks for making me get off my duff and do a little thinking this weekend 🙂 )