What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).
For theists out there, I am interested to know which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there are those who would deny the move from (8) to (9) and why.
------
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
2. Our world contains animals that die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children who undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer.
3. An omnipotent being could prevent such events, if he knew that those events were about to occur.
4. An omniscient being would know that such events were about to occur.
5. If a being allows something to take place that he knows is about to happen, and which he knows he could prevent, then that being intentionally allows the event in question to occur.
Therefore:
6. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are cases where he intentionally allows animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer.
7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.
Therefore:
8. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases of such a being's intentionally allowing animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, that have wrongmaking properties such that there are no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of that both apply to the cases in question, and that are also sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristics.
Therefore it is likely that:
9. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases of such a being's intentionally allowing animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, that have wrongmaking properties such that there are no rightmaking characteristics—including ones that we are not aware of—that both apply to the cases in question, and that are also sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristics.
10. An action is morally wrong, all things considered, if it has a wrongmaking characteristic that is not counterbalanced by any rightmaking characteristics.
Therefore:
11. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases of such a being's intentionally allowing animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, that are morally wrong, all things considered.
Therefore:
12. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then that being both intentionally refrains from performing certain actions in situations where it is morally wrong to do so, all things considered, and knows that he is doing so.
13. A being who intentionally refrains from performing certain actions in situations where it is morally wrong to do so, all things considered, and knows that he is doing so, is not morally perfect.
Therefore:
14. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then that being is not morally perfect.
Therefore:
15. There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
16. If God exists, then he is, by definition, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
Therefore:
17. God does not exist.
Originally posted by LemonJelloAll the ramifications of what death entails are not fully understood by humans. So the argument is flawed from #1.
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).
For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]
Originally posted by Rajk999Even if it is true (which I am sure it probably is), how exactly would "All the ramifications of what death entails are not fully understood by humans" justify rejection of premise 1? That does not follow at all....
All the ramifications of what death entails are not fully understood by humans. So the argument is flawed from #1.
Originally posted by LemonJelloYou are viewing death [as we know it] as something bad and evil so if a morally responsible omnipotent being exists then he must want to do something about the death and suffering. However if death was a desirable outcome [a possibility if some of the Bible is to be believed] of all life then the whole argument would fail.
Even if it is true (which I am sure it probably is), how exactly would "All the ramifications of what death entails are not fully understood by humans" justify rejection of premise 1? That does not follow at all....
Originally posted by LemonJelloWhy not go directly to Copy & Paste: "17. God does not exist."
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).
For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]
If true, accept it and move on; if false, consider expanding the truth search
beyond the confines of "http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/."
Originally posted by Rajk999So which premise(s) are you rejecting?
You are viewing death [as we know it] as something bad and evil so if a morally responsible omnipotent being exists then he must want to do something about the death and suffering. However if death was a desirable outcome [a possibility if some of the Bible is to be believed] of all life then the whole argument would fail.
Originally posted by Grampy BobbyBecause 17 is simply the conclusion of the argument, not the argument itself. Duh....
Why not go directly to Copy & Paste: "17. God does not exist."
If true, accept it and move on; if false, consider expanding the truth search
beyond the confines of "http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/."
Originally posted by Grampy BobbyFeel free to actually contribute something here...
Plato's convincing though dreary presentation of the arguments resulted in a sidebar acceptance the conclusion.
If there's a premise somewhere in there that you disagree with, then that would be good for discussion....
- Joined
- 29 Dec 08
- Moves
- 6788
Originally posted by LemonJelloThe inductive step seems to be from 7's
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).
For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]
"no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of"
which is part of 8
to 9's
"there are no rightmaking characteristics—including ones that we are not aware of"
IOW it seems to assume that because there are no RC's that we are aware of (or can conceive of) we can justifiably induce that there are no RC's.
Do I have it?
Originally posted by JS357Yeah, that's the basic gist of the crux of the argument (or what many would take to be the crux of this argument). Although others may have various other objections against the argument as well.
The inductive step seems to be from 7's
"no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of"
which is part of 8
to 9's
"there are no rightmaking characteristics—including ones that we are not aware of"
IOW it seems to assume that because there are no RC's that we are aware of (or can conceive of) we can justifiably induce that there are no RC's.
Do I have it?
So, yeah, I am interested in what you and others make of this inductive move and whether you think it is successful or not. The article in the link I provided has quite a bit of discussion regarding the move from 8 to 9 as well.