24 Feb '15 19:52>7 edits
It has been established previously (by some pretty talented logicians) that omnipotence is logically compatible with libertarian freewill subject to all parties agreeing not that
1) Necessarily, God knows P (precluding ¬P)
but that instead
2) Necessarily, if P then God knows P.
This does make uneasy sense Reveal Hidden Content
how can it be established they are referring to convention (2)?
To me the proposition that prior to even instantiating a timeline T where X can have truth values, he knows everything about every possible truth value of X seems to render absurd (or better moot) any notion of "if X ...". Indeed X has a known and invariant truth value at every point on T.
To me the suggestion in (3) suggests only (1). How am I mistaken?
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Sorry about the rubbish title - not allowed to change it (and I suspect it could be refactored to have half its length and twice the legibility)
1) Necessarily, God knows P (precluding ¬P)
but that instead
2) Necessarily, if P then God knows P.
This does make uneasy sense Reveal Hidden Content
I suppose we can imagine some god sitting back on an orthogonal timeline free to fast-forward or rewind our own, and observe what we do (such that from our perspective he always knows))
but when a theist turns round and tells us something like:
3) "God knew what we would choose to do before he created the universe"
how can it be established they are referring to convention (2)?
To me the proposition that prior to even instantiating a timeline T where X can have truth values, he knows everything about every possible truth value of X seems to render absurd (or better moot) any notion of "if X ...". Indeed X has a known and invariant truth value at every point on T.
To me the suggestion in (3) suggests only (1). How am I mistaken?
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Sorry about the rubbish title - not allowed to change it (and I suspect it could be refactored to have half its length and twice the legibility)